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We are still in the early stages of working out what it means for the Canadian state to be both officially secular and supportive of religious pluralism. In this period of uneasy transition, the respective roles of secular and religious norms in shaping public policy are matters of considerable political debate and scholarly attention. The Supreme Court has had a few opportunities to contribute to these debates in recent years. The author discusses three significant 2004 rulings on religious freedoms: Syndicate Northcrest v. Amselem, the Same-Sex Marriage Reference and Congregation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. Lafontaine (Village). While the majority in Lafontaine avoided the religious freedom issue, Lebel J.'s dissent introduced the language of religious neutrality into the Court's jurisprudence and his thoughtful discussion of its implications ought to contribute to future debates. The Court's opinion in the Same-Sex Marriage Reference was commendable by so clearly stating that religious freedom is in no way threatened by the federal government's Proposed Act (Bill C-38 in Parliament). The move from a definition of civil marriage rooted in Christendom to one aimed at fulfilling the secular ideals of the Charter is consistent with the state's duty of religious neutrality, and the Court's opinion played a valuable role in removing any legal objections to its attainment. Justice Iacobucci's opinion for the majority in Amselem is the Court's most ambitious contribution to the jurisprudence on freedom of religion since the Big M ruling. His emphasis on personal choice may pave the way for the development of a broad conception of freedom of conscience in the future.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction: How Freedom of Conscience and Religion Are Protected and Why It Matters -- 2 Early Cases: Getting Off on the Wrong Foot -- 3 Culture Wars: Majority versus Minority Values -- 4 When Religion and Politics Intertwine -- 5 Human Rights: A Zero Sum Game? -- 6 Conflicting Rights: A Balancing Act? -- 7 Freedom of Conscience: The Forgotten Human Right -- 8 Can We Change? (And Why We Should) -- Notes -- Bibliography -- General Index -- Index to Cases Discussed

Following the inclusion of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the catalog of fundamental human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the right to freedom of conscience and religion falls into numerous multilateral agreements at the regional level on almost all continents of the globe, and regional mechanisms for its implementation have been created. The international legal protection of religious rights and freedoms on the European continent is the most important for us. The European Union, the Council of Europe and the OSCE have repeatedly reaffirmed the importance of protecting the right to freedom of religion in building a democratic Europe. The right to freedom of conscience, thought or belief includes theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs as well as the latest religions. To protect these beliefs, they must reflect a certain level of persuasiveness, seriousness, commitment, and importance. It is not appropriate to give a legal definition to the terms "religion", "thought" or "belief", since any definition will not reflect the different attitudes to these terms in different cultures of the world, substantially narrow their meaning and benefit those who discriminate. International law requires that these terms be interpreted as broadly as possible.

Freedom of conscience and religion is one of the fundamental freedoms of person. This freedom is a constitutionally registered freedom and its exercise, like its constitutional guarantees, is the foundation of the modern concept of a democratic state's rule of law. At the same time, the concept of a democratic rule of law is a source of limitations for this freedom, implemented in the spirit of European standards. The regulation of the freedom of conscience and religion under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland is a relatively extensive regulation, showing its own specificity, rooted in the experiences of the past, undemocratic political reality. Freedom of conscience and religion cannot be considered solely in the sphere of the psyche and in the sphere of privacy. On the contrary, it has an important public-law dimension. The issue taken up is closely related to the freedom of worldview, which determines both the behavior of the individual towards himself and the behavior of the individual towards other people and towards the community. The author presents and analyzes the regulation in question against the background of the principles determining the position of churches and religious associations in the state and their relations with the state.

Nowadays, liberty of conscience as an inalienable right is a standard of demoliberal constitutionalism. It is an obvious component of a well-organized society and state. However, at the very beginning of its presence in the political discourse, it was more a product of Christian theology (the free conscience perceived as a gift of God) than a legal category; more an endowment of divinity than an intrinsic human value. In the contemporary, secularized world, our understanding of freedom of religion includes not only free exercise of religion but also freedom from religion. An increasing number of non-believers changes our expectations of the state that is obliged to protect the freedom of conscience of all citizens regardless of their beliefs. The goal of the article is to consider the difficulties faced by people with a theistic worldview in the reality of a state founded on the principle of ideological neutrality.

