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For more than sixty years American grand strategy is based on the conviction that external environment is of fundamental importance for US core interests in security, prosperity and domestic liberty. There was the foundation for containment policy and after the cold war succeeding presidents on this conviction have based their deep engagement in world affairs. In XXI century as American supremacy has been steadily diminished, Washington is still ready to lead the world, but wants to share with partners the burdens of keeping it in order. The idea of partnership isn't put into words explicitly. It emphasizes burden-sharing between US and the partners, sometimes is about the transfer of crisis-management capacity and it has sought to advance American leadership as well. European states – NATO and EU members – are seen as indispensable Washington's allies, densely connected with the US through transatlantic partnership. Due to community of values and the convergence of strategic interests, and because of its own peculiarity EU is not and won't be America's strategic rival. After few years of diminished interest in old continent, when president B. Obama focused his attention on domestic policy and on problems in other world's regions, since March 2014 he has decided to take the initiative in European affairs. Russia's aggression towards Ukraine has serious consequences for Washington's European and global strategy. In Europe there is increased request for US leadership. From American point of view it might come with expectations, that the allies will be eager to strengthen their cooperation with Washington in other regions, especially in Asia.

European Union and Indian Union signed the cooperation agreement in 1994 and a strategic partnership 10 years later. Europe was feeling safe and secure, which was well-described in 2003 in the European Security Strategy, so the approach to the relations with India stressed their economic aspects. In 2007, both sides have started negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement. They still have not concluded but in the meantime the world has changed dramatically. In the current international "disorder" both India and Europe are looking for new partners and vectors of influence, defending multilateralism and democratic values. The paper analyses 5 factors which severely influence these relations. They can bring both sides closer and make the strategic partnership stronger: Rise of China as a global power; Increase of American-Chinese competition and rivalry; Russia's coming back to the international game of power; Rise of India as a regional power and global player, the world largest democracy and a counterbalance to China; Brexit and internal dynamics in the EU. The text is based, among others, on research and discussions taken under umbrella of the India-EU Think Tank Twinning Initiative - the project implemented by 10 best European and Indian think tanks.

The process of forming the European Union Battlegroups has become an important factor in developing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU). Creation of immediate reaction capacity in the EU' military and anti-crisis actions increase the cohesion throughout the Union. This is also a strong motive to intensifying other security actions; e.g. development of the capacity of strategic military transfer or foundation of regular operational command structures. Political role of the future European Union Battlegroups is worth mentioning, they could provide new perspectives throughout CSDP. This project would serve to strengthen European identity, as well as increase the significance of the Union on the international/global political scene. For success in becoming an effective EU strategic reserve the Battlegroups should be, however, active and appropriately used. In order to do that the European Union needs more solidarity in concepts and actions (due to national differences the CSDP still lacks integration). Meanwhile, the EU still poses new challenges (e.g. the state of affairs Georgia and Afghanistan).

