Suchergebnisse

Explanation is given to the dismal predictions of the Club of Rome studies concerning long-run consequences of economic growth & population increases, & why they are not translated into policy changes affecting those variables. The domestic function of economic growth, providing bargaining space for the solution of political conflicts, & the propensity of policy makers to give priority to short-run problems affecting their own position inhibit these policy changes. Focus is on the theory of W. Harich, (KOMMUNISMUS OHNE WACHSTUM? BABEUF UND DER CLUB OF ROME [Communism without Growth? Babeuf and the Club of Rome], Rheinbeck: Rowohlt, 1975) a philosopher from the German Democratic Republic who argued for rigid centralization of political & economic power at the global level. Although Harich did not include concepts such as `liberty', `democracy', & `constitution' in his theory, this can be compared to some of the political reactions to the challenge in Western Europe. Proposals made by Tinbergen & the Mansholt plan however are found to be more promising. 3 Figures. Modified HA.

Between 1949 and 1962 the Netherlands renounced its sovereignty over most of its overseas territories. Nevertheless, during the entire period of the Cold War, the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN) stood by its point of view that it had a global task to fulfil. This military-naval deployment, outside the NATO treaty area during and shortly after the Cold War in relation to the structural global ambitions of the Royal Netherlands Navy's leadership, is the central theme of this study. This theme is analysed on the basis of theories and an understanding of multinational fleet operations after 1945 and Dutch policy regarding naval operations outside the NATO treaty area, but above all through regional case studies (Korean War 1950-1955, operations around the Arabian peninsula 1984-2000, and in the Adriatic Sea and Montenegrin waters 1992-2001). These case studies were examined by addressing the following central questions: to what extent did these missions involve a traditional approach to Dutch foreign policy? To what extent did the Navy's leadership influence the political-strategic decision-making on these out-of-area operations? To what extent were Dutch tasks and operations different from those of coalition partners, specifically those of the British Royal Navy, which the Royal Netherlands Navy considered to be its 'sister navy'? To what extent did the existing national and international perceptions of the RNLN influence Dutch decision-making on these missions, and how much did the participation in multinational fleet operations subsequently contribute to the objectives the Dutch government had in mind? In all the three case studies, the national and international perception of the Netherlands as a maritime nation and the ability to deploy high-quality navy units were taken into account in the Dutch government's decision-making regarding the RNLN participation in multinational fleet operations. The missions always received international, and especially British and American, appreciation and respect. The fact that ...

The amalgamation of Belgian municipalities was intended to enhance the resolution of civic problems. Although it would require more dedication, deeper understanding, a readiness to listen, & preliminary research on the part of the managers, the merged communities could have better facilities because they were centralized. However, the resulting hierarchy & bureaucracy have made flexible management more difficult, & some citizens focus on the negative rather than positive aspects of the consolidation. The global impression is that the consolidation has been better for the small municipalities than the large ones, especially those of 50,000+ inhabitants, who feel that the understanding & resolution of their problems has become more complicated. This situation is viewed with particular regard for the services offered by Belgium's public centers for social welfare (OCMW). Modified HA.

The question whether the Belgian foreign policy is marked by a continuity or break between the first & second turns of Guy Verhofstadt as a prime minister of this country's governments is addressed, surveying developments in the 1999-2004 period & scrutinizing the rhetorical declarations & concrete initiatives "on the ground" by the foreign minister Louis Michel. The diplomatic style of the first & second administrations are compared, & the principles & directions of Belgian foreign policy in 2004 are assessed in the context of the state of political affairs on the global arena, with special attention to the split between the EU & US on the war in Iraq, the division inside the former vis-a-vis supporting or opposing US intervention in this Middle Eastern country, & the recent troubles the EU experiences with greater degree of political integration, projecting also into a lack of coherent, uniform foreign policy on the supranational level. Some of the major issues the Belgian foreign policy must deal in 2004 & beyond are identified: securing democratic & peaceful governance in Central Africa, responding to the anti-Belgian campaign conducted by the US, & supporting the process of strengthening the EU position as a relevant actor on the geopolitical stage. Z. Dubiel

A debate consisting of a main article on the paradigm of information and communication technologies for development, the so-called ICT4D-paradigm, stating that access to ICT can promote development, leading to a decrease in global socio-economic inequality. The author underlines the parallel with former modernisation paradigms, and the fact that basic market and power structures are ignored. In the first of two responding articles the authors point out possibilities in ICT interaction and participation, thus enabling developing countries to respond actively, not merely passive. Furthermore they plead for further investment in researching the positive impact ICT can have on social change and development. In the second article examples are outlined in which ICT empowered existing development processes with the inclusion of two requirements: participation of interested people, and capacity building locally. O. van Zijl

