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Mathematical game theory – developed starting from the publication of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern – aims to outline an ideal model of behaviour of rational agents involved in some interaction with other rational agents. For this reason, game theory has immediately attracted the attention of philosophers dealing with practical rationality and, since the fifties, has been applied to the analysis of several issues concerning ethics and philosophy of politics. Here we will focus on one of the most interesting applications of game theory to ethical-political inquiry, i.e., with the game theoretic analysis of some problems related to the evolution of moral norms. Firstly, we will provide a short outline of the development of game theory, which has lead to the formulation of a plurality of different game theories. It will be shown that such theories can be classified in two main groups: rationalistic game theories –in two different versions: classical and epistemic – and evolutionary game theories. Moreover, some basic elements of classical game theory will be introduced and the key ideas of epistemic and evolutionary game theories will be illustrated. Afterwards, the main approaches developed within the ethical-political applications of game theory will be shortly described. Finally, some results obtained in the last twenty years by the researchers who have analysed the evolution of moral norms by the conceptual tools of evolutionary and epistemic game theories, will be examined.

This research presents results of the last three years collaboration between the Centro di Ricerca ''E.~Piaggio'' and the company Ingegneria dei Sistemi SpA (IDS), on the application of game theoretic algorithms. Based on the results obtained by this research, IDS has decided to investigate the implementation of the proposed system on board of its unmanned vehicles, in order to provide a novel security system to the market. This research proposed the application of a coordinated multi robot system to the problem of asymmetric threat, both in military and civilian scenarios. The problem of detecting and accordingly reacting to an asymmetric threat (Asymmetric threats or techniques are a version of not ''fighting fair,'' which can include the use of surprise in all its operational and strategic dimensions and the use of weapons in ways unplanned) is a challenge both from research and technological points of view. Even though the available surveillance sensors are sufficient to identify and classify asymmetric threats, they are able to give a quick alert only in nominal working conditions. Indeed, adverse weather conditions easily lead to degradation of sensors performance leading to a drastic reduction of the time available for a possible reaction after the detection, identification and classification procedures. The short time--to--reaction may increase the possibility of human errors especially in stressful situations (e.g. an incorrect assessment of the necessary reaction). This research proposes the use of multi--robot coordinated team as autonomous surveillance systems that can guarantee an adequate supervision of the area in any working conditions even though the entire area is not fully monitored at any time instant. Indeed, the mobility abilities of autonomous vehicles can be exploited to deploy the team of robots to monitor the environment and to react to possible intruders. In particular, this research is focussed on the problem of coordinating a team of robots based on partial knowledge of the environment due to limited sensors footprint and communication range. The coordination of the robot must also guarantee the accomplishment of other tasks in a framework in which communication is limited due to security issues or deteriorated communication channels (e.g. underwater scenarios). An example of antagonistic tasks is the monitoring of the area around the main ship while detecting, tracking and herding an intruder toward a safe area. It is worth noting that the marine scenario is only a possible application of the proposed methodology that is valid whenever the goal is to detect, localize and react to any environmental changes of interest, e.g. high variation of temperature, water pollution, terrorists attacks, etc. In this research a unified model has been proposed for the problem under study for different application scenarios such as asymmetric threats protection in marine environments and safety at border crossing points, such as airports. The proposed unified framework is based on the Game Theory. Indeed, it is well known that the particular class of potential games solves several cooperative control problems with a reduced amount of communication between robots. In particular, the considered control problem is transformed into a non--cooperative game where the goal is to reach specific equilibria. Moreover, the case of ``payoff--based'' scenarios, where robots get a reward in the reached regions based on the action performed by other robots, helps in capturing the requirements into the problem formulation. Learning algorithms that can steer the robots toward Nash equilibria are proven to solve partially the problem. In case of a static environment, e.g. fixed area of interest in the scenario, the coverage problem has been largely studied with a game theoretic approach. However, such algorithms are proven to converge to a static configuration maximizing the number of interested area covered by the robot sensors' footprint but are not able to handle a dynamic intruder. On the other hand, in case of dynamic environment, as for asymmetric threat protection, existing algorithms have been only designed to explore the entire area without selecting the sub--regions of major interest or doing it with high communication costs. Concluding, with respect to the state of the art literature, in this research, a game theoretic approach is used to detecting, track and herd a dynamic intruder protecting pre-defined areas. In particular, the work proposes two kind of coordination protocols which are proved to solve the asymmetric threat protection problem. Based on the well--known payoff--based algorithms, the research presents some extension of state--of--the--art coordination protocols which are suitable for dynamic environment. Moreover, the work presents new payoff--based algorithms to deal with the problem of multi--robot coordination in dynamic environment where the robots must accomplish antagonistic tasks simultaneously. For those new algorithms convergence to equilibria is formally proved. Finally, our research is interested in investigating the relationship between the team of guards and the intruder once it has been identified, i.e, the \emph{reaction phase}. Such problem is investigated with the use of a game theoretic framework and, a novel team coordination protocols for the intruder herding problem, is proposed. Such new algorithm solves the problem of steering a team of guards for guiding an intruder towards a restricted area of a known environment. The proposed system, based on the virtual objectives concept, is able to limit the movement of an intruder without communication between robots of the team. Proposed framework has been validated with a Monte Carlo simulation in order to cover a large set of different situations. Based on Monte Carlo simulation, a novel tool, that solves the problem of determine the minimum number of robots contrasting an intruder which is moving in the area, is proposed. Indeed, it can be used to determine the maximum volume to store autonomous vehicles on board. Proposed algorithms have been evaluated against intruders piloted by human, in order to test the robustness of the proposed solution. The proposed game theoretic framework has been tested in real robot experiments thanks to the use of a novel multi--robot system for managing team of robots. Based on the promising results, the proposed model has been extended to cope the asymmetric threat protection problem when sensors are affected by uncertainty on the detection. Video of some validation results are available online (https://youtu.be/emyf4xx-_pY, https://youtu.be/rBs23CNdh8U and https://youtu.be/ODoHY7WgQdc).

