Suchergebnisse

Nowadays, the optimal usage of exhausting natural resources is a serious economic, social and political question. For this reason, in this paper we examine how the optimal sustainable use and allocation of these resources can be achieved in a sustainable way using different game theoretic models. As the proper solution needs the cooperation of national economies, the optimization driven by own interest should be completely changed. In this examination, we use the tools of cooperative game theory to describe ecomomies' strategic behaviour and their interactions. Moreover, we describe different well-known game theoretic solution concepts (e.g. Core, Shaply-value, Nucleolus) with special focus on their required fairness properties. The fairness properties, detailed in this paper, can ensure stable and acceptable allocations for the player at individual and coalitional level as well. Besides the theoretical descriptions, we give some practical example related to games defined on different water supply management problems (e. g. urban water management, irrigation problems, hydro power licensing etc.).

The EU is bound to respect the national identities of Member States. States might, at occasions, define their national identities in ways that breach inclusive constitutional values (e.g. equality) protected under TEU Article 2. The assumption behind the recognition of diverse constitutional identities is the peaceful coexistence of both, which is challenged by illiberal national developments. Instead, we see a zero-sum game between the constitutional recognition of exclusive values (e.g. dominant ethnicity or religion) and inclusive constitutional values; every gain by the proponents of emergent authoritarianism translates to a loss on the side of constitutional democracy. While exclusive norms appear in virtually every constitutional system, a critical mass of exclusive values can lead to the hollowing out of a democratic order, both on the national and on the supranational level. To try to draw the line where this shift happens, we are relying on the limits of toleration, and recognition, of exclusive norms and identity elements of minority communities in liberal theories of multiculturalism (e.g. Raz, Taylor, Kymlicka). We think that the case of illiberal minorities raise structurally similar theoretical questions, insights, and experiences than the dilemma defined above, the challenge of illiberal Member States undermining EU fundamental values.

Abstract: 'The Politics of Uncertainty' in Practice: The 2020 Presidential Election that Changed BelarusUp until 2020 Aleksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian regime had ruled Belarus for 26 years without major challenges. Thus, the popular mobilization that took shape in connection with the August 2020 presidential election came as a surprise. It was not the first time that elections in Belarus were not fair – but it was the first time that large sectors of the population reacted openly. Six months later, Belarusians all over the country were still contesting the falsified results. What contributed to this mobilization and politicization of a previously largely apolitical society? Why does that development represent such a serious threat to the authoritarian system? This study sees the Belarusian presidential election and its aftermath as illustrating the 'politics of uncertainty' of electoral authoritarian regimes. Because of the intrinsic insecurity of authoritarian systems, all regular elections in that context entail risks, which in theory might lead to change. In Belarus, the emergence of latent threats to the regime's legitimacy in the form of social cleavages and an economic crisis, combined with the fundamental dynamics of the 'election game', amplified this instability. The election served as the starting point for a process of transformation that became the most serious threat ever faced by the Lukashenka regime.