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Social actions can be formulated in the frame of game theory or in a frame using,
and foccussing on, the notion of power. The two frames are described and clarified. The
comparison of theories from these two branches are evaluated from the point of theory of science.

Considers how game theory fits into ongoing international relations theory development, particularly that branch addressing international politics via the strategic logic of spare stylizations of the international system centered on Hobbesian state of nature. At issue are what game theory offers international relations theory, the extent to which game theory's capacities are needed, & the impacts on international relations theory of adopting a more game theoretic approach. Game theory is viewed as providing a formal method of analyzing strategic interactions; advantages in the formalization concomitant with such analysis are described. After detailing the general properties of research methods & some advantages available with game theory, debates dominating international relations theory are delineated, demonstrating that much of the dialogue is rooted in weakly or poorly specified linkages among actor preferences, the strategic setting in which the actors pursue their goals, & the outcomes. Consequences of adopting a more formal approach to international relations are scrutinized in conclusion. 2 Figures. J. Zendejas

"Social actions can be formulated in the frame of game theory or in a frame using, and foccussing on, the notion of power. The two frames are described and clarified. The comparison of theories from these two branches are evaluated from the point of theory of science." (author's abstract)

Scrutinizes the international relations literatures surrounding three principal research movements that study international conflict: game theory, the democratic peace, & offense-defense theory. The development of the microfoundations of conflict, ie, crisis origins & escalation to war, in game theoretic models is examined; focus of this approach is on why actors fight when preferable peaceful settlements exist. The notion of the democratic peace centers on the observation that democracies are far less likely to war with one another than other dyads. Its establishment as stylized fact is considered before critiquing theories proposed to explain this phenomenon. Three additional approaches to explain the democratic peace are delineated, & a call is made for more hypotheses to test against the large-n sets typically analyzed as well as case studies. Offense-defense theory derives comes from the idea that war & conflict are more likely when territory is easily taken; case studies dominate this research field. Measurement of the offense-defense balance has proven problematic, & the two World Wars, key to the theory's development, are seen to pose a puzzle. Following a look at some test cases, a revision to the theory is proffered. It is contended that the democratic peace & offense-defense theory can benefit by employing game theory. J. Zendejas

Examines the comparative advantages of the rational-choice perspective for the study of institutions. The effects of institutions are explored, devising a comparative framework to demonstrate how various powers & institutional details influence the legislative-executive balance of power & policy choice in the US & parliamentary systems. The utility of this to show how specific policy settings provide new answers to key political puzzles & the strategic role of US courts in policy making is demonstrated via the example of the development of civil rights legislation via US Supreme Court decisions. Attention turns to the analysis of a range of rational-choice models (the "Law Merchant" [1990] variant of the prisoners dilemma model, spatial models of the separation of powers, & the rationality of fear model) explaining why institutions exist & considering their endogenous aspects to address why they exist in their particular forms. The latter focuses on the independent judiciary, democratic consolidation, ethnic conflict, medieval Genoa, Italy, & the American Revolution. It is concluded that discussion on the effect of institutions shows how rational-choice institutionalism integrates the study of US politics into broader comparative politics, & rational-choice theory offers various mechanisms that allow for predictions of discontinuous change. 12 Figures. J. Zendejas

Analyzes the Supreme Court of Canada & Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms litigation as an instrument for changing the dynamics of political power & altering the status of competing interests. The judicial decisions & decision-making processes concerning two cases are explored: Mortgentaler & Vriend -- cases on abortion & sexual orientation, respectively. While both are morally contentious issues with similar outcomes, they differ on the Supreme Court's imposition of future policy constraints on legislative actors. A model & game of relations between the Supreme Court & legislatures are constructed, & conclusions are drawn about judicial review in Canada. 1 Table, 2 Figures. L. Collins Leigh

Argues that the materiality of postmodern ambivalence & the desiring subjects produced by this ambivalence are properly understood as ideological effects linked to the persistent & contradictory structures of capitalism in a reading of Neil Jordan's movie, The Crying Game. The movie is interpreted as a mythic representation of sexual ambivalence connected to the eruption of a postmodern sexual imaginary in industrial centers transformed by the processes of late capitalism. It is also taken to represent a neoimperialist postcolonial imaginary that is connected to Western anxieties over the breakdown of the colonial order. Together, these narratives are read as mythologizing the social structures of late capitalism through the fetishization of ambivalence, the naturalization of difference, & the displacement of third terms of collective subjectivity & social transformation with romantic individualism. The representation of ambivalence in the work of Slavoj Zizek (1993) & Judith Butler (1994) is shown to propose neoidealist or neoculturalist tales of ambivalence, respectively, that end in offering alibis for the historical & material conditions out of which new identities arise. It is concluded that this theoretical work, like the movie, participates in the mythologizing strategies of a broad-based postmodern imaginary. D. M. Smith