This article analyzes the rights to freedom of conscience and religion in the light of the separation the church and Colombian state, since 1991. Moreover, the religious beliefs and convictions are those of the "being" of a person, integrating their identity, while, the course of everyday life falls into the "doing". This has resulted in the birth of a public censure based on the criteria and action of whom, whether declared or not, has a religious conviction. Therefore, the consciousness, religious beliefs or principles of life, are not elements to be removed, but rather to be put in the exercise of academia, labor, politics and social life and thus deserve all the respect in society in general. ; El presente artículo analiza los derechos a la libertad de conciencia y culto a la luz de la separación, desde el año 1991, del estado colombiano con la iglesia. Lo anterior porque las creencias y convicciones religiosas son propias del "ser", integran su identidad y en el curso de la vida diaria recaen en el "hacer", lo que ha derivado en el nacimiento de una censura pública al criterio y al actuar de aquel que, declarada o no, tiene una convicción religiosa. No son entonces la conciencia, las convicciones religiosas o los principios de vida, elementos de quitar y poner en el ejercicio de la vida académica, laboral, política o social y merecen por ende todo el respeto de la sociedad en general.

What is freedom of conscience and religion? What about the right to free speech and political thought? How far do these rights go and how can they be limited?In this lecture, we will discuss the scope of these constitutional rights and freedoms and how they come up in everyday life. We will explore what sorts of activities and practices are constitutionally protected, which ones are not and how courts evaluate claims under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The influence of religion on the freedom of conscience cannot be defined in simple terms. Religion is often conceived as limiting the freedom of conscience. However, from the perspective of the philosophy of religion it is necessary to underline the significance of the adoption of democracy as a principle of government. The limitation of the freedom of conscience by religion could be explained, on an anthropological level, by the identity function realized by religion. Nevertheless, religion can exist without being accepted by all. Beyond the evidence of a possible coexistence of religion and political pluralism, religion inherently implies the recognition of the freedom of conscience. The respect for the freedom of conscience results from the human condition itself. Religion makes it possible to transcend one's cultural identity. In return, the freedom of conscience is based on a faith in the equal value of the conscience of every human being. The latter is recognized not only as the means but also as one of the purposes of political power. Religion and the freedom of conscience seem to derive from common foundations. The legal recognition of the freedom of conscience has a concomitant impact on religion by the regulation of its exercise. ; La religion est souvent conçue comme une limite à la liberté de conscience. Cependant, du point de vue de la philosophie de la religion, il est nécessaire de souligner l'importance de l'adoption de la démocratie, qui reconnaît la liberté de conscience comme un moyen mais aussi comme finalité du pouvoir politique, en tant que principe de gouvernement. La limitation de la liberté de conscience par la religion peut être expliquée, sur le plan anthropologique, par la fonction dentitaire assurée par la religion. Néanmoins, la religion, pouvant exister sans être acceptée par tous, n'implique pas en elle-même une telle contrainte. Au-delà de la preuve d'une possible coexistence de la religion et du pluralisme politique, la religion implique intrinsèquement la reconnaissance de la liberté de conscience, résultant de la condition humaine elle-même. En retour, la foi en la valeur égale de la conscience de chaque être humain apparaît comme une motivation de la consécration juridique de la liberté de conscience. ; Wpływu religii na wolność sumienia nie sposób wyjaśnić za pomocą prostych schematów. Często religia jest postrzegana jako ograniczenie wolności sumienia. Z perspektywy filozofii religii należy jednak podkreślać znaczenie wyboru demokracji jako zasady ustroju. Na poziomie antropologicznym ograniczanie znaczenia wolności sumienia przez religię może być wyjaśniane z odwołaniem się do funkcji identyfikacyjnej realizowanej przez religię. Z drugiej strony, dla swego istnienia religia nie potrzebuje akceptacji ze strony wszystkich. Poza tym, że istnieją oczywiste dowody na możliwą koegzystencję religii i pluralizmu politycznego, religia zakłada w swojej istocie uznanie wolności sumienia. Poszanowanie wolności sumienia wynika z samej natury człowieka. Religia pozwala człowiekowi na przekroczenie jego tożsamości kulturowej. Natomiast wolność sumienia opiera się na przekonaniu o równej wartości sumienia każdego człowieka. Nie jest ona jedynie środkiem, ale również jednym z celów władzy politycznej. Religia i wolność sumienia mają wspólne podstawy. Prawne uznanie wolności sumienia ma pośredni wpływ na religię poprzez regulacje dotyczące korzystania z tej wolności.