"Covering both noncooperative and cooperative games, this comprehensive introduction to game theory also includes some advanced chapters on auctions, games with incomplete information, games with vector payoffs, stable matchings, and the bargaining set. Mathematically oriented, the book presents every theorem alongside a proof. The material is presented clearly and every concept is illustrated with concrete examples from a broad range of disciplines. With numerous exercises the book is a thorough and extensive guide to game theory from undergraduate through graduate courses in economics, mathematics, computer science, engineering, and life sciences to being an authoritative reference for researchers"--
"What is a game? Classically, a game is perceived as something played by human beings. Its mathematical analysis is human-centered, explores the structures of particular games, economic or social environments and tries to model supposedly "rational" human behavior in search of appropriate "winning strategies". This point of view places game theory into a very special scientific corner where mathematics, economics and psychology overlap and mingle. This book takes a novel approach to the subject. Its focus is on mathematical models that apply to game theory in particular but exhibit a universal character and thus extend the scope of game theory considerably. This textbook addresses anyone interested in a general game-theoretic view of the world. The reader should have mathematical knowledge at the level of a first course in real analysis and linear algebra. However, possibly more specialized aspects are further elaborated and pointers to relevant supplementary literature are given. Moreover, many examples invite the reader to participate "actively" when going through the material. The scope of the book can be covered in one course on Mathematical Game Theory at advanced undergraduate or graduate level"--
Game theory and contemporary decision theory provide the mathematical foundation of economics. Neuroeconomics, which principally concerns itself with the integrative study of brain, mind and behavior, builds on this mathematical foundation while also drawing heavily from the repository of experimental paradigms that have grown out of economic game theory and behavioral economics. Game theory is central to neuroeconomics primarily because it constitutes a formal mathematical framework with which to bridge insights occurring at different levels of neuroeconomic analysis. In particular, game theoretic principles can be used to express neuroscientific ideas about the brain, psychological concepts regarding the human mind, and economic predictions of human behavior, thereby making these different ideas more rigorously relatable to each other. In this chapter we provide a nontechnical introduction to game theory and its relation to neuroeconomics. It has been written as an overview of the basic concepts most likely to be encountered in neuroeconomic research. The first part of the chapter introduces the reader to the basic concepts and philosophical underpinnings of game theory in relation to neuroeconomics. The second part is an introduction and discussion of common games, including the games featured in the other chapters of this book.
This book primarily addresses various game theory phenomena in the context of management practice. As such, it helps readers identify the profound game theory principles behind these phenomena. At the same time, the game theory principles in the book can also provide a degree of guidance for solving practical problems. As one of the main areas in management research, there is already an extensive body of literature on game theory. However, it remains mainly theoretical, focusing on abstract arguments and purely numerical examples purely. This book addresses that gap, helping readers apply game theory in their actual management or research work.
Defence date: 23 March 2015 ; Examining Board: Professor Fernando Vega-Redondo, Supervisor, Bocconi University; Professor Piero Gottardi, EUI; Professor Paolo Pin, Università degli Studi di Siena; Professor Giovanni Ponti, Universidad de Alicante. ; My thesis covers different aspects of applied game theory. The first paper looks at a two-sided asymmetric information game where agents make a collaborative decision not knowing each others' types. In the model, an intermediary has full knowledge about the types of agents and can make a decision that brings information to some types. However, once he puts the information on the table the agents are not obliged to pay him, which undermines his incentive to participate in the first place. I find that, nevertheless, the intermediary is still welfare-improving. In my second chapter I search for the optimal prize schemes in contests with sabotage. In the presence of sabotage, a standard prize scheme where all of the prize is given to the winner is no longer optimal as it creates very high incentives for sabotage. I show that in that case, an optimal prize structure may also assume a positive reward for contestants that are behind. With a higher number of contestants sabotage becomes a public good and therefore it is a lesser concern for the designer. In that case, when sabotage is expensive, the designer can achieve the first best by giving the whole sum to the winner. When I extend the problem to the continuous case the solution crucially depends on the cost of sabotage. When sabotage is expensive, the principal wants to give all of the prize to the winner, while when it is cheap he does not want to make a contest at all, and distributes all prizes equally. In the third paper we analyze to what extent knowing game theory alters a persons' behavior. Our experiment showed a huge difference in results before and after the course. However results suggest that players behave less cooperatively not because of the knowledge of game theory per se, but due to changed expectations. We have also found that a course on game theory increases the level of reasoning.
"The progress of society can only happen through interpersonal cooperation, because only cooperation can bring about mutual benefit, thus bringing happiness to each person. This should be our collective rationality, but we often see it conflicts with individual interests, which leads to the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" and does not bring happiness to all. From a game theoretical perspective, this book addresses the issue of how people can cooperate better. It has two objectives. The first is to use common language to systematically introduce the basic methodologies and core conclusions of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium, multiple equilibriums, dynamic games, etc. Mathematics and theoretical models are used to the minimum necessary scope too, to make this book get access to ordinary readers with elementary mathematical training. The second objective is to utilize these methods and conclusions to analyze various Chinese social issues and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the reasons people exhibit non-cooperative behaviors as well as the institutions and cultures that promote interpersonal cooperation. In addition to economics, specialists in sociology, law, history, politics and management will also be attracted by this book for its insightful analysis on the issue of cooperation in these fields. Also, readers curious about Chinese society will benefit from this book. "--Provided by publisher.
Game theory studies the strategic interactions between and among decision makers, players, through mathematical models called games. This paper presents an overview on the evolution of the application of game theory to fisheries economics. The first applications emerged in the late 1970s, focussing upon internationally shared fish stocks. This occurred in the context of the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. During the 1980s and early 1990s the application of game theory to fisheries focused mainly on transboundary fish stocks. Thereafter, the applications to straddling fish stocks developed significantly, through the use of coalition games. This was a consequence of the mismanagement of these stocks, and the management regime brought forth in response by the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The application of game theory to the management of national/regional fisheries is a new research frontier, as it is still much underexplored, when compared to international fisheries. This paper also summarizes the main research developments of a set of nine papers selected for this special issue on Game Theory and Fisheries. ; Peer reviewed
Abstract Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group's harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.
