Suchergebnisse

Online proračunska transparentnost lokalnih jedinica (OLBT) prepoznata je kao važna značajka dobrog upravljanja. U skladu s tim, OLBT se u ovom radu mjeri u svih 128 gradova i na uzorku od 100 općina u Hrvatskoj koristeći nekoliko ključnih lokalnih proračunskih dokumenata objavljenih na web stranicama lokalnih jedinica. Koristeći Poissonov panel model s fiksnim učinkom u razdoblju 2013. – 2017., pokazalo se da osim dohotka stanovnika i fiskalnog kapaciteta lokalnih jedinica, razinu OLBT-a određuju politička ideologija i politička konkurencija. Ovaj rad pridonosi rastućoj literaturi o proračunskoj transparentnosti utvrđivanjem važnosti političkih faktora kao odrednica OLBT-a u bivšoj socijalističkoj, fiskalno centraliziranoj, članici EU-a i otkriva zanimljivu tvrdoglavost građana koji dosljedno glasaju za netransparentne političare. Glavni nalaz je da su politički faktori (politička ideologija i politička konkurencija) važni kao odrednice OLBT-a, što u lokalnim jedinicama rezultira suboptimalnom ravnotežom s niskim razinama OLBT-a. Lokalni političar na vlasti zaključuje da OLBT nije od posebne važnost da bi mu izborna jedinica zamjerila netransparentnost. U takvom je okruženju navedeni zaključak valjan, jer ovaj rad dokazuje da birači, koji su tvrdoglavi u svojim glasačkim obrascima, odbijaju promijeniti lokalnog političara na vlasti iako je netransparentan. ; Online local budget transparency (OLBT) has been recognized as an important feature of good governance. Accordingly, in this paper, OLBT is measured in all 128 cities and a sample of 100 municipalities in Croatia using several key local budget documents published on local government websites. Using a fixed effect Poisson panel model covering the 2013-2017 period, it is shown that along with residents' income and fiscal capacity of local governments, political ideology and political competition determine the level of OLBT. This paper contributes to the growing body of budget transparency literature by establishing the importance of political factors as determinants of OLBT in this former socialist, fiscally centralized EU member state and reveals the curious stubbornness of the citizens who consistently vote for non-transparent politicians. The main finding is that political factors (political ideology and political competition) matters in determining OLBT, resulting in suboptimal equilibrium of local governments with low levels of OLBT. The local incumbent concludes that OLBT is not a high priority and that his/her constituency will not hold it against him/her. In this environment such a conclusion stands owing to the fact that voters who are stubborn in their voting patterns refuse to change the incumbent who created nontransparency.

Faza europeizacije hrvatske javne uprave započela je 2001. godine. Obuhvaća značajne promjene u središnjoj državnoj upravi, javnim službama (službama od općeg interesa), lokalnoj i regionalnoj samoupravi, službeničkom sustavu, upravnom obrazovanju, općem upravnom pravu te u sustavu pravne zaštite građana. U svim tim područjima razvijaju se značajni europski standardi, koji služe kao oslonac harmonizacije javnih uprava europskih zemalja. Europske standarde razvijaju Europska unija, Vijeće Europe, ali i same europske zemlje međusobnom razmjenom i učenjem. Reformama hrvatske uprave želi se ojačati upravne kapacitete, ostvarenje standarda dobrog europskog upravljanja i efektivni ulazak u zajednički europski upravni prostor. Europska je unija nametnula politiku i mehanizme kondicionalnosti te osigurala značajna financijska sredstva, projekte i stručnu potporu upravnim reformama u Hrvatskoj. Prilagodbe su u tijeku, a usprkos općenito dobrim rezultatima, ostaje značajni prostor za punu europeizaciju, u smislu postizanja odgovarajućih učinaka hrvatske javne uprave. ; Europeanization of the Croatian public administration formally started in 2001. This phase has encompassed important changes of the central state administration, services of general interest, local and regional self-government, civil service, administrative education and in-service training, general administrative law and system of legal protection of citizens. Reforms have been oriented towards strengthening administrative capacities, acquiring standards of good European governance, and effective entrance into common European Administrative Space. During that phase, till the Croatian accession, the European Union imposed conditionality policy and mechanisms, and ensured huge financial and expert support to the reforms. Reforms at the central level consisted of agencification, professionalisation and depoliticisation of the civil service, Europeanization of a significant part of sectoral public policies and strengthening openness and ethical standards. The purposes of reforms at the local and regional levels have been strengthening democratic legitimacy, reorientation towards economic development, and realisation of prerequisites for more efficient regional policy in line with European regional and structural policy. A new concept of services of general interest along with liberalisation, privatisation and commercialisation policy has been realised. Independent regulation of services of general economic interest and fostering better quality of non-economic services of general interest have been developed. Legal protection of citizens has been strengthened by introducing two-tier administrative justice and realisation of standards of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, parallel with some administrative simplification. The right to good administration, established by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, has attracted increased attention. Certain steps towards quality modern education for key administrative personnel have been made.

