Suchergebnisse

The 'dilemmas' between multilingualism in theory and English as a lingua franca in practice concern the post-Bologna European higher education as a whole. The article presents the case of Slovenia by furthering the analysis of similar quandaries present in the Slovenian (higher education) language policy. The state of affairs is addressed by acknowledging the status of Slovenian as the official language of the Republic of Slovenia, as well as the need for a greater inclusion of foreign students and teachers and for further enhancement of the quality of higher education. The results of surveys conducted among the most important stakeholders in the Slovenian higher education in October 2012, with the aim of researching the viewpoints on the use of languages of instruction in higher education, are presented. The results were analysed with a view to the expressed standpoint on language use in higher education, which led to the formation of three opinion groups within the sample of students and university teachers of the University of Ljubljana. Based on the analysis of accessible sources, discussions, opinions, surveys and interviews some recommendations on the regulation of language use in higher education in Slovenia are provided. ; "Nedoumice" između višejezičnosti u teoriji i engleskoga kao lingue france u praksi tiču se poslijebolonjskoga europskoga visokog obrazovanja u cjelini. Ovaj rad prikazuje primjer Slovenije putem analize sličnih izazova prisutnih u slovenskoj (visokoobrazovnoj) jezičnoj politici. Stanje se stvari sagledava s aspekta prihvaćanja statusa slovenskoga jezika kao službenoga jezika Republike Slovenije, kao i prihvaćanja potrebe za većom uključenosti stranih studenata i nastavnika i daljnjeg unapređenja kvalitete visokoga obrazovanja. U radu se predstavljaju rezultati ispitivanja koja su provedena u listopadu 2012. godine među najvažnijim dionicima slovenskoga visokog obrazovanja s ciljem istraživanja stajališta o uporabi jezika poučavanja u visokome obrazovanje. Rezultati su analizirani s pogledom na izraženo stajalište u vezi s uporabom jezika u visokome obrazovanju, što je dovelo do uspostavljanja triju skupina mišljenja unutar uzorka studenata i nastavnika Sveučilišta u Ljubljani. Na temelju analize dostupnih izvora, rasprava, mišljenja, ispitivanja i intervjua donose se određene preporuke o regulaciji uporabe jezika u visokome obrazovanju u Sloveniji.

Jedan od praktično i teorijski najvažnijih problema teritorijalne organizacije lokalne samouprave svodi se na dilemu uspostave jednog stupnja ili više stupnjeva lokalnih samoupravnih jedinica. Stupnjevanjem se odgovara na problem i potrebu integracije sustava lokalne samouprave te na potrebu povezivanja tog sustava sa širom državnom organizacijom. Nakon opće rasprave o prednostima i nedostacima stupnjevanja, opsežno je komparativno analizirano stanje u 39 zemalja, 23 razvijene i 16 tranzicijskih. Ustanovljena su četiri tipa teritorijalnih okvira za integraciju sustava lokalne samouprave, jednostupanjski, mješoviti ili segmentirani, dvostupanjski i trostupanjski. Kao glavni faktori koji uvjetuju izbor jednog od tih okvira u pojedinoj zemlji utvrđeni su: veličina lokalnih jedinica, njihovo monotipsko ili politipsko uređenje, veličina države izražena brojem stanovnika te oblik društvenog uređenja (federacije, unitarne države). ; The dilemma about the establishment of one or more levels of local self-government units is one of the most important problems of territorial organisation of local self-government. Levelling is structural answer to the problem and needs to integrate local self-government system itself and to integrate that system into a wider organisation of a state as a whole. At the beginning, the paper deals with general discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of levelling. The situation in almost forty countries has been analysed, including two groups of countries: developed democracies (Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Island, Italia, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA) and transition countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Serbia). Four different types of territorial frames for local self-govern mentsystem integration have been identified: one-tier, mixed or segmented, two-tier, and three-tier systems. Decision to select one of them is conditioned by the average size of local units, monotypic or polytypic design of territorial division of a country, the size of a country in terms of the number of inhabitants, and form of political organisation (federation or unitary state).

Mixed government, which is commonly regarded as a distinctly medieval form of government, is relevant also to contemporary constitutional states. It is the best form of government, since the aristocratic element is a continuous source of virtue, especially of justice, & a check not only on the executive, as the monarchical element which is the seat of political power, & the legislature, as the democratic element which expresses the will of the majority, but also groups & institutions that have the might & will to impose themselves as oligarchies. Mixed government is also the form of government that is practiced by most developed contemporary constitutional states: US, UK, France, Switzerland, Germany, etc. European nobility is the original aristocratic institution, by virtue of the fact that it was a system for the transfer of both virtue & general conditions of life. Three institutions that emerged in the late Middle Ages assumed structures & functions of the nobility. The first is the clergy. When, as a result of the differentiation of feudal society ethical & intellectual virtues of the nobility could no longer maintain general conditions of life, the clergy, by virtue of their abstract knowledge that ranged from philosophy & theology to law & medicine, became a class of new experts in generalities & thereby a new aristocracy. The second modern aristocratic institution is the judiciary, which has a structure & function similar to earlier aristocracies. The task of judges is to establish the highest virtue of constitutionalism. It is justice by law, which regulates general conditions of life in the state & society. What qualifies judges for the task is expertise in the new generality. The expertise includes not only education & experience in law but also impeccable private life & demonstrated professional ethics. The third modern aristocratic institution is the profession, whose most important instance is the legal profession. It shares its structure & function partly with the judiciary & partly with other professions. It seems that modern professions are degenerating. In the key area of data processing, due to rapid changes of technology, professions as systems of the transfer of virtue do not even seem to be possible. Professional aristocracies are replaced increasingly by oligarchies of capitalists & technocrats. Adapted from the source document.