The study examines the European coverage in four leading Nordic newspapers during two periods in 1993 and in 1996. During the first period, three countries were negotiating for membership in the European Union. During the second period, work on a new European Constitution was ongoing, to be negotiated by the Intergovernmental Conference at the end of the period. Two of the applicant countries, Finland and Sweden, were then members of the union since Jan 1, 1995. Voters in the third country, Norway, opted to stay outside the union. Norway is, however closely linked to the union by the previous EEA agreement. Finally, the fourth country, Denmark, had limited its longstanding membership in four important areas. Results of the main study in 1993 indicate a great difference in the degree of Europeanness of the coverage of European affairs, as indicated by the share of European issues, sources, players, institutions etc. The Danish paper, the Politiken, was on all counts genuinely European in its coverage. This could, to begin with, be understood in terms of a relational context - Denmark was a member of the European Community, the other countries were not. In 1996, as could be expected, the Norwegian paper, the Aftenposten, reduced its coverage of European affairs to about half the previous volume, the Finnish and Swedish papers, the Hufvudstadsbladet and the Dagens Nyheter, increased their volumes to new highs. The Danish paper maintained its previously comparatively high volume of European coverage, and was still distinctly more European in its outlook on transnational politics. This could be understood in terms of a new Maturity proposition - it may take a long time for the national media to come to terms with a new political environment. The study also puts forward the proposition that Danish political culture requires a different coverage of European affairs, and also requires an opportunity to discuss and evaluate European politics. On a theoretical level, the study supports the idea that national experience, historical and relational contexts influence media content. National agendas powerfully determine the orientation of transnational political communication . Three in-depth studies by and large confirm results from the content analysis. A separate exercise inspired by Grounded Theory gives rise to three theoretical concepts that seem to be fundamental dimensions of European political communication: Legitimacy (media coverage contributes to status conferral and encourages deliberation of cooperation as an idea), Participation (media coverage as expressions of intrinsical and instrumental motives for joining and taking responsibility towards European cooperation), and Mondialization/Universalism (media coverage of Europe's efforts in the global arena) ; digitalisering@umu

Trying to diagnose contemporary and future security environment of the NATO and EU one should begin with identifying challenges and goals determining activities of these two organization. Accordin to UN forecast the Word population tends do steadily increase. Demographical changes applies also to Europe as existing social balance would be undermined by growing old citizens, weakening national identity and reluctance to solve global challenges. Climate changes will bring not only global warming but inevitable geopolitical and economic consequences related to territorial borders and right to explore energy resources – oil and gas. The competition around the Arctic will involve a number of states such as US, Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia. Another threat is the danger of new divisions in Europe resulting from the economic and civilization threats. Deepening the differences arising from such a state of affairs as well as the existing extremes of richness and poverty may bring about an escalation of social dissatisfaction, and as a consequence, internal destabilization of the states. That is the reason why both organization should upport the tendencies towards economic and political integration of Euroatlantic area countries as well as towards the development of active mutually profitable co-operation with the states and regions from beyond particular European camps and institutions. NATO and EU possess a number of tools, political and military instruments that could face and manage crisis situation arising from dramatically changing security environment. Having mentioned above in mind the United States and European Union should enforce its strategic partnership

The article is concerned with the latest strategies of Polish development policy in the light of shifting global economic and political power structures, when North-South relationships are fundamentally changing, and so the conditions that frame European and polish development aid policy. Key documents define Polish development aid activities as the important field of foreign policy. The first part of the article analyses the determinants and experience of polish development cooperation. The second part examines the legal basis for development cooperation (Act on Development cooperation approved on 16th of September 2011 by the Polish Parliament) and the medium term vision for Poland's development cooperation (Multiannual development cooperation programme 2012–2015, development cooperation plan for 2012 and 2013). The last part of the analysis characterizes geographical and thematic areas of polish aid. The article presents strengths and weaknesses of Poland's official development assistance (ODA). The author intends to describe basic principles of the organization of the Polish development policy under Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and so their implementation.

In 2003, the Council of Europe, the highest political organ of the European Union, resolved to adopt the European Security Strategy. This document outlined three fundamental objectives for the EU: stability and good governance in the area of the EU's closest neighbors; creating an international order that would be based not only on bilateral relations, but primarily on efficient multilateral relations; and preventing threats, whether new or traditional. The Strategy assumed that the EU would take the responsibility for international security both in the realm of 'peace keeping' (peace and defensive missions) and 'peace-making' (peace and offensive missions). Defining the threats that the European Union needs to defy, the Strategy enumerates local conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use against the territory of the EU and its member states, collapsing states, and conflicts breaking out in such states and their neighborhood, as well as organized crime. The assessment of numerous threats to internal and external security, presented in the European Security Strategy, remains up-to-date. There have also emerged new threats for Europe that result from the need to ensure energy security, primarily with respect to the diversification of energy sources. The significance of climate change to international security has increased. The same applies to IT security or piracy. The EU has been rather anxious about the intensification of frozen conflicts, in particular the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the enlargement process is a significant stabilizing factor in the EU neighborhood. Fundamental importance is also attached to the review of cooperation principles with the USA, the crucial role of the UN in the international system, and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union. There is also the need to develop a strategic partnership with NATO, in particular in terms of operational cooperation. Another key factor in the strengthening of the EU's global position is the development of a civil and military crisis response system.