U radu se izlaže prvi dio prijedloga analitičkog okvira za opće razmatranje teritorijalne osnove lokalne samouprave. Obrađene su dvije sastavnice tog okvira: 1. opća načela na kojima se treba zasnivati podjela teritorija na lokalne samoupravne jedinice i 2. uvjeti koji ograničavaju odnosno faktori koji utječu na teritorijalnu podjelu. Valjanost analitičkog instrumentarija provjerava se na komparativnom materijalu. ; The paper contains the first pan of the analytical framework for theoretical analysis of the territorial basis of local self-government. Two components of the framework have been dealt with: 1 ) general principles on which territorial organisation should be based in any developed local self-government System, and 2) conditions that limit and factors that influence any territorial organisation. With regard to general principles, the author differentiates between the principles of the territorial basis of the whole local self-government System and the principles related to the determination of the territory of individual local self-government units, i.e., parts of local self-government System, The principles related to the whole local self-government System are coverage, stabïlity, rationality, and organisational adequacy of the territorial division, whïle the principles on which the territory of local self-government units should be based are the wholeness of a self-government unit, uniformity of local self- government units, financial capacity and independence, démocratie quality of local governance, and accessïbïlity of local services. Each principle has been analysed with regard to its limitations and Problems concerning its implémentation. The author points out contradictory implications that may arise from the implémentation of certain principles related to territorial détermination of local self-government units. The second component of the analytical framework deals with objective conditions and subjective factors that determine and influence territorial organisation. These conditions and factors have been grouped and systematised into eight groups according to the degree of their invariance: natural characteristics of the territory; network and types of settlements; population characteristics; administrative-territorial tradition; level of economic development; transport and communication networks; efficiency and effectiveness of local services; and political aims and interests. The validity of analytical tools has been corroborated by the examples from comparative local self-government, The second part of the analytical framework containing the main Problems of any territorial division to local self-government units and their possible solutions is forthcoming.

Rast gradskog stanovništva utječe na održivost i razvoj pametnih regija. Međunarodni standardi mogu pružiti dobre prakse u širokim područjima koja se odnose na ekološke, sigurnosne i društvene aspekte koji doprinose postizanju gospodarskog i održivog rasta, dobrobiti i sigurnosti okoliša. Cilj ove studije je istražiti postoji li povezanost između razine pametnih gradova u različitim regijama i broja certifikata koji bi mogli pokrenuti daljnji razvoj pametnih i održivih gradova. Analizirali smo standarde koji podržavaju razvoj održivih i pametnih gradova iz različitih zemalja i istražili njihov utjecaj na razinu pametnih i održivih gradova. Za mjerenje uspješnosti gradova koristili smo UN-ovu inicijativu za prosperitet grada (CPI) i njezinih šest dimenzija: produktivnost, razvoj infrastrukture, kvalitetu života, jednakost i društvenu uključenost, održivost okoliša i urbano upravljanje i zakonodavstvo. Za analiziranje utjecaja međunarodnih standarda na inicijativu pametnih regija i gradova proveli smo SEM analizu. Rezultati istraživanja potvrđuju da postoji značajna razlika između razine pametnih gradova u različitim regijama i broja certifikata koji bi mogli pokrenuti daljnji razvoj pametnih i održivih gradova. Nadalje, potvrđen je pozitivan utjecaj međunarodnih standarda na razvoj pametnih regija i gradova. Vjerujemo da predstavljeni pristup može pružiti dodatni uvid u čimbenike koji utječu na razvoj pametnih regija i gradova i pokrenuti daljnja istraživanja o toj temi. ; The growth of city population has consequences on the sustainability and development of smart regions. International standards can provide good practices in wide areas related to environmental, security and social aspects that contribute to the achievement of economic and sustainable growth, well-being, and safe environment. The aim of this study is to explore if there is an association between the level of smart cities in different regions and the number of certificates that could initiate further development of smart and sustainable cities. We analysed standards that support the development of sustainable and smart cities from different countries and explored their influence on the level of smart and sustainable cities. To measure the performance of cities we used the UN-habitat City Prosperity Initiative (CPI) and its six dimensions: Productivity, Infrastructure Development, Quality of Life, Equity and Social Inclusion, Environmental Sustainability, and Urban Governance and Legislation. To analyse the influence of international standards on smart regions and cities initiative we conducted SEM analysis. The results of the research have proved that there is a significant difference between the level of smart cities in different regions and the number of certificates that could initiate further development of smart and sustainable cities. Additionally, a positive impact of international standards on the development of smart regions and cities is confirmed. We believe that the presented approach might provide additional insights into the factors which impact the development of smart regions and cities and initiate further studies on the topic.

