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本研究运用地方政治经济特征来解释商业协会与威权国家关系的分化,以及商业协会之间的系统差异,主张在地方政治经济结构中理解商业协会的角色及其之于威权政体的意义。本研究说明了在转型中国商业协会政治角色的新经验进展,探讨了社会利益能够成功地以制度化的方式输入威权政体的条件。 ; 在国家一面,本项研究说明了支撑地方威权国家维持支配的制度基础。激励地方政府开拓财源的财政制度和刺激官僚追求政绩的晋升制度,促使地方政府及其组成部门利用商业协会来提供必要的财政补给、提供公共品和帮助政府执行治理职能。在社会一面,中国的地方政治经济发展模式并非消弭而是加深了私营企业主之间的利益分化,破坏了商业协会的同质性基础。大型私企、中小型私企、个体与地方政府的互动模式具有本质差别,形成了分化的利益诉求。但是当前的商业协会体系并不能处理这种分化了的社会利益诉求,试图将它们都聚集到同一个结社中,既破坏了结社的内部凝聚力,也阻碍了制度化利益传输的可能。 ; 商业协会与威权国家的关系取决于政府渗透与结社凝聚力两大条件的交互作用。本研究将当下商业协会与威权国家的关系概括为四种类型:"合作型,"对抗型,"支配型和"庇护型。不同类型协会表达利益诉求的能力不同,"合作型与"对抗型都可以曲折的方式实现利益中介,但它们都还不是制度化的利益中介过程。通过"去政治化的政治整合过程,当前中国的商业协会对威权政体的政治稳定起到了正面作用。基于上述分析,合理的推论是:若地方政治经济特征存在系统差异,则商业协会的整体状况也应存在系统差异。本研究所建立的关于商业协会政治影响力的Logistic回归模型说明,商业协会的层级越高,组织凝聚力越高,与政府的"合作型关系越强,其被政府咨询以及实际影响政策的可能性也越高。在中国,在更高的政府层级上商业协会具有更可见的政治影响力。 ; This research reveals how the differentiated relation between business associations and authoritarian state and the systematic organizational variations are configurated by local political economy, and argues the political significance of business associations in authoritarian state should be located in the specific political economic structure. This research displays recent development of business associations' political role in transitional China, and identify the conditions that facilitate organizational social interest pursuits to be successfully inputted into authoritarian state. ; On the one hand, this research discusses the institutional bases which motivate the local authoritarian state to maintain continuing domination over society. Both the fiscal institution driving local state to expand revenue incomes and the bureaucratic promotion institution driving officials to accumulate political achievements motivate the local government to achieve following benefits from penetrating and dominating business associations: extract money from society, provide public goods, and facilitate the governance functions. On the other hand, the specific developmental pattern of local market economy actually has deepened the fragmentations among emerging private ...

在过去十年间里,中国立法机关及政府机关已制定颁布了大量新的法律法规。这些法律从数量和质量上而言,和过去相比都有了很大飞跃,公司法和证券法领域尤为如此。 法律从业人员数量的增多满足了人们多元化的法律需求。财经媒体的迅速发展使得大众对商业和市场运行、以及相关法律法规产生了更加深刻的认识。 然而,这些方面的改善并不意味着中国上市公司小股东保护也得到了相应的加强。 ; 本文主要围绕以下三部分内容进行了探讨:1.中国现行法律下规制小股东保护的法律原则及规则;2.从政治环境的角度分析政治对部分规则形成的影响以及一些规则在实践中未能达到其立法旨意的原因;及3.小股东积极通过诉讼保护自身权利的现状及困境。作者评估了法律在小股东保护方面的实际效果,并分析中国的当代政治对法律达到其原本立法旨意的影响。虽然保护小股东及上市公司治理的法律框架已越来越全面,但实践中,小股东通过诉讼途径来有效实现自身权利却仍困境重重。本文认为,法院拒绝受理针对政治背景深厚的公司提起的诉讼、小股东面临的举证困难、法院收取的高额诉讼费用等因素都是小股东在实践中所要克服的障碍。 ; 本文认为,影响众多中国上市公司治理的最大问题以及小股东通过诉讼途径保护自身权益的最大障碍正是党国体制对经济活动的干预,尤其是对于部分上市公司和法律程序的干预。为论证该观点,文本首先分析了党国是如何参与并影响中国上市公司的治理。文章发现,党组织在那些由国家直接或间接控股的上市公司发挥了重要的决策及监督作用。此外,文章还分析了民营性质的上市公司是如何受到地方政府的干预。文章认为,针对上市公司的政治干预消弱了法律治理的作用,同时也损害了小股东的合法权益。为了实现对小股东的保护,法律不但要保护小股东不受私权的侵犯(比如私人或私人实体对小股东作出的欺诈或不当行为),更重要的是保护小股东权利不受到来自党国体制默许、支持、甚至实际参与的行为的侵犯。 ; In the past decade, China has experienced an exponential increase in the quantity and quality of new laws and regulations promulgated by the state and its agencies, especially in the area of company law and securities regulation. The legal profession grows and provides ever more diversified services to a public, whose awareness of business and market practices, as well as to some extent the legal rules and principles governing these, are being strengthened by the burgeoning financial media. Yet, these improvements do not necessarily translate into better protection for minority shareholders of Chinese listed companies. ; This thesis discusses the legal rules and principles governing minority shareholders' protection, the political realities that have shaped some of the rules and, as argued here, threaten to undermine some of the principles, and minority shareholders' activism to enforce their rights through litigation. The author has sought to test how law functions in the area of minority shareholder protection and how political practice affects the functioning of law in this area. While the legal framework for minority shareholders' protection and for the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies is becoming increasingly ...