Résumé: Les Hunger Games, grand succès de la littérature jeunesse, est une trilogie dans laquelle abondent les occurrences de tortures de toutes sortes. L'examen de ce thème nous permettra d'élucider ses corollaires directs, à savoir l'éthique, la philosophie politique (dans la mesure où la torture peut se justifier par le bien général), mais nous amènera également à nous pencher sur nos valeurs modernes quant à la corporéité et sur les menaces de réification qui pèsent sur le corps et sur le sujet. Tous ces aspects convergent naturellement vers des questionnements sur le totalitarisme, mais aussi et surtout sur les outils de résistance les plus efficaces: contre la torture et contre le totalitarisme, les sujets maintiennent un statut de sujet grâce à une lucidité, une recherche authentique de la vérité et à une spontanéité qui leur permet de contrer la manipulation du réel. Mots-clés: Hunger Games; Torture; Littérature jeunesse; Totalitarisme Abstract:The Hunger Games, a very successful trilogy in popular culture aiming to reach young adult audiences, is surprisingly rich in occurrences of various kinds of tortures. Examining this pervasive theme will cast an interesting light in the matters of ethics, of political theory insofar as torture can be used as a tool to justify the greater good, but will also teach us a lot about our modern society and especially the implications torture has on our notions of corporeality and the potential reification of the body and the subject. All these aspects converge naturally towards the matter of totalitarianism, beautifully exemplified by the Capitol in the Hunger Games, but also, most notably, on the most efficient tools for resistance: against torture as well as against totalitarianism, subjects remain subjects and overcome the reign of manipulated things through lucidity, truth, authenticity and spontaneity. Key-words: Hunger Games; Torture; Young adult literature; Totalitarianism

According to Russell Hardin, the rational choice approach to politics offers "devastating theoretical claims for any conception of democracy that implies a minimum degree of coherence of collective choice, information & participation." This essay argues that such conclusion is misplaced. The author discusses two classes of results, derived respectively from social choice theory & game theory, both of them pointing to a gap between individual & collective rationality. These theoretical results are better understood as benchmarks against which comparing alternative explanations of political outcomes. For instance, disequilibrium results from social choice theory imply that political outcomes cannot be explained only on the basis of individual preferences, but also on the basis of the rules aggregating them. The downsian paradoxes -- complete convergence of candidates/parties, voters' rational abstention & rational ignorance -- are a starting point for more complete explanations of electoral competition & electoral participation. Finally, the game theoretical analysis of collective action problems can provide useful insights in order to understand classic problems in democratic theory, such as transition to democracy & democratic stability. In short, while many results of the rational approach to politics are better interpreted as limitative theorems, ignoring them would make analysis of democracy much poorer. References. Adapted from the source document.