U radu se na temelju arhivskih izvora, stručne literature i onovremenoga tiska analizira povratak jugoslavenskih iseljenika iz Argentine i ostalih dijelova Južne Amerike u prvim godinama nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata. Prati se priprema, organizacija, brojnost, transport, dolazak, smještaj i razmještaj iseljenika u domovini. Analizira se i stručna, nacionalna i spolna pripadnost iseljenika povratnika. Posebna pozornost posvećena je odnosima dviju država, Jugoslavije i Argentine, u ovom pitanju. ; Diplomatic, consular and economic relations between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Argentina were established on 16 September 1946. The agreement was signed by General Ljubo Ilić, chief of the Yugoslav diplomatic mission in South America, and Juan Atilion Bramuglia, Argentinian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Religion. In the first decade after World War II, the two states had some open problems and unresolved issues such as the question of commercial agreements, Yugoslav political emigration in Argentina, especially the Ustasha movement, Argentine nationalised property in Yugoslavia, visas for entering Argentina etc. Following World War II, Argentina became the country with the most emigrants of Yugoslav origin in the entire Latin America. The major part of those were Croats and Slovenes, while emigrants from Montenegro and Serbia made up a smaller proportion. The issue of Yugoslav immigrants in Argentina was of the greatest importance in the relations between two countries. In the late 1940s, the interests of Yugoslavia and Argentina in this matter were opposed. Both sides wanted to use a qualified work force for building their own country. Yugoslavia tried to recruit immigrants to come back and take part in fulfilment of the Five-Year Plan established in 1947. Argentina on the other hand, wanted to keep able-bodied people for building its own industry. The Yugoslav government sent ships for immigrants and organised housing and jobs for them upon their return. The majority of them were construction, agriculture, and textile workers. The peak of the repatriation was 1948, when 83% of Yugoslav immigrants returned from Argentina. There was another problem, and that was the different treatment of immigrants with dual citizenship, which especially referred to the children of Yugoslav immigrants who were born on Argentine soil. According the law, they were Argentine citizens, but Yugoslav authorities still thought of them as their own. According to official data, of all the people to return in Yugoslavia in the 1946–51 period, a total of 1,748 arrived from Argentina, which was 10.84% of the total number of returning Yugoslav citizens. Only France was ahead of Argentina in this period in terms of numbers of returns, with 3,914, while Canada was behind, with 1,727.

Jedna od najznačajnijih obitelji hrvatsko-ugarske povijesti jest porodica Gorjanski (Garai). Podrijetlom je iz nekadašnjega sela Dorozsme, koje se danas nalazi u sastavu Szegeda, trećega po veličini mađarskoga grada. Selo je ime dobilo po rodu Drušini(Drušbi) iz kojega potječu Gorjanski. Utemeljitelj obitelji je Ivan Gorjanski koji je 1269. od hercega Bele dobio grad i utvrdu Gorjani (Gara) u tadašnjoj Vukovskoj županiji. Gorjanski su tijekom dva stoljeća zauzimali visoke državne položaje u Hrvatskoj i Ugarskoj te su uz Karla Khuen-Hedervaryja (bio je predsjednik središnje vlade u Budimpešti 1903. i 1910.–1912. godine te hrvatski ban od 1883. do 1903.) bili najviše pozicionirani državnici iz Hrvatske. Naime, oni su u tri uzastopna naraštaja nosili najviši dvorski naslov palatina (1375.-1385., 1402.–1433., 1447.–1458.), a i u njihovoj drugoj, tzv. "banskoj" lozi imali su važnu ulogu kao hrvatski i slavonski, odnosno mačvanski banovi. Najvažniju ulogu u obitelji imao je Nikola Gorjanski mlađi, šurjak i najbliži suradnik kralja Sigismunda (Žigmunda) Luksemburgovca, koji je bio kraljev zamjenik za njegovih čestih izbivanja iz zemlje, a obavljao je i najdelikatnije diplomatske zadaće u Njemačkoj, Francuskoj i Engleskoj. Za to je nagrađen ne samo golemim posjedima, nego i Redom zmaja i Redom rupca. ; One of the most notable families in Croatian-Hungarian history is the Gorjanski (Garai) family. The family hails from Dorozsma village of old, which is part of present-day Szeged, the third largest city in Hungary. The village was named after the clan of Drušina (Drušba), from which the Gorjanski family draws its lineage. The progenitor of the family was Ivan Gorjanski, who received the Gorjani (Gara) town and fortress in the Vukovska County from Duke Bela in 1269. For two centuries members of the Gorjanski family held high level court positions in Croatia and Hungary and were, along with Karoly Khuen-Héderváry (the president of the central government in Budapest in 1903 and 1910-1912 and the Croatian ban from 1883 to 1903), the most notable political figures from Croatia. Namely, they held the highest court title of palatine (1375 – 1385, 1402 – 1433, 1447 – 1458) throughout three successive generations, while their other so-called "banal/Bánfi" branch also had an important role as Croatian and Slavonian bans, as well as bans of Macsó. The most significant figure of the family was Nikola Gorjanski Junior, brother-in-law and closest associate of King Sigismund of Luxembourg, who stood in for the King during his frequent travels. He also performed the most delicate diplomatic duties in Germany, France and England, for which he was rewarded not only with huge estates, but also the Order of the Dragon and Order of the Scarf.