Examines the usefulness of an equilibrium-based rational choice theory for analysis of the efficacy of informal & formal social institutions in combining beliefs & conduct in such a way as to constrain individual behavior. An equilibrium-based rational choice model of repeated cooperation in the two-player prisoner's dilemma game is constructed to ascertain the organizational effectiveness of various equilibria. Absent communication, equilibrium is achieved in a kind of tit-for-tat strategy of individual punishments. When the model is revised to allow communication, it is found that a true institution is achieved in which the whole group monitors & punishes deviant behavior, but this outcome is accomplished at significant costs. Such costs are partly ameliorated with the establishment of a central communication system directed by a single enforces. While the creation of a director reduces the costs of communication, it also raises the issue of who monitors the director. The notion of institutions as equilibria is defended as a useful approach for analyzing institutional stability & the effects of institutions in various areas of social life. 4 Tables. D. M. Smith

Explores the concepts of the status quo & structure-induced equilibrium during the development of the Canadian constitution since 1867. The decision-making rules & procedures, in regard to treatment of the status quo, for each of the three Canadian constitutions illuminate the following: (1) the first demonstrated a separation of powers among multiple authorities; (2) the second placed executive powers over the legislative; & (3) the third, representing the post-1982 power structure, allows control of the executive over the legislature with an increasingly powerful judiciary. The relations between the powers in the dual system are explored via examples of complex games between the courts & executive, & confirmation of the Rawlsian paradox is asserted. 3 Figures. L. Collins Leigh

Discusses factors leading to the government institutionalization of individual property rights. Although previous theorists have hypothesized that property rights emerge as the result of moral requirements, it is argued that these rights are the product of desires to improve the productivity & wealth of individuals &, thereby, the government. Individual rights institutions evolve in environments characterized by conflict between the old agents of control & agents seeking changes in old institutions. Since society without rules leads to unproductive & unregulated conflict, governments support individual rights to enhance productivity, which allows government to advance its own power through increased taxes & other forms of support. Drawing on a game-theoretic model of government-enforced individual rights, it is concluded that law enforcement policies must be known to society to maintain the government monopoly of rights & achieve the desired ends associated with such rights granting. In an environment with incomplete information, governments may fail to grant necessary rights or grant rights that undermine their own goals. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix. T. Sevier

Draws on game theory for a comparative-historical analysis of the relationship between cultural beliefs & institutional structures among 11th-century Maghribi traders & 12th-century Genoese, stressing the importance of cultural beliefs in explaining different trajectories of societal organization. The origin & manifestations of cultural beliefs among Muslim Maghribi traders, whose societal organization resembled modern collectivist societies, & Latin Genoese traders, whose societal organization was individualistic, are discussed, along with the impact of these beliefs on social patterns of economic relations & wealth distribution. An economic transaction model is used to examine relations between culture & societal organization in a multiple equilibra game, demonstrating the impact of cultural beliefs on the evolution of institutions that regulated long-distance trade. It is argued that a societal organization's capability to change is determined by its organizations, cultural beliefs that led to their adoption, & the influence of past organizations & beliefs on subsequent games & organizations. Implications for analyzing economic & political institutions are considered. 1 Appendix, 73 References. J. Lindroth

The scholarly traditions that explain the federal judicial state building in the United States are countered with a new theory of federal courts. A game theoretic Congressional centered account & a judicial court centered account are compared to the new approach of a jurisdiction game applied to the Fugitive Slave Act. The jurisdiction game puts the federalism back into federal court analysis by including the preferences of state voters, states rightists & moderns. The apparent preference reversals of antebellum abolitionists & slave holders, the passage of the Removal Act of 1875 & state sovereign immunity are integrated into the analysis. This model overcomes the current silence over the national versus state power in theories of federal courts. The integration of institutions & preferences is useful to explore the consequences for federal judicial power on deep preferences, although it says little about the origins of shifting passions & structure. Figures, Appendixes, References. J. Harwell

Survey data collected 1991-1997 are drawn on to investigate public attitudes toward social conflicts, egalitarianism, & support for economic transformation in Poland as a function of increasing time since its transition from a socialist to a market economy in 1989. It is hypothesized that (1) support for transformation is strongly affected by egalitarian vs inegalitarian attitudes, & (2) persons who view their society as conflict-ridden will assume more egalitarian attitudes & expect more from the government in terms of redistributive & interventionist policies; however, this is only true if such conflicts are perceived as zero-sum rather than positive-sum games. In addition, these persons will not support the transformation to capitalism. Sociodemographic correlates of inegalitarian vs egalitarian attitudes are discerned, & linked to attitudes toward economic transformation. Results indicate that neither perceptions of social conflicts nor sociodemographic characteristics have a direct bearing on attitudes toward transformation; rather, inegalitarian attitudes, general political orientations, & the evaluation of current material conditions & well-being are important. 13 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 26 References. K. Hyatt Stewart

Draws on neoinstitutionalist theory in a discussion of social movements & social change. Conventionally, social change produced by social movements has been theorized on the model of revolution, in which state structures dissipate. This model presents an investigation of social change caused by social movements that is less than revolutionary, but still important. Institutional theory is drawn on to consider how social movements transform the basic rules & practices of institutional games. Such transformation may take the form of altering unequal relations of interdependence produced by institutional routines or inserting alternative scripts shared among institutional challenges into conventional institutional patterns. Social movements may also influence the shared beliefs, values, & forms of thought that connect prevailing institutional arrangements in a cultural web of practices. In this manner, social movements may produce moments of indeterminacy that do not lead to state breakdown, but still may be exploited for progressive causes. D. Ryfe