U radu se razmatra potencijalni doprinos socijalnih inovacija jačanju socijalne kohezije i ublažavanju učinaka krize. U politikama i programima financiranja Europske unije socijalne inovacije prepoznaju se kao važan doprinos jačanju socijalne kohezije, koja slabi uslijed krize i povećane socijalne ranjivosti. Istovremeno, pokazuje se da su socijalne inovacije u hrvatskom kontekstu i dalje slabo poznat koncept priređivačima politika, stručnjacima i široj javnosti. Nalazi i zaključci rada temelje se na empirijskom istraživanju provedenom u okviru međunarodnog FP7 projekta WILCO – Welfare Innovations at Local Levels in Favour of Cohesion, unutar kojeg su studirani izabrani gradovi (u Hrvatskoj su to bili Zagreb i Varaždin); obilježja njihovih socijalnih sustava te su analizirani identificirani primjeri socijalnih inovacija. Lokalni socijalni sustavi gradova u istraživanju tek djelomično odražavaju karakteristike nacionalnih socijalnih režima, a otvorenost i podrška lokalnih vlasti ključna je za razvoj i održivost socijalnih inovacija. Većina istraživanih inovacija je u području usluga, iako se inovacije prepoznaju i u inovativnim instrumentima regulacije i socijalnih prava, novim oblicima vladavine te novim modalitetima rada i financiranja organizacija te one mogu utjecati na postupne promjene samih lokalnih socijalnih sustava. U hrvatskom kontekstu razlikujemo tri tipa socijalnih inovacija: (1) inovacije koje nastaju u javnom sektoru, uz podršku stručnjaka izvan sektora, (2) inovacije koje dolaze iz inozemstva, kao rezultat inozemnih financijskih programa te (3) inovacije koje dolaze iz civilnog društva, temeljem samoorganizacije građana. Dok se u primjerima nekih zapadnoeuropskih gradova javni sektor sa svojim profesionalnim kapacitetima prepoznaje kao važan proizvođač socijalnih inovacija, u Hrvatskoj prijašnja iskustva te istraživanja provedena u projektu sugeriraju da većina socijalnih inovacija dolazi iz civilnog društva, pri čemu je razina kulturnog i socijalnog kapitala važan preduvjet razvoja i uspjeha inovacija. ; This paper discusses a potential contribution of social innovations to strengthening social cohesion and mitigating the effects of the crisis. In EU funding policies and programs, social innovations are recognized as an important contribution to strengthening of social cohesion, which has weakened due to the crisis and increasing social vulnerability. At the same time, it is shown that social innovations in the Croatian context are still a concept poorly understood by policy creators, experts, and the general public. The findings and conclusions of the paper are based on the empirical research conducted within the international FP7 project WILCO - Welfare Innovations at Local Levels in Favour of Cohesion, which studied the selected towns (in Croatia Zagreb and Varaždin) and characteristics of their social systems, and which analyzed identified examples of social innovations. Local social systems of cities included in the research reflected the characteristics of national welfare regimes only partially, and the openness and support of local authorities is crucial for the development and sustainability of social innovations. Most of the studied innovations were in the field of services, although innovations were also recognized in innovative instruments of regulation and social rights, the new forms of governance and new modes of work and funding of organizations, and they can have an impact on the gradual changes of the local social systems. In the Croatian context, three types of social innovations can be distinguished: (1) innovations occurring in the public sector, with the support of experts from outside the industry, (2) innovations that come from abroad, as a result of foreign financial programs, and (3) innovations coming from civil society, based on the self-organization of citizens. While in the examples of some Western European cities the public sector with its professional capacity is recognized as an important producer of social innovations, in Croatia, past experiences and the research conducted within the project suggest that most social innovations come from civil society, where the level of cultural and social capital is an important prerequisite for the development and success of innovations.