Ove se godine (2009.) slavi šezdeseta obljetnica postojanja i uspješnoga djelovanja Sjevernoatlantskoga saveza, poznatijega kao NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). NATO je međunarodna vojno-politička organizacija koja je osnovana 4. travnja 1949. potpisivanjem Sjevernoatlantskoga ugovora (Washingtonski ugovor) između dvanaest zemalja zapadnoga bloka (Belgija, Danska, Francuska, Italija, Island, Kanada, Luxemburg, Nizozemska, Norveška, Portugal, SAD i Velika Britanija). Na stvaranje NATO-a utjecali su sljedeći čimbenici: razilaženje protuhitlerovske koalicije zbog suprotnih ciljeva, stvaranje zemalja "narodne demokracije" pod sovjetskom dominacijom, Marshallov plan gospodarske pomoći Sjedinjenih Američkih Država razrušenoj Europi koji je odbio Sovjetski Savez, Trumanova doktrina iz 1947. godine koja je označila veće angažiranje SAD-a, politika SSSR-a pod Staljinovim predsjedanjem i sve veće "prijetnje komunizma i socijalističkih zemalja". Sjevernoatlantski ugovor počiva na četrnaest članaka, a prema petomu članku "strane su suglasne da će se oružani napad na jednu ili više zemalja Saveza smatrati napadom na sve njih". Sjedište je NATO-a u Bruxellesu, službeni su jezici engleski i francuski, a aktualni glavni tajnik jest Anders Fogh Rasmmunsen. Savez funkcionira u skladu s načelima međuvladine suradnje, a odluke se donose pristankom svih zemalja članica (28 zemalja). Misija NATO-a u BiH od 1992. do 1995. godine bila je najopsežnija u povijesti Saveza. U njoj je zabilježeno i prvo oružano djelovanje ove organizacije. Danas je NATO ne samo vojna nego i politička organizacija. ; The sixtieth anniversary of existence and successful functioning of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, more famous as NATO is celebrated in this year (2009). NATO is international military-political organization established on April 4, 1949 by signing North Atlantic Treaty (Washington Treaty) between twelve countries of the Western block (Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Iceland, Canada, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, USA and Great Britain). Following factors influenced on establishment of NATO: separation of anti-Hitler coalition because of opposing goals, development of "national democracy" countries under Soviet domination, Marshall's plan of the USA help to demolished Europe, which was rejected by the Soviet Union, Truman's doctrine from 1947 which marked greater engagement of USA, politics of U.S.S.R. under Stalin's presiding and bigger "threats of communism and socialist countries". North Atlantic Treaty is based on fourteen articles, and according to the fifth article "the parties agreed that an armed attack against one or more of the organization members shall be considered as an attack against them all". The NATO headquarters are in Brussels, official languages are English and French and Anders Fogh Rasmmunsen is the current Secretary General. The alliance functions in accordance with the principles of intergovernmental cooperation and decisions are made by common consent of all members (28 countries). NATO mission in B&H from 1992 to 1995 was the most extensive in the history of Alliance. The first military action of this organization took place during this mission. Today NATO is not only military, but also political organization.

Pojam "centralizacije" počeo se koristiti u Francuskoj krajem 18. stoljeća kada je nakon revolucije stvorena nova struktura vlade. Pojam "decentralizacije" u upotrebu je ušao početkom 19. stoljeća. Ideje slobode i decentralizacije provodili su tijekom 19. i 20. stoljeća protudrţavni politički aktivisti koji su sebe nazivali "anarhistima", "libertarijancima", pa čak i decentralistima. Tocqueville, jedan od zagovornika decentralizacije je istaknuo da decentralizacija ima ne samo administrativnu vrijednost već i graĎansku dimenziju, jer povećava mogućnosti za graĎane da se zainteresiraju za javne poslove. I od akumulacije tih lokalnih, aktivnih, pronicljivih sloboda, raĎa se najučinkovitija protuteţa središnjoj vladi, čak i ako bi bila podrţavana od neosobne, kolektivne volje. Veliki broj zemalja u razvoju i tranzicijskih zemalja započeo je neki oblik programa decentralizacije. Taj je trend povezan sa sve većim zanimanjem za ulogu civilnog društva i privatnog sektora kao partnera vladama u traţenju novih načina pruţanja usluga. Decentralizacija upravljanja i jačanje kapaciteta lokalne uprave dijelom je i funkcija širih društvenih trendova, što uključuje, na primjer, općenito rastuće nepovjerenje u vladu, propast nekih od najcentraliziranijih reţima na svijetu (npr. Sovjetskog Saveza) i novonastale separatističke zahtjeve koji se rutinski pojavljuju u pojedinim dijelovima svijeta. Pokret prema lokalnoj odgovornosti i većoj kontroli nad nečijom sudbinom nije, meĎutim, rezultat samo negativnog stava prema središnjoj vladi. Umjesto toga, ovaj razvoj dogaĎaja uglavnom je potaknut snaţnom ţeljom za većim sudjelovanjem graĎana i organizacije privatnog sektora u funkciji upravljanja. ; The term "centralization" began to be used in France in the late 18th century when, after the revolution, a new government structure was created. The term "decentralization" came into use in the early 19th century. The ideas of freedom and decentralization were implemented during the 19th and 20th centuries by anti-state political activists who called themselves "anarchists," "libertarians," and even decentralizers. Tocqueville, one of the proponents of decentralization, pointed out that decentralization has not only an administrative value but also a civic dimension, as it increases opportunities for citizens to take interest in public affairs. And from the accumulation of these local, active, insightful freedoms, the most effective counterbalance to central government is born, even if it were supported by an impersonal, collective will. A large number of developing and transition countries have embarked on some form of decentralization program. This trend is linked to the growing interest in the role of civil society and the private sector as partners to governments in seeking new ways of providing services. Decentralization of governance and strengthening the capacity of local government is partly a function of broader social trends, which include, for example, growing distrust of government, the collapse of some of the world's most centralized regimes (eg the Soviet Union) and emerging separatist demands that routinely emerge in some parts of the world. The movement towards local responsibility and greater control over one's destiny is not, however, the result of only a negative attitude towards the central government. Instead, this development is largely driven by a strong desire for greater citizen participation and private sector organization in the governance function.