In 2003, the Council of Europe, the highest political organ of the European Union, resolved to adopt the European Security Strategy. This document outlined three fundamental objectives for the EU: stability and good governance in the area of the EU's closest neighbors; creating an international order that would be based not only on bilateral relations, but primarily on efficient multilateral relations; and preventing threats, whether new or traditional. The Strategy assumed that the EU would take the responsibility for international security both in the realm of 'peace keeping' (peace and defensive missions) and 'peace-making' (peace and offensive missions). Defining the threats that the European Union needs to defy, the Strategy enumerates local conflicts, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their potential use against the territory of the EU and its member states, collapsing states, and conflicts breaking out in such states and their neighborhood, as well as organized crime. The assessment of numerous threats to internal and external security, presented in the European Security Strategy, remains up-to-date. There have also emerged new threats for Europe that result from the need to ensure energy security, primarily with respect to the diversification of energy sources. The significance of climate change to international security has increased. The same applies to IT security or piracy. The EU has been rather anxious about the intensification of frozen conflicts, in particular the outbreak of war between Russia and Georgia. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has indicated that the enlargement process is a significant stabilizing factor in the EU neighborhood. Fundamental importance is also attached to the review of cooperation principles with the USA, the crucial role of the UN in the international system, and cooperation with regional organizations, such as the African Union. There is also the need to develop a strategic partnership with NATO, in particular in terms of operational cooperation. Another key factor in the strengthening of the EU's global position is the development of a civil and military crisis response system.

In 1991, the Swedish Social Democratic government established the Pensioners' Council at the Ministry of Social Affairs. The Council's purpose and structure were spelled out by the Government in a Commission of Inquiry Directive. According to this, the Council is to be a forum for deliberations between the Government and pensioners' organizations. At the municipal level, Senior Citizens Councils have existed since the 1970s. They fill a similar purpose to that of the Pensioners' Council at the central level, namely to be an arena for political discussions between representatives from pensioners' organizations and the municipality. The purpose of this dissertation is two-fold. First, I describe the influence of pensioners' organizations on the establishment of the pensioners' councils and their political influence – potential as well as actual – in these councils. Second, I seek to explain the influence of pensioners' organizations from a power resources perspective. By doing so, I hope to contribute to our knowledge of the relationship between the welfare state and organized interests. Does this relationship imply the existence of a corporatist or pluralistic power structure? Finally, I also hope to contribute to our understanding of the future development of the welfare state in the light of a global economy and aging population. The empirical investigation on the central level suggests that pensioners' organizations influenced the decision to establish the Pensioners' Council. Moreover, they had actual as well as potential political influence through the council since the early 1990s. There success in influencing government policy is due to the fact that pensioners' organizations represent an important voting group and their employees have expert knowledge. At the local level, the empirical investigation suggests that pensioners' organizations had influence on decisions made by municipalities to establish Senior Citizens Councils. However, opportunities to influence vary at the local level, and pensioners' organizations actual political influence is limited. This limited influence can be explained as a consequence of pensioners' organizations lack of an important power resource at the local level – employed expertise. It is argued in the dissertation that the empirical results do not suggest an existence of a corporatist power structure in social issues. Rather, they point to a pluralistic power structure – i.e. along side producer organizations, other organizations (such as those for welfare consumers) also have an important power position. This, in turn, limits the ability of politicians to cut welfare spending. The case of pensioners' organizations therefore suggests that we cannot expect any drastic downsizing of the Swedish welfare state due to factors such as the globalization of the economy. In light of the aging population, the empirical results suggest that politicians will have to seek other solutions to be able to meet the challenge of financing welfare programs targeting the elderly than making drastic cutbacks in those programs.