The European Union's merchandising policies have been a successful enterprise, whereas sensitive political items of safety, defense and international policies were not its priority. Since the 1990's however the EU tries to define itself in relationship to the rest of the world, of which the Common Foreign and Safety Policy (Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands- en Veiligheidsbeleid, GBVB) is a good example with which the EU promotes and defends its interests internationally. Moreover, through the GBVB, the EU takes part in crisis control activities, as for example on the Balkans. An analysis of EU interventions and behavior during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with explanations for the limited successes achieved, in particular by lack of its member states to cooperate in a unified action, partly based on differences of opinion, partly on a lack of national profit to be gained from the region concerned. Differences of opinion often based on conflicting national interests, and highly influence - negatively - on the GBVB's effectivity. To be more influential on a global scale, member states should compromise their proper interests into a unified voice, and bind together their bilateral relations into cooperation. Furthermore, problems regarding coherence and continuity exist by means of an often changing chairmanship of the EU, making the flow of information and mandates irregular, therewith reducing the GBVB's into a reactive organ, where dynamic activity is needed. References. O. van Zijl

This introductory article sketches the problematique of this special issue on 'Subsidiarity in the European Union and beyond'. It starts with a short historical overview of the origins, meanings and implementation of the subsidiarity principle within the EU. Subsequently, it problematizes the concept and application of subsidiarity in a multilevel governance context by examining two fundamental characteristics of this essentially contested concept that render it fascinating to study: its complexity and power-relevance. The relatively new concept of global subsidiarity is briefly discussed to situate the intra-EU discussion in a wider context. This introduction ends by discussing some of the findings of the special issue's two substantial articles -- that both deal with policy topics in which different competence regimes meet -- in light of the subsidiarity problematique. Adapted from the source document.

Dutch socioeconomic concertation has experienced some transformative changes in its modus operandi in recent years, which has given the 'Polder Model' a new lease on life for the time being. Building on an older tradition of sharing political space with civil society organizations, the recent liberal-social democratic government coalition, with Mark Rutte at the helm (2012-2017), has been able to enact a surprisingly successful structural reform agenda in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Governing in times of significant economic, social and political uncertainty, it is no mean feat that the Rutte II administration – de facto a minority government – is the first Dutch coalition to complete its term since the administration under Wim Kok (1994-1998). After the foundational Social Accord (the so-called Mondriaan Akkoord) in April 2013, a series of reform agreements were reached in the policy areas of education, housing, healthcare, industrial and energy policy. For each of these more meso-level accords, a variety of civil society organizations participated that were beyond the traditional social partners of business and labor. Over time these seemingly ad hoc, open and non-hierarchical agreements materialized in a trajectory of cumulatively transformative policy change. The political tactic of the Rutte II government stands out in comparison with the halcyon Dutch miracle era of the Polder Model in the 1980s and 1990. We explain the new modes of Dutch socioeconomic policy concertation and its political tactic as a kind of rallying around existing institutional arrangements to bring the contested political and social center together behind a major adjustment strategy, including retrenchment, compensatory social meas­ures and investments, when reform output and outcomes are fundamentally uncertain. Whether the new Polder Model will prove robust remains an open question. Recently, new multiple party covenants were negotiated in the textile and banking industry. Meanwhile a number of issues concerning regional labor market regulation and work-life balance reconciliation have yet to be resolved.

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.

The ecologist (green) party, Agalev, & the radical right-wing party, Vlaams Blok, have often been considered each others' antipodes on the Belgium political spectrum in their attitudes toward immigrant rights, Flemish & Belgian nationalism, materialistic vs postmaterialistic values, & environmental policy. Using data from 2,619 Flemish voters after the 1991 general elections, attitudes & sociodemographic characteristics of these parties are analyzed in a global logistic regression model, using the electorates of all other parties as a reference category. It is found that young urban non-Catholics are overrepresented in the electorates of both parties; however, Agalev voters tend to be well-educated & have a high occupational status, whereas Vlaams voters are more likely to have little education & a low (blue-collar) occupational status. Controlling for social characteristics, these attitudinal variables show significant opposite net effects on the electoral choice. Agalev & Vlaams Blok each received about 10% of the votes, supporting Swyngedouw's thesis (1986 [see abstract 86Q8012]) about the emergence of two cleavages, the universalistic-particularistic & postmaterialistic-materialistic. 3 Tables. Adapted from the source document.