Biografija Bartolomea Zabarelle slična je biografijama mnogih njegovih vršnjaka iz uglednih padovanskih obitelji. Kao nećak utjecajnoga kardinala i uglednoga profesora na drugome najstarijemu talijanskom Sveučilištu, od rane je mladosti uključen u važna društvena i politička događanja svoga rodnoga grada. Nakon završenoga studija prava, poput mnogih svojih vršnjaka pripremao se za crkvenu karijeru. Poticaji za odlazak u Rim došli su pred kraj pontifikata pape Martina V., iz rimske plemićke obitelji Colonna. Međutim, vrhunac karijere dostigao je obavljajući razne kurijalne službe tijekom pontifikata Eugena IV., Mlečanina Gabriela Condulmera. Novopronađeni i neobjavljeni izvori iz nekoliko serija registara Vatikanskoga tajnog arhiva, međusobno isprepleteni s objavljenim dokumentima iz padovanskoga kruga, osvjetljavaju neke ključne trenutke ove uspješne kurijalne karijere između Rima i Firence, a ukazuju i na rijetke i sporadične veze sa Splitom. ; Biography of Bartholomeo Zabarella (1400-1445) is similar to the biographies of many young men, offsprings of influential Paduan families in the early decades of the fifteenth century. He was a nephew to Francesco Zabarella, one of the most famous professors of canon law at the University of Padua, well trained diplomat in the service of the Carrara family, and the cardinal of the Holy See. His career path was therefore well programmed: with the doctor in utroque degree he embraced the ecclesiastical career within the Curia of Martin V (Colonna) and Eugenius IV (Condulmer). Starting from the office of apostolic protonotary in 1418, in the late twenties, at the age of 28, he was appointed archbishop of Split. However, he continued to reside in the Roman residence of the Patriarch of Constantinople and pope Gregory XII, Angelo Correr. By the end of 1432 he was assumed to the college of referendarii utriusque signaturae, and on 21 June 1434 he became auditor litterarum contradictarum which made him work in close contact with the cardinals Francesco Condulmer and Giordano Orsini, patriarch of Grado Biagio Molino, bishop of Cervia/Rimini Cristoforo Marcello, bishop of Concordia Daniele Scoti, bishop of Poreč and Trogir Angelo Cavazza, and the pope himself, both in Rome and in Florence during the 1430s. In the course of his busy curial career he witnessed important historical events such as the consecration of the Florentine cathedral Santa Maria del Fiore on 25 March 1436, or the Union of Latin and Greek Churches on 6 July 1439 in Florence. Bartholomeo's fidelity to the pope in the most difficult period of his pontificate, was rewarded with the appointment to the archbishopric of Florence at the end of 1439, followed by that of apostolic legate to France and England. Both of these offices would have led him to the cardinalate, had he not died in Sutri on 13 August 1445. He certainly showed considerable ability as he shrewdly balanced within two important, complex and complicated networks that animated his affairs. One was the University of Padua, led by teachers and students: a degree in canon and both laws could launch them to the successful Curial career. The other network was Roman Curia, delineated by the relationships internal to the Church hierarcy and personal favouritism.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.