The provision of public goods is an important problem in economics and the social sciences. It is often claimed that this problem has the structure of the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma so that rational and self-interested individuals would not be able to provide any public good by spontaneous cooperation. In this paper, we argue that this pessimistic view of the possibility spontaneous cooperation is largely unjustified, since the game theoretic analysis of public goods shows how their voluntary provision is indeed feasible in a number of circumstances. We conclude by considering the implications of the game theoretic approach to the problem of public goods for political philosophy and, in particular, for the possibility of "ordered anarchy" as defended in the works of Anthony de Jasay.

The aim of this paper is to provide the reader with a simple and systematic analysis of the fundamentals of non cooperative game theory. Special attention is paid to the most controversial tools discussed throughout the specific literature concerning the problems of strategical interdipendence.

This article explores the possibility of applying the tools of economic analysis of law, which are traditionally used in the field of private law, to public law as well. The first part investigates constitutional law issues, addressed by prevailing approaches through the social contract framework, by applying an agreement model to a general public good such as the State. This model is typically based on games with features of the 'prisoner's dilemma.' Through the analysis of constitutional preferences that may transform such dilemma in a game with full cooperation equilibrium, two types of preferences are compared: 'utilitarian based on impartiality principle' & 'rawlsian based on difference principle'; it is shown that this second type better facilitates the constitutional agreement. With the objective of utilizing more easily economic theory tools, the article then attempts to apply the distinction between private & public good to that between private & public rights. In particular, both public goods & public rights can be assimilated as they are non-excludable & non-transferable through exchanges or contracts. Moreover, an attempt is made to define an economic counterpart to the juridical notion of 'general interest' which is the basis for those norms in the fields of public & administrative law envisaging the direct intervention of the State to remedy market failures, both at constitutional & sub-constitutional level. Hence the question of what are the most efficient legal procedures to solve such problems is addressed. Using above all the case of negative externalities related to private goods, the article discusses in particular when it is more efficient to resort to administrative interventions rather than judicial ones; or otherwise allowing such problems to be dealt with through private bargaining between injured & injurers. In this respect the latest literature of economic analysis of law often favors private bargaining in the spirit of Coase's thinking. However, it is here put forward that in terms of cost-benefit analysis economic theory reaches much less radical conclusions often supporting the higher efficiency of legal rules & administrative types of intervention. In the final part of the article, different legal systems (minimal, neoliberal, welfarist) are compared by way of analyzing their rationale & limitations from an efficiency point of view. Adapted from the source document.

A recently established field of political studies aims at explaining historical events through models drawn from Rational Choice & Game Theory. This blend between history & theory is now generally indicated as Analytic Narratives, which is the name of an influent book published a few years ago. In this essay the author applies the approach of analytic narratives to the period immediately after WWII when the anti-Fascist parties alliance was superseded by majority governments between the Christian Democratic Party & its smaller moderate allies & the Socialist & the Communist parties were excluded from government. The paper maintains that that passage can be analyzed through the debates in the constitutional assembly elected in June 1946. It focuses on the question of the relations between the Italian Republic & the Vatican State. The Communist Party, contrary to general expectations, voted in favor of the Catholic position that eventually prevailed. The paper makes use of well-known historical documents to plot parties' positions in the political space. Then the author explains the unexpected Communist choice considering its unwillingness to face religious confrontation, & its hope to be accepted as a long-term government partner by the Catholic Party. On the basis of the spatial theory of rational voting, the paper shows that both hypotheses are consistent with the preferences of the parties & their view of the political situation. This choice reveals the disregard of the Communist Party toward the Socialist & the other Left parties, a theoretical finding confirmed by historical research. 2 Tables, 6 Figures, 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