U radu se polazi od shvaćanja da je javno-privatno partnerstvo (JPP) jedan od najznačajnijih instrumenata dobrog upravljanja, pri čemu treba voditi računa o složenosti tog mehanizma, mogućnos tima i opasnostima koje u sebi nosi, posebno ako ga se uzima u njegovoj reduciranoj ulozi – kao instrument privatnog investiranja za zadovoljenje javnih potreba. Upravo takav uski koncept dolazi do izražaja u Smjernicama Vlade Republike Hrvatske donesenim u rujnu 2006., kojima se uvodi isključivo ugovorni oblik JPP-a i koncesije. Rad upozorava na nedovoljnu sustavnost, konzistentnost, jasnoću i cjelovitost pristupa, koja čini upitnom proklamiranu svrhu Smjernica da potencijalnim partnerima pruži informacije, koje sadržavaju dovoljno odgovora kad oni razmišljaju primijeniti li ili ne JPP. Kako bi se došlo do dodatnih informacija, najveći dio rada posvećen e prikazu instituta isključivog ugovornog oblika JPP-a kroz praksu zemalja (prvenstveno V. Britanije i donekle Australije) kojega najviše primjenjuju u posljednjih 10-ak godina, pri čemu je naglasak na problemima transfera rizika. ; The paper is based on the belief that public-private partnership is one of the most important instruments of good governance. However, the complexity, potentials, and dangers of that institute also must be taken into consideration. At the beginning of the paper, the author outlines Guidelines of the Government from September 2006, which introduced the institute of public-private partnership as exclusively contractual relationship. A critical analysis of the Guidelines has shown a number of incomplete and disputable provisions as well as confusion about the principles, objectives, and instruments of public-private partnership. That situation certainly does not provide sufficient information to those who would like to use the instrument of PPP, particularly because they are constantly persuaded that PPP is the best way for satisfying public needs without additional taxation of citizens.969 Perko-[eparovi} Inge: Upitnost transfera rizika u javno-privatnom partnerstvu HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA, god. 7. (2007.), br. 4., str. 943–969 HRVATSKA JAVNA UPRAVA The main part of the paper deals with the practice in Great Britain – the country that has been using that institute most frequently in the past ten years – and Australia – the country that often copies British solutions. Since the legitimation for contractual form of PPP – in Great Britain known as private financial initiative – often seems to be the allocation of risk, i.e. the transfer of risk from the public to the private sector, the main part of the paper deals with these issues: the existence and time of the transfer of risk; public sector constraints that appear after a contract has been signed in the situation of asymmetrical powers; and transaction costs. British and Australian examples are followed by an outline of legal framework for PPP projects. Several options are shown: BOOT, DBFO (the most successful and the most common), and DBO. If we calculate value for money, it is obvious that previous experiences with PPP more than disputable. »Successful projects« have been and still are the result of heavy payments to the private sector. E.g. road construction with private financial initiative: initial construction costs were paid off in only three years, the private sector makes operative profit of 68%cper annum based on the contract valid for thirty years. Previous experience has shown that the state has been enthusiastic in protecting the profit interests of private investors at the expense of its citizens, i.e. in putting the private interest above the common good. The reality of this PPP form is far from perfect. Finally, the author suggests better institutionalisation of PPP processes in Croatia in order to ensure the best of imperfect contractual forms of PPP.