Na temelju građe nekoliko fondova Arhiva Jugoslavije i dostupne dokumentacije međunarodnih institucija zaduženih za kontrolu opijumske proizvodnje i prometa, ovaj rad rekonstruira malo poznate aspekte američko-jugoslavenskih odnosa tijekom 1930-ih koji prelaze domenu privredne suradnje. U tekstu je rekonstruirano nekoliko faza izvoza kvalitetnoga jugoslavenskoga (makedonskoga) sirovog opijuma američkim farmaceutskim kompanijama: od 1929. do 1934., kada su gotovo čitavu godišnju proizvodnju otkupljivale američke tvornice, preko perioda poslovanja tursko-jugoslavenskoga Centralnog biroa obilježenog međusobnim opstrukcijama i rivalstvom na američkom tržištu, pa do faze kada je stupanj ilegalne prerade i krijumčarenja droge u Jugoslaviji ugrozio odnose sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama uoči izbijanja Drugoga svjetskog rata. ; Due to its large morphine content, Yugoslav medical opium was an exception-ally sought-after pharmaceutical raw material, and therefore exported to leading processing plants in Germany, Switzerland, and France till 1928, when American plants began buying up almost the entire production. After 1932, yearly production of raw opium in Yugoslavia stabilised at 35-48 tons, with 99% of the production being absorbed by the American pharmaceutical companies Merck & Co. and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, at prices significantly greater than those in Europe. However, the enthusiasm about exporting the entire yearly opium production to the USA was put into question in early 1934, when the Turkish-Yugoslav Central Bureau for raw opium export began operating in Istanbul. It comprised representatives of the Turkish Opium Export Institute and the Yugoslav Opium Export Institute (Jugoslovenski zavod za izvoz opijuma – JUZOP). The Yugoslav participation quota of 23-26% hindered the previous level of export to America, which generated resistance towards further cooperation with Turkey in Belgrade. Thus, disputes about placing opium on the American market led to a short-lived blockade of Yugoslav opium import, while the appearance of cheap Iranian opium in Europe further emboldened the Turkish side in the Central Bureau to compensate its loss of the European market by obstructing its Yugoslav partners in dealing with American plants. Apart from this, the debts of the American Eli Lilly plant towards the JUZOP on the day of the Central Bureau's liquidation in late June 1941 further contributed towards the impression that Yugoslavia was actually suffering a loss by exporting opium in collaboration with Turkey. According to official Ministry of Agriculture data, a total of 688 tons of raw opium worth 386 million dinars were exported from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1927–1939 period. On a yearly level, this amounted to an average of 42 tons of opium worth 29 million dinars, which equalled, for example, the average yearly budget revenue of the entire Vardar Banate (province). Since yearly opium smuggling in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia stood at around 8-10 tons of opium, one can conclude that almost a quarter of the legal production actually ended up in illegal trafficking. If the smuggling of processed opium derivates (morphine, heroin, codeine) to the USA is added to these figures, and if one keeps in mind the links of the Belgrade and Skopje smuggling organisations with leading European networks for drug trafficking across the Atlantic (Eliopoulos, Bacula, Raskin), then the increased interest of the League of Nations and American diplomacy for the situation in Yugoslavia from late 1937 becomes more understandable. The direct pressure of the American embassy in Paris, which operated a "service" for tracking narcotics smuggling, influenced the Yugoslav authorities to enact harsher laws and at least temporarily reign in the increasingly aggressive criminalisation of a formerly perspective branch of agriculture.

Na temelju građe nekoliko fondova Arhiva Jugoslavije i dostupne dokumentacije međunarodnih institucija zaduženih za kontrolu opijumske proizvodnje i prometa, ovaj rad rekonstruira malo poznate aspekte američko-jugoslavenskih odnosa tijekom 1930-ih koji prelaze domenu privredne suradnje. U tekstu je rekonstruirano nekoliko faza izvoza kvalitetnoga jugoslavenskoga (makedonskoga) sirovog opijuma američkim farmaceutskim kompanijama: od 1929. do 1934., kada su gotovo čitavu godišnju proizvodnju otkupljivale američke tvornice, preko perioda poslovanja tursko-jugoslavenskoga Centralnog biroa obilježenog međusobnim opstrukcijama i rivalstvom na američkom tržištu, pa do faze kada je stupanj ilegalne prerade i krijumčarenja droge u Jugoslaviji ugrozio odnose sa Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama uoči izbijanja Drugoga svjetskog rata. ; Due to its large morphine content, Yugoslav medical opium was an exception-ally sought-after pharmaceutical raw material, and therefore exported to leading processing plants in Germany, Switzerland, and France till 1928, when American plants began buying up almost the entire production. After 1932, yearly production of raw opium in Yugoslavia stabilised at 35-48 tons, with 99% of the production being absorbed by the American pharmaceutical companies Merck & Co. and Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, at prices significantly greater than those in Europe. However, the enthusiasm about exporting the entire yearly opium production to the USA was put into question in early 1934, when the Turkish-Yugoslav Central Bureau for raw opium export began operating in Istanbul. It comprised representatives of the Turkish Opium Export Institute and the Yugoslav Opium Export Institute (Jugoslovenski zavod za izvoz opijuma – JUZOP). The Yugoslav participation quota of 23-26% hindered the previous level of export to America, which generated resistance towards further cooperation with Turkey in Belgrade. Thus, disputes about placing opium on the American market led to a short-lived blockade of Yugoslav opium import, while the appearance of cheap Iranian opium in Europe further emboldened the Turkish side in the Central Bureau to compensate its loss of the European market by obstructing its Yugoslav partners in dealing with American plants. Apart from this, the debts of the American Eli Lilly plant towards the JUZOP on the day of the Central Bureau's liquidation in late June 1941 further contributed towards the impression that Yugoslavia was actually suffering a loss by exporting opium in collaboration with Turkey. According to official Ministry of Agriculture data, a total of 688 tons of raw opium worth 386 million dinars were exported from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1927–1939 period. On a yearly level, this amounted to an average of 42 tons of opium worth 29 million dinars, which equalled, for example, the average yearly budget revenue of the entire Vardar Banate (province). Since yearly opium smuggling in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia stood at around 8-10 tons of opium, one can conclude that almost a quarter of the legal production actually ended up in illegal trafficking. If the smuggling of processed opium derivates (morphine, heroin, codeine) to the USA is added to these figures, and if one keeps in mind the links of the Belgrade and Skopje smuggling organisations with leading European networks for drug trafficking across the Atlantic (Eliopoulos, Bacula, Raskin), then the increased interest of the League of Nations and American diplomacy for the situation in Yugoslavia from late 1937 becomes more understandable. The direct pressure of the American embassy in Paris, which operated a "service" for tracking narcotics smuggling, influenced the Yugoslav authorities to enact harsher laws and at least temporarily reign in the increasingly aggressive criminalisation of a formerly perspective branch of agriculture.

