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This book primarily addresses various game theory phenomena in the context of management practice. As such, it helps readers identify the profound game theory principles behind these phenomena. At the same time, the game theory principles in the book can also provide a degree of guidance for solving practical problems. As one of the main areas in management research, there is already an extensive body of literature on game theory. However, it remains mainly theoretical, focusing on abstract arguments and purely numerical examples purely. This book addresses that gap, helping readers apply game theory in their actual management or research work.

Equilibrium points in n-person games ; The bargaining problem / John F. Nash, Jr. -- Non-cooperative games / John Nash -- An iterative method of solving a game / Julia Robinson -- Equivalence of games in extensive form / F.B. Thompson -- Extensive games and the problem of information / H.W. Kuhn -- A value for n-person games ; Stochastic games / L.S. Shapley -- Recursive games / H. Everett -- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments / R.J. Aumann and B. Peleg -- A limit theorem on the core of an economy / Gerard Debreu and Herbert Scarf -- The bargaining set for cooperative games / Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler -- Existence of competitive equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders / Robert J. Aumann -- The core of an n-person game / Herbert E. Scarf -- Games with incomplete information played by "Bayesian" players. pt. 1. The basic model ; pt. 2. Bayesian equilibrium points ; pt. 3. The basic probability distribution of the game / John C. Harsanyi -- The big match / David Blackwell and T.S. Ferguson -- On market games / Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik -- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games / R. Selten.

1. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories -- 2. On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games -- 3. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game -- 4. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points -- 5. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof -- 6. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model -- 7. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points -- 8. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game -- 9. Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory -- 10. An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition -- 11. A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Noncooperative Games -- 12. Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior.

Defence date: 23 March 2015 ; Examining Board: Professor Fernando Vega-Redondo, Supervisor, Bocconi University; Professor Piero Gottardi, EUI; Professor Paolo Pin, Università degli Studi di Siena; Professor Giovanni Ponti, Universidad de Alicante. ; My thesis covers different aspects of applied game theory. The first paper looks at a two-sided asymmetric information game where agents make a collaborative decision not knowing each others' types. In the model, an intermediary has full knowledge about the types of agents and can make a decision that brings information to some types. However, once he puts the information on the table the agents are not obliged to pay him, which undermines his incentive to participate in the first place. I find that, nevertheless, the intermediary is still welfare-improving. In my second chapter I search for the optimal prize schemes in contests with sabotage. In the presence of sabotage, a standard prize scheme where all of the prize is given to the winner is no longer optimal as it creates very high incentives for sabotage. I show that in that case, an optimal prize structure may also assume a positive reward for contestants that are behind. With a higher number of contestants sabotage becomes a public good and therefore it is a lesser concern for the designer. In that case, when sabotage is expensive, the designer can achieve the first best by giving the whole sum to the winner. When I extend the problem to the continuous case the solution crucially depends on the cost of sabotage. When sabotage is expensive, the principal wants to give all of the prize to the winner, while when it is cheap he does not want to make a contest at all, and distributes all prizes equally. In the third paper we analyze to what extent knowing game theory alters a persons' behavior. Our experiment showed a huge difference in results before and after the course. However results suggest that players behave less cooperatively not because of the knowledge of game theory per se, but due to changed expectations. We have also found that a course on game theory increases the level of reasoning.