Zmiana instytucjonalna jest nieodłącznym procesem wpisującym się w rozwój społeczeństwa i gospodarki. Najistotniejszym procesem w ramach transformacji instytucji wydaje się dopasowywanie (się) instytucji formalnych i nieformalnych. Jest to niezbędne, aby system instytucjonalny działał sprawnie, aby generował odpowiednie bodźce na rzecz aktywności gospodarczej (niski koszt transakcyjny, przewidywalność, zaufanie). Efektem takich dostosowań jest ład instytucjonalny, który jest warunkiem trwałości rozwoju gospodarczego. Cechą instytucji jest długookresowe trwanie, choć jednocześnie odbywa się ich nieprzerwana ewolucja. Powstaje pytanie, w jaki sposób kształtuje się ład instytucjonalny, jaką rolę odgrywają w nim instytucje nieformalne. Za cel artykułu przyjęto określenie roli instytucji nieformalnych w kreowaniu ładu instytucjonalnego. Można wysunąć przypuszczenie, że instytucje nieformalne wraz z upływem czasu stają się trwałą podstawą ładu instytucjonalnego. W artykule wskazano również przejawy niesprawności systemu instytucji w Polsce, w tym instytucji nieformalnych. ; Institutional change is an integral process in the development of the society and economy. The seemingly most significant process in the transformation of institutions is the adjustment (also, mutual adjustment) of formal and informal institutions. This is critical to the proper functioning of the institutional system, so that it generates sufficient stimuli for economic activity (low transaction costs, predictability, trust). The result of such adjustments is institutional order which is a prerequisite of sustainable economic growth. One of the features of imitations is their longevity, even though they are constantly evolving. The question arises about how institutional order is formed and what the role of informal institution in this process is. The aim of the article is to determine the role of informal institutions in the formation of institutional order. It is possible that, given time, informal institutions become a solid foundation of institutional order. 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Po upadku komunizmu i zakończeniu zimnej wojny wydawało się, że świat na trwałe wchodzi w okres stabilizacji, pokoju i współpracy. Szybko jednak okazało się, że świat narastającej globalizacji ma różne oblicza, także negatywne, co rzutuje na prawie każdą sferę życia, także na bezpieczeństwo. Spadło co prawda zagrożenie nuklearne, ale pojawiły się nowe zagrożenia oraz nasiliły te, które przedtem przesłonięte były rywalizacją Wschód – Zachód. Chodzi głównie o konfl ikty etniczno- -religijne, kulturowe i cywilizacyjne, w tym rozlewające się konfl ikty wewnętrzne w państwach słabych i upadłych, proliferację broni masowego rażenia, niebezpieczne ambicje państw dyktatorskich. Ogromny wpływ na ład międzynarodowy i bezpieczeństwo miały zamachy 11 września 2001. Zmieniły one percepcję zagrożeń dla bezpieczeństwa. Terroryzm uznany został za największe zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa, a ogłoszona przez prezydenta Busha walka z terroryzmem doprowadziła Stany Zjednoczone i prawie cały Zachód do zaangażowania w dwie wojny: w Iraku i w Afganistanie. O ile interwencję w Afganistanie i obalenie reżimu Talibów można uznać za swoiste prawo do samoobrony Stanów Zjednoczonych (a właściwie po uruchomieniu art. 5 traktatu waszyngtońskiego za sprawę całego NATO), bo Al-Kaida, która była organizatorem zamachów 11 września, za przyzwoleniem tego reżimu była na stałe zainstalowana w tym kraju, to już interwencja w Iraku miała wątpliwe podstawy prawne, a właściwie była ona jednostronną decyzją USA, podjętą mimo protestów połowy sojuszników NATO. To co nastąpiło potem, w ramach wojny z terroryzmem, przekształciło się w totalny chaos, przypominający wojnę domową, w Iraku obecnie wygasającą, w Afganistanie zaś, już w warunkach obecności tam Międzynarodowych Sił Wsparcia Bezpieczeństwa (ISAF), coraz bardziej nasilającą się. W ostatnich dwóch latach warunki bezpieczeństwa w Afganistanie, za które w praktyce, w ramach ISAF, odpowiedzialne jest NATO, gwałtownie się pogorszyły. Gwałtownie wzrosła liczba zamachów terrorystycznych, a talibowie odzyskują pozycje, kontrolując już prawie 40% obszaru Afganistanu. Sytuacja w Afganistanie