U prilogu se objavljuju i u povijesno umjetnički kontekst stavljaju dva srebrna zidna svijećnjaka s poprsjima antičkih figura uokvirenih prepletima stiliziranog akantusovog lišća, a koji se čuvaju u franjevačkom su samostanu na Trsatu. Posljednji su put svijećnjaci snimljeni prilikom fotodokumentacijske kampanje Artura Schneidera tijekom četvrtog desetljeća 20. stoljeća, a 1974. godine su registrirani kao kulturno dobro u sklopu inventara franjevačkog samostana. Riječ je o vrijednom kompletu srebrnih zidnih svijećnjaka koje je 1693. godine trsatskom samostanu darovao car Svetog rimskog carstva njemačkoga naroda Leopold I. Habsburg (1658.-1705.). U radu se donose izvori kojima se potvrđuje naručitelj svijećnjaka te se analizira nastanak njihove specifične tipologije. Oni se prema načinu oblikovanja i ikonografskoj shemi, a putem sličnih komparativnih primjera, kao i grafičkih predložaka, smještaju u augsburški zlatarski krug. Teza se potvrđuje i zlatarskim žigom grada Augsburga te drugim utisnutim žigom koji upućuje na zlatara Antonija Grilla I., dokumentiranog u tom umjetničkom centru od 1668. do 1700. godine. ; The sanctuary of Our Lady of Trsat is a pilgrimage centre in the northern Adriatic visited for centuries by pilgrims and dignitaries, who brought various artefacts in fulfilment of their vows. Most of the oldest votive objects are today exhibited at the convent's treasury, but the two silver wall candelabra in question remain deposited in the convent's storage. They were first mentioned by Bishop Juraj Franjo Ksaver Marotti in 1710, who wrote that they had been donated to the convent in 1693 by the Emperor Leopold I (1658-1705). Petar Francetić and Klaro Pasconi corroborated this information, and late in the 19th century Julije Janković mentioned that they were standing on marble columns at the main church altar. In the early 20th century, the candelabra were briefly described by Riccardo Gigante, Gjuro Szabo, Apolinar Braničković, and Artur Schneider, but a scholarly study establishing the true value of these precious artefacts was still missing. The candelabra of Trsat used to hang on the wall like paintings, but today they are lacking the holders with candle plates. At their centre, formed of stylized fleshy acanthus leaves made of silver, there are shell-like cavities with applique silver busts of a Roman emperor and a young warrior wearing a helmet. The edge of the cavity under the busts is decorated with an embossed masqueron resembling a lion's head, placed between the curving volutes. By donating the candelabra to the Franciscans of Trsat, Emperor Leopold I. made a political gesture and also continued the tradition started by his predecessor Charles V (1519-1556), who had donated a golden pendulum in the shape of a two-headed eagle decorated with gems in 1536 as a symbol of Pietas Austriaca practiced by members of the Habsburg family from the first half of the 17th century onwards. Candelabra of this type were mostly produced for the private chambers or lavish salons of noble families and similar examples made of various materials are found in museum collections all over Germany and France. Even though the candelabra were intended for religious space, Emperor Leopold I was probably guided in their commission by the idea of expressing his power by iconographically relating himself to the mythology and history of ancient Rome. Thus, the figure of Emperor Augustus should most probably represent the emperor himself, while the young Roman warrior was to impersonate his son Joseph, who was to inherit the imperial throne. Hallmarks have been identified on the candelabra that had previously gone unnoticed and that positively relate them to a particular goldsmith's workshop in Augsburg. One of them has the form of a stylized pinecone, while the other shows a stork with a fish in its beak. This was the hallmark of Antoni Grill I, documented in Augsburg as a master from 1668 until his death in 1700. Even though he stemmed from a family of goldsmiths, whose members had been producing imaginative artefacts for European courts since the mid-16th century, his own identified works are preserved only in a few museums and private collections. Most of them are gilded silver plates with carefully elaborated compositions that reveal great skill in embossing motifs in various depths and their even distribution over the plate surface. The same feature is evident in the candelabra of Trsat. Grill's models possibly included drawings by graphic artists Jakob Wilhelm (Augsburg, documented since 1694-1738) and Leonhard Heckenauer (b. ca. 1655 in Augsburg, d. 1704 in Munich), who likewise belonged to the Augsburg circle of artists. Their maps contain several examples of wall candelabra, with complex compositions and a choice of decorative motifs that bear some similarities with the Trsat ones. Compared to other known examples, the candelabra of Trsat may be considered among the first cases of this typology in the goldsmith circle of Augsburg, and considering their provenance and the importance of their imperial donor, they are certainly special items in the rich heritage of artefacts made of precious metals preserved in the church treasuries of the eastern Adriatic.

Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.