open ; Rational-choice explanations of institutional change are generally considered the prototype of the individualistic research programme. The first aim of the paper is to demonstrate that this claim is not warranted. It is not so if the phenomena to be explained are defined from the external point of view of social efficiency: in this case, individualism is transformed into functionalism and the notions of its toolbox are turned into elements of an objective teleology. When considered from the point of view of the individuals involved in their construction, institutions can be conceived as repeated cooperation schemes devised by some of these individuals (the proposers) as the best means to tackle the mutual dependences in which they find themselves and achieve some of their goals, and adopted in mutual agreement with their counterparts (the receivers) because convenient for them too, given their own particular interests. The second aim of the paper is to develop a bargaining model based upon this idea. The proposed model shows, among other things, that when bargaining concerns the adoption of repeated cooperation schemes (i.e. of institutions, according to my definition), it is in the interest of the proposers to get to correct (or so considered) beliefs and to communicate them to the counterpart sincerely. Moreover, when bargaining consists in choosing one scheme among others, it is possible that some will agree to it despite the fact that they are not better-off with respect to the initial situation. The third aim of the paper is to show that the model proposed can highlight the process that has led to adopt important institutions such as the European Monetary System. ; European Phd On Socio-Economic And Statistical Studies ; Social sciences methodology; institutional change; game theory. ; open ; Palminiello, Paola ; Palminiello, Paola

LIUC PAPERS-41 Serie Economia e Impresa 10, maggio 1997 In this essay I suggest a first-best solution to the collusion problem in a three-levels principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy (Tirole 1986, Laffont-Tirole 1993) in the context of a repeated games model. I introduce a new player in the component game i.e. a group of consumers which is also modelled as the constituency of the principal. An ex ante incomplete constitutional contract of authorisation links the principal to the group of consumer. At the next move in the game the group of consumers has a choice on the level of support and compliance to the principal's authority, which I intend as a specific investment. Due to the incompleteness of contracts problem, according to the economic theory of corporate culture (Kreps 1990) and code of ethics (Sacconi 1997), the principal may only announce a code of basic principles of good administration, being not automatically enforceable. In the repeated game among the three levels hierarchy and an infinite series of short-lived groups of consumers/supporters, I prove by a reputation effects construction (Fudenberg-Levine 1989, 1992) that the first best contract offered by the principal to the supervisor and the agent is part of a self-enforcing equilibrium profile making possible to the principal to get a payoff that approximates the Stakelberg payoff in nearly all the component games.

In this paper I compare Wittgenstein's and Adorno's different post- metaphysical visions of philosophy. In my opinion, it is possible to find many analogies between their approaches regarding the importance of the analysis of concepts and the relation between philosophy and music. But, while Adorno's theory is understandable just within the sort of philosophy of history traced in the famous Dialectical of Enlightenment, Wittgenstein is absolutely against such an approach. According to Adorno, negative dialectic is the only philosophical instrument useful to resist the universal tendency of domination of the Reason and his vision of language derives from that presupposition. By opposite, Wittgenstein believes that many "language games" exist and therefore our liberty depends on the possibility to use language in different ways. But the notion of "language games" presupposes that of "form of life" and therefore using language is a collective experience and not a monological one like in Adorno. This difference is the most important in order to understand why Adorno still believes in a positive role of philosophy while Wittgenstein not. More, according to Adorno, our li berty is also reachable thanks to that kind of music that stands opposite to social domination while Wittgenstein argues that we have to gain a contemplative perspective of the music in order to annul our suffering.

International audience Beginning with the 1979-1980 lectures at the Collège de France, Du gouvernement des vivants, this article aims at a reconstruction of Foucault's shift: from a study of knowledge-power systems to an archaeological-genealogical analysis of the government of human beings by means of truth; or, better yet, a study of the relations between the manifestation of truth, the constitution of subjectivity, and the government of self and others. Therefore, it seeks to explore the meaning of the fundamental notion of "regime of truth" (in its connection with the notion of "truth games"), as well as the Foucauldian project of a genealogy of the modern subject in Western civilization. The conclusion suggests that Foucault's last series of lectures at the Collège de France are a way to urge us to undertake a "politics of ourselves", and consequently to get rid of the hermeneutics of the self, no matter whether Christian or scientific.