武舉常科創自武曌(則天),長安二年(702)始設。歷後各朝,除元代不開武科,宋、金、明三代偶有停罷,武科相沿一千二百年,幾與文科相埒。職是之故,近世中國之造士與選士,於文科、儒學、儒經、文廟一系之外,另有武科、武學、武經、武廟一系。兩系雖各有輕重,然並駕駢行千餘載,交互制衡,以保政治之平穩暢達。 ; 入關伊始,清廷即詔令因襲前明舊制,開設文武科考。自順治二年(1645)開科鄉試,至光緒二十七年(1901)正式廢除,清代武科持續運作二百五十餘年,幾與王朝相伴始終。清代武科之主要層級同於文科,皆始於童試,繼而鄉試、會試,終於殿試。各級武考中式者,亦相應得授武生員、武舉人、武進士出身。武科各級考試,均分別外場、內場進行,以外場試武藝,內場試文藝。錄取權衡時外場重於內場,外場技藝之中,馬、步箭及開弓又重於舞刀、掇石。 ; 清代武科之制度設計及考試內容,延續中國歷代選士「文武合一」之一貫理想,然現實中卻文武殊途。清代武科之設計與運作,既體現旗民之別,八旗內部又有滿蒙與漢軍之別、京旗與駐防之別。武科之正面影響遠不及文科,然文武科考皆為常規掄才途徑,兩者所揭櫫清代政局大勢與掄才需求之變化,實際異曲同工。通過文武兩途考選,清代科考人才之宏觀佈局,呈現南方文風熾盛、北方技勇突出之特徵。武進士之初始授職,以皇宮侍衛及地方營、衛守備為主,然武科選途清初即病壅滯,實授遷轉甚難。 ; 清廷之復武科,宣稱旨在遴選「干城之才」,以為「腹心之寄」。然武科內場考試,自乾隆朝廢止《四書》,嘉慶朝盡廢論、策之試,改為默寫《武經》,日漸形同虛設。武科士子之文化素養,亦日益下降。武科外場所試技藝,係屬展示表演,而非對抗實戰。而且,自乾隆間改試鳥槍之議被禁,外場各項冷兵器技藝考核陳陳相因,與實際戰局日漸疏離。職是之故,清代中期以降,武科越益頹化為授予功名之儀式與恩榮,而非掄才要徑、晉身要途。武進士初始授職之品級,雖遠較文進士為高,然武科出身之仕途前景與政治影響遠不及文科。更有甚者,武科內、外場不僅弊情嚴重,不少武科士子更危害一方,成為地方社會亂源,大悖設科初衷。 ; 清代武科出身雖有功勳卓著、官居高位者,然究屬鳳毛麟角,且集中於清代初中期。整體而論,這套幾乎橫貫全國、縱跨全清之掄才制度,得材甚少。其對帝國整體軍事力量,亦鮮少實質促進。然武科之存續,仍有平衡文武、調劑滿漢之功用,清廷既可藉此驅策雙方、維持動態均勢,又可以之宣示恩典威權、籠絡地方。因此,清代武科雖然實效不彰,卻又相沿不輟。必至清末內憂外患之鉅變衝擊,始與文科相繼停廢。復因武科之影響遠不及文科,故廢除武科所致近代中國社會之震盪,亦不可與停廢文科同日而語。 ; Established by Empress Wu in 702, the imperial military examination system lasted, albeit having been suspended in the entire Yuan dynasty and in part of the Song, Jin and Ming dynasties occasionally, for 1200 years, which was nearly as long as the period of existence of the imperial civil examination system. In effect, the military examination system, associated with military schools, military classics and military temples, functioned as a mechanism parallel to the civil examination and its related institutions (i.e., Confucian schools, Confucian classics and Confucian temples) for cultivating and recruiting talents in late imperial China. Although the two systems exerted influence in different degrees on the Chinese empire, they co-existed and managed to keep a balance between them for more than a millennium so as to contribute to the stable and smooth governance of traditional China. ; The Manchu court, immediately after ...