Riječ uredništvaPrije nekoliko godina u jednom dvobroju Šumarskog lista pojasnili smo zadaću ove rubrike. Naglasili smo da ona nije zamišljena da podučava šumarske stručnjake o šumarstvu (struku su učili na Fakultetu), nego da podsjetimo na aktualnosti koje se događaju u šumi i šumarskoj struci. Navodeći činjenice, nastojimo pomoći da šumarska praksa, pa i znanost, lakše zauzme stav o pojedinom aktualnom stručnom problemu ili događanjima kako bi štitila šumu i struku. Stoga, osvrnimo se na prošlogodišnje rubrike koje nam ukazuju na probleme koji nas očekuju.U dvobroju 1-2/2021. najavili smo cjelogodišnje obilježavanje 175-e obljetnice osnivanja Hrvatskoga šumarskog društva (1846. g.) i 145-e obljetnice (1877. g) tiskanja znanstveno-stručnog i staleškog glasila Šumarskog lista. Naveli smo kako je Hrvatsko šumarsko društvo, uz ostalo, ostvarilo svoja dva glavna cilja: uvođenje više šumarske nastave u Hrvatskoj osnivanjem Gospodarsko-šumarskog učilišta u Križevcima 1860. godine, a potom Šumarske akademije (danas Šumarski fakultet) 1898. godine kao četvrte visokoškolske ustanove Zagrebačkog sveučilišta. Tiskanjem prvoga broja svojega glasila, Šumarskog lista 1. siječnja 1877. godine, ostvaren je i drugi cilj. Posebno smo istaknuli kako je već tada usvojeno mišljenje da je za gospodarenje šumskim ekosustavima potrebno visokoškolsko obrazovanje. Upitali smo se kakva je danas situacija sa šumarskom strukom? Zaključili smo: nikakva – svi znaju sve o šumi, a nisu niti "primirisali" šumarsko obrazovanje bilo kojega ranga. Skrenuli smo pozornost na netržišno gospodarenje šumskim resursima, posebice najvrjednijima, kada izvozom drvne sirovine, a ne drvoprerađivačkih proizvoda izvozimo radna mjesta i obezvrjeđujemo dugogodišnji trud šumarskih stručnjaka.U dvobroju 3-4/2021. raspravljali smo na temu teksta Thomasa Waitza, zastupnika Zelenih u EU, objavljenog pod bombastičnim naslovom "Novo izvješće o krčenju šuma u Hrvatskoj", na kojega su se odmah "zalijepili" naši Zeleni. Nakon više od 250 godina gospodarenja našim šumama po načelu potrajnog gospodarenja, ovaj naslov je uvreda hrvatskim stručnjacima. Osim toga, ovo je poistovjećivanje pojmova krčenja i kontrolirane sječe šuma, što je očiti primjer neznanja, bolje rečeno amaterizma koji danas preplavljuje ne samo šumarsku nego i druge struke. Svakako preporučamo opetovano pročitati ovu Riječ Uredništva, kako bi imali jaču podlogu za eventualnu raspravu o odnosnoj temi.U dvobroju 5-6/2021. rubriku smo posvetili "Odlasku čovjeka koji je život posvetio šumi i šumarstvu". Bez obzira na njegov životni put opširno prikazan u rubrici In memoriam, osvrnuli smo se kratko na najvažnije dijelove toga životnog puta, zaključujući: "Odlaskom profesora Matića završilo je jedno razdoblje, koje će nama suvremenicima ostati u sjećanju kao nezaboravno iskustvo, plemenitog, šumarskog načina života i zajedništva, a koje je rezultiralo njegovanim i očuvanim šumama. Hoće li novi trendovi koji su sve izraženiji u današnjem šumarstvu, a prema kojima su šumarski stručnjaci sve manje povezani sa šumom, ali i međusobno, uspjeti odgovoriti na nove izazove, posebice u okolnostima sve izraženijih klimatskih promjena, tek je za vidjeti."U dvobroju 7-8/2021. uz temu: Tko je kriv za loše poslovanje drvoprerađivača? navodimo tekst Europskoga šumarskog instituta i Svjetske banke pod naslovom "Pregled i preporuka za sustav prodaje drvne sirovine Hrvatskih šuma". Čitamo da se kod nas 93 % drvnih proizvoda prodaje administrativno na temelju dugoročnih ugovora, a tržišno samo 5 % (Poljska 89-90 %, Češka 96 %, a Estonija i Francuska približno 100 % tržišno). Hrvatska prodaje drvnu sirovinu po 20-30 % nižoj cijeni u usporedbi s europskim cijenama i cijenama u susjednim zemljama, što čini gubitak od oko 316 milijuna kuna godišnje (hrast 163 milijuna kn, bukva 105 milijuna kn, smreka i jela 48 milijuna kn). S obzirom na gospodarenje po načelu potrajnosti te na kvalitetu i prirodnost naših šuma (čime je osiguran i FSC certifikat – od čega najveći benefit ubiru upravo drvoprerađivači), mišljenja smo da je gubitak i veći.Što donosi nova EU strategija za šume do 2030. tema je dvobroja 9-10/2021. Smatra se ključnim za ostvarivanje ciljeva Europskoga zelenog plana, smanjenje emisija stakleničkih plinova za najmanje 55 % do 2030. i klimatske neutralnosti do 2050. godine. Pomaže i ispunjavanje ciljeva EU-a za povećanje uklanjanja CO2 prirodnim ponorima prema Zakonu o klimi. Strategijom se šumi, šumarima i sektoru koji se temelji na šumi daje središnja uloga u ostvarivanju tih ciljeva. Uz njihovu pomoć očekuje se europski prelazak na moderno, klimatski neutralno, resursno učinkovito i konkurentno gospodarstvo.U dvobroju 11-12/2021. pokušali smo sažeti nazovimo prognoze "Što nam donosi Glazgovska klimatska konferencija". U sklopu potpisane Deklaracije o korištenju šuma i zemljišta, koju je do sada podržalo preko 140 država u kojima se nalazi više od 90% svjetskih šuma, čelnici zemalja obvezali su se zajednički raditi na zaustavljanju i preokretanju gubitka šuma i degradacije zemljišta do 2030. godine. Glavni cilj konferencije odnosio se na ograničavanje povišenja globalne prosječne temperature na razinu koja je znatno niža od 2°C iznad razine u predindustrijskom razdoblju. Ovdje nas zabrinjava činjenica da mnogi neupućeni, a mjerodavni, poistovjećuju krčenje šuma i kontroliranu sječu šuma koja je uzgojni zahvat u održavanju, a posebice u obnovi šumskih sastojina. Usprkos našoj visokoj šumovitosti, to bi nam u budućnosti moglo bitno utjecati na dosadašnji dokazano uspješni način gospodarenja našim šumama.Uredništvo ; EditorialWe explained the mission of this column in a double issue of Forestry Journal several years ago. We pointed out that the intention of the column was not to teach forestry experts about forestry (the profession which they study at the faculty), but to point to some current events taking place