Suchergebnisse

1. Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories -- 2. On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games -- 3. A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game -- 4. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points -- 5. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof -- 6. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part I: The Basic Model -- 7. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points -- 8. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game -- 9. Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory -- 10. An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition -- 11. A New General Solution Concept for Both Cooperative and Noncooperative Games -- 12. Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior.

Game theory in both popular and academic circles is prominently associated with the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. But game theory, unfortunately, is not easy to use, and much of its application to the nuclear dilemma has only fathered confusion. Two of these confusions are particularly destructive.The first comes from thinking of strategic interactions as games, to be won like chess and poker. We owe this confusion directly to John von Neumann, who gave the name "game theory" to his analysis of the logical structures of strategic interactions. It is too late to change the name, but it may not be too late to quit thinking of poker and chess when we are involved in the more crucial strategic interactions that fill our lives.

This article uses game theory to explore the situation of bus operators when there is competition on stage-carriage, or local, bus services, as is proposed in the recent British White Paper 'Buses' (Department of Transport, 1984), and as exists in the Hereford area at the time of writing. The Hereford area is one of three so-called 'trial areas' set up under the Transport Act 1980 where the provision of bus services is unregulated, although operators still have to meet the usual safety requirements.
Our model is very simple and could be developed further. Nevertheless it provides some insights into the position of operators under competition, and an interpretation of some of their actions. It also suggests one rationale for regulation. Regulation can be seen as a device to avoid the worst possible outcome for the public that might arise under competition at the cost of giving up the best possible outcome.
Game theory is concerned with the logic of decision-making in situations where outcomes depend on the decisions of two or more autonomous agents, and each agent therefore has only partial control of the outcomes.

Game theory is elaborated as atheoreticalapproach to international politics by contrasting it with metaphorical and analogical uses of games. Because it embraces a diversity of models, game theory is especially useful for capturing the most important contextual features of the international system that affect prospects for international cooperation. Through a discussion of the relation among and extension of different game models, the versatility and scope of game-theoretic approaches to international relations are demonstrated. Special attention is paid to the empirical issues of international politics which are raised by game theory and are analyzed in other articles in this symposium.