i odpowiedzialność NATO za bezpieczeństwo tego kraju budzi ogromne zaniepokojenie przywódców państw natowskich oraz kierownictwa sojuszu. Staje się to również jednym z centralnych problemów nowej administracji waszyngtońskiej. Trwające już siedem lat i rosnące zaangażowanie NATO i sił koalicyjnych w Afganistanie, pionierskie w ramach misji out of area, mimo zaangażowania ok. 64 tysięcy żołnierzy, sprzętu i idących w miliardy dolarów kosztów operacji nie przynosi jak dotąd, oczekiwanych rezultatów. Dlatego też przygotowana i realizowana jest nowa strategia obecności USA i NATO w Afganistanie. Zaangażowanie NATO w Afganistanie często interpretowane jest jako swoisty test dla Sojuszu, jako wyraz rosnącej odpowiedzialności za bezpieczeństwo globalne, w tym za zwalczanie nowych zagrożeń, takich jak terroryzm, których eskalacja jest także ubocznym skutkiem globalizacji. Autor nie w pełni podziela te opinie, choć niewątpliwie obecność NATO w Afganistanie jest ważną i trudną próbą dla Sojuszu, w tym także dla Polski ze względu na rosnące zaangażowanie sił zbrojnych naszego kraju w tę operację. Sprawa udziału NATO jednak rzutuje na stan bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, eskaluje napięcia i budzi negatywne emocje cywilizacyjno-kulturowe, utrudnia walkę z terroryzmem, kładzie się cieniem na i tak niejasny obraz sytuacji na Bliskim i Środkowym Wschodzie. Na wiele spraw z zakresu bezpieczeństwa globalnego i regionalnego, w tym narodowego poszczególnych krajów (choćby USA), patrzy się przez pryzmat Afganistanu. ; When the cold war ended, after the collapse of communism and when fi nally the Soviet Union disintegrated, there was a widespread feeling through the world that at long last universal peace had descended on earth. The fear of war in which weapons of mass destruction would be used had vanished. Today's world is a vastly different place. It is a world of globalization, which has both good and bad sides. This inexorable process has extended the opportunities of worldwide interchange. But this same globalization process and associated technology have also brought major new threats and intensifi ed existing ones. The threats we face are seamless, running across the boundaries of defence, foreign affairs, domestic and social life. It has left nations and peoples ever more vulnerable to phenomena ranging from international crime and terrorism through to cyber-attacks, health pandemics, energy politics, resource shortages and fi nancial crisis. We are facing the problem of failed states, WMD proliferations, rough countries challenges. We all have to agree that it was a great impact of 9/11 terrorist hijackers and attacks on security. The perception of international security threats has changed. Terrorism has been recognized as the biggest threat for security. The war on terrorism, declared by George W. Bush, has engaged United States and almost the whole West in two wars: in Iraq and in Afghanistan. As far as Afghanistan case is concerned, one has to recognize the legitimacy of American intervention (as did the UN Security Council), as U.S. had the right to self-defence after Al-Qaeda attacks, operating from Afghan territory. In the case of intervention in Iraq there are far going doubts about its legitimacy. The result was not only the overthrow of both regimes, of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Taliban in Afghanistan, but a real mess – if not a civil war – in Iraq. Today, after seven years, the security situation in Iraq has much improved, but in Afghanistan there is ongoing process of violence escalation. In the last years the conditions of security in Afghanistan, for keeping which responsible is ISAF (and practically NATO, being a core of ISAF), has dramatically deteriorated. The number of terrorist attacks has enormously increased and Taliban have regained the control over 40% of Afghan territory. The security situation in Afghanistan and NATO's responsibility for that is the reason of deep concern for both the leaders of NATO member states and Alliance itself. The new American administration has made the confl ict a policy priority. President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan, including the decision to commit an additional 30 000 U.S. military forces to address the confl ict. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan is treated as a kind of test for Alliance and a confi rmation of NATO's rising responsibility for global security, opening new out of area alliance missions. It is also important for Poland, taking in consideration the rising number of Polish troops in Afghanistan. Many questions of global and regional [Middle East] security are treated in the framework of Afghanistan case. ; Многие считали, что после падения коммунизма и окончания холодной войны, мир входит в период стабилизации, мира и сотрудничества. Однако вскоре ока- залось, что в эпоху глобализации мир имеет разные обличия, в том числе нега- тивные, что отражается почти на каждой сфере жизни, в том числе и на безопас- ности. Хотя и уменьшилась ядерная угроза, но появились новые угрозы, а также усилились те, которые ранее, в связи с соперничеством Востока и Запада, на- ходились на втором плане. Главным образом здесь необходимо иметь ввиду эт- ническо-религиозные, культурные и цивилизационные конфликты, в том числе, внутренние конфликты в слабых и распавшихся государствах, распространение оружия массового уничтожения, опасные шаги диктаторских государств. Огромное влияние на международный порядок и безопасность оказали террористические акты 11 сентября 2001 года. Они полностью изменили вос- приятие угроз безопасности. Терроризм был признан самой большой угрозой безопасности, а провозглашенная президентом Бушем война с терроризмом вовлекла Соединённые Штаты и почти весь Запад в ведение двух войн: в Ира- ке и в Афганистане. Если интервенцию в Афганистане и свержение режима та- либов еще можно признать своеобразным правом на самозащиту Соединённых Штатов (а имея ввиду 5 статью Вашингтонского договора делом всего НАТО), поскольку Аль-Каида, ответственная за организацию терактов 11 сентября, с согласия режима талибов имела постоянные базы в этой стране, то интер- венция в Ираке имела очень слабые юридические основания и в действитель- ности она была односторонним решением США, принятым вопреки протестам половины союзников НАТО. То, что произошло в рамках войны с терроризмом, позже превратилось в тотальный хаос, приведший к ослабевающей гражданс- кой войне в Ираке, и усиливающейся войне в Афганистане, происходящей в ус- ловиях присутствия там Международных сил содействия безопасности (ISAF). В последние два года безопасность в Афганистане, за которую в действитель- ности в рамках ISAF, несет ответственность НАТО, сильно ухудшилась. Возрос- ло количество террористических актов, а талибы контролируют уже почти 40% территории Афганистана. Ситуация в Афганистане и ответственность НАТО за безопасность этой стра- ны, вызывает огромное беспокойство глав государств членов НАТО, руководс- тва союза, а также становиться одной из главных проблем новой вашингтон- ской администрации. Продолжающееся уже семь лет и растущее присутствие НАТО и коалиционных сил в Афганистане, не взирая на контингент численностью около 64 тысяч солдат, современную технику и исчисляющуюся в миллиар- дах долларов стоимость операции, пока не принесло ожидаемых результатов. В связи с чем, подготавливается и реализуется новая стратегия присутствия США и НАТО в Афганистане. Действия НАТО в Афганистане часто интерпретированы как своеобразный тест для союза, как проявление растущей ответственности за глобальную бе- зопасность, в том числе за борьбу с новыми угрозами, такими как терроризм, эскалация которого в какой-то степени является побочным следствием глоба- лизации. Автор не полностью разделяет такое мнение, хотя, несомненно, при- сутствие НАТО в Афганистане – это важное и тяжелое испытание для союза, в том числе также для Польши, ввиду возрастающего присутствия вооружён- ных сил Польши в этой операции. Вопрос участия в операции НАТО, хотим мы этого или нет, отражается на состоянии международной безопасности, вызыва- ет напряжения и отрицательные цивилизационно-культурные эмоции, затруд- няет борьбу с терроризмом, оказывает влияние на и так непростую ситуацию на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке. На многие вопросы в сфере глобальной и ре- гиональной безопасности, в том числе и национальной, отдельных стран (даже США), нужно смотреть сквозь призму Афганистана.