in the forest and the forestry profession. By stating the facts, we try to help the forestry practice and science to take a stand on a particular professional problem or event, all with the view of protecting the forest and the profession. Therefore, let us remind ourselves of last year's columns, which point to the problems that await us in the future.In the double issue 1-2/2021 we announced the year-round celebration of the 175th anniversary of the founding of the Croatian Forestry Society (1846) and the 145th anniversary (1877) of the publication of the scientific-professional paper Forestry Journal. Among other things, we pointed out that the Croatian Forestry Society achieved its two main goals. The first was the introduction of higher forestry education in Croatia by founding the College of Agriculture and Forestry in Križevci in 1860 and the Academy of Forestry (the present Faculty of Forestry) in 1898 as the fourth higher education institution of the University of Zagreb. The second goal was achieved by publishing the first issue of Forestry Journal on January 1st, 1877. We especially emphasised that the awareness of the need for higher education to manage forest ecosystems was keenly felt even then. We asked ourselves what the current situation was regarding the forestry profession. We concluded it was dire: everybody knows everything about the forest without having the slightest idea of the forestry profession. We also drew attention to the non-market management of forest resources, particularly the most valuable ones, when by exporting wood raw material instead of wood processing products, we export jobs and devalue the long-lasting hard work of forestry experts. In the double issue 3-4/2021, we discussed the text by Thomas Waitz, representative of the Green Party in the EU, published under the bombastic title "New Report on Deforestation in Croatia", which our Greens immediately "embraced". In view of over 250 years of managing our forests according to the principle of sustainable management, this title is an insult to Croatian experts. In addition, this mixing up of the concepts of deforestation and controlled felling of forests is a blatant example of ignorance, or rather amateurism, which today permeates not only forestry but also other professions. We warmly recommend rereading this Editorial in order to gain a stronger basis for a possible debate of this subject.The Editorial in the double issue 5-6/2021, was entitled "The demise of a man who has devoted his life to forests and forestry". Although his life path was extensively presented in the column "In memoriam", we briefly described the most important points of his life path, concluding: "The demise of Professor Matić ends a period which we, his contemporaries, will always look upon as an unforgettable experience of living a noble foresters' life in togetherness, the result of which are well-tended and preserved forests. Will the new trends, increasingly visible in present day forestry, in which foresters have less and less contact with forests and with their colleagues, be able to respond to all the challenges, particularly in the light of distinct climate changes, remains to be seen." The topic of the double issue 7-8/2021 "Who is to blame for poor business results of wood processors?" is accompanied by the text of the European Forestry Institute and the World Bank, entitled "A survey and recommendations for the wood raw material sale system in the company Croatian Forests Ltd." According to the text, 93 % of wood products in Croatia are sold administratively on the basis of long-term contracts, and only 5 % are sold on the market (Poland 89 - 90 %, Czechia 96 %, and Estonia and France about 100 % on the market). Compared to European prices and prices in neighbouring countries, Croatia sells wood raw material at prices which are 30 – 30 % lower, which incurs a loss of about 316 million kuna annually (oak 163 million kuna, beech 105 million kuna, spruce and fir 48 million kuna). Taking into consideration the principles of sustainable management, as well as the quality and naturalness of Croatian forests (which has earned them the FSC certificate – of which it is the wood processors who reap the highest benefits), we suspect that the losses are even higher than the ones mentioned above. The topic of the double issue 9-10/2021 was "What does the new EU forest strategy for 2030 bring?" A core part of the European Green Deal, this strategy anticipates a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030 and a climate-neutral continent by 2050. It also helps meet EU targets to increase CO2 removal through natural sinks under the Climate Act. The strategy gives forests, foresters and the forest-based sector a central role in meeting these targets. With their help, a European transition to a modern, climate-neutral, resource-efficient and competitive economy is expected. The double issue 11-12/2021 was concerned with predictions contained in the text "What does the Glasgow Conference bring us?" As part of the signed Declaration on Forests and Land Use, which has so far been supported by over 140 countries in which more than 90 % of world's forests are located, the leaders pledged to work together to "halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation" by 2030. The main objective of the conference was to limit the increase in global average temperature to a level significantly lower than 2°C above the level in the pre-industrial period. Here, we are concerned about the fact that those who are uninformed, but in position of authority, equate deforestation and controlled felling, which is a silvicultural operation performed in order to maintain and regenerate forest stands. Despite the fact that Croatia is highly forested, this could significantly affect our proven success in the management of our forests.Editorial Board