The Manuscript Legacy of Miroslav Krleža, filed in the Manuscripts and Old Books Collection of the National and University Library in Zagreb under a unique shelf number R 7970, includes two letters which Ivan Supek addressed to Krleža in 1954. The first letter was sent on 1 March, accompanied by an "Open Letter to the Assembly of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts (JAZU)," which the Council of the Ruđer Bošković Institute of Physics dated 26 February 1954. The second letter Supek addressed to Krleža on 13 May 1954, and as far as we know, it marked the end of their correspondence in 1954. The Legacy of Ivan Supek, in family possession, contains an official letter dated 5 May 1954, by which Miroslav Krleža, acting as vice-president of the Academy at the time, informs Ivan Supek about two decisions passed at the informal session of the Assembly of the Yugoslav Academy on 29 April 1954; in his intellectual autobiography entitled Krivovjernik na ljevici [Heretic on the Left], Supek cites but a single characteristic fragment of that letter. For the first time a full text of these four documents is published here in my transcription which most faithfully follows the original without any interventions in terms of either punctuation or devices used for emphasis. The Open Letter of the Council of the Ruđer Bošković Institute to the Assembly of the Yugoslav Academy includes a host of hitherto unknown data on the Institute's first four years of development, as it closely documents the chronology of the conflict between the Institute's Council and the Presidency of the Yugoslav Academy from 1950 till 1953, at the root of which was the decision making on the development of the Institute. As Council president, Ivan Supek made huge efforts to reconcile "two different tendencies of development," first by drawing up a Temporary Statute of the Institute in 1952, and later, in the spring of 1953, by making a proposition to the University Senate and the Presidency of the Yugoslav Academy by which "the Academy and University should collaborate at the Ruđer Bošković Institute on common goals." Since the draft of the Institute's Statute at the turn of 1953 to 1954 had stood at a standstill for three months, the Institute's Council decided to send an Open Letter to the Assembly of the Yugoslav Academy with a counter-proposition by which "the Academy Statute should be changed in accordance with scientific development in our country." From the perspective of Ivan Supek, that is, "us physicists," the Institute's successful development was to rest on its self-governance and organic connection with the University, but the Academy's administration was not willing to consider such a formally-based legal framework of the Institute's operation within its system. The Open Letter emerged during a heated debate on the organisation of scientific work in Croatia and Yugoslavia. Academic circles could not reconcile with the fact that, according to the Soviet model, the research work would be organised exclusively at the academies. From this standpoint, the topics of the Open Letter reverberate two strong voices: the addresses of the Nobel Prize winner Lavoslav Ružička during his visits to Yugoslavia in November 1949 and October 1952, and a speech that Ivan Supek delivered on 22 January 1953 at a meeting of the Department of the Mathematics and Physics at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences of the Zagreb University, published in the March issue of Pogledi. While Ružička firmly stated that the "University ought to be a supreme place for higher education and for the fundamental research in the field of pure and applied science, and a unique place for the attainment of academic degrees," in the interest of the Institute Supek publicly advocated for "a harmonic community of University and Academy," although deep at heart he shared Ružička's views. In the letter of 1 March 1954, Ivan Supek appealed to Miroslav Krleža, vicepresident and Communist Party secretary of the Academy, to help him untangle the relations between the Institute and JAZU, and whom he wished to address in person and elaborate the motives behind the Open Letter. Judging by the events that followed, Supek's attempt proved futile. In the absence of Andrija Štampar, Academy president, Krleža, acting as vicepresident, on 5 May 1954 sent an official letter to Supek concerning the decisions of the informal session of the Academy Assembly held on 29 April 1954. From this letter alone we can learn that the Academy Assembly established 23 March 1954 as termination date of Supek's Academy membership on the basis of his letter on the renouncement of membership, but also that on 29 April 1954 an additional penalty was issued against Supek: that "he disqualified himself for any work at the Academy or collaboration with it." Nevertheless, he retained his leading position at the greatest institute within the Yugoslav Academy. In a letter dated 13 May 1954, Supek asked Krleža to send him the minutes of the Commission which the formal Academy Assembly of 16 March 1954 appointed with an aim to establish his responsibility for the Open Letter, so that he could finally learn "the reasons underlying the accusation against me. The consequences which I may suffer are not an issue here, but it is in the Academy's interest to establish the truth, along with the true motives for drawing up an Open Letter." Here he expressed his disappointment by the fact "that some places [from the Open Letter] were understood as offences, and that they actually distracted discussion away from the principal issues," but insisted on the key point from the Open Letter "that for the selfgovernance of the Institute and its organic connection with the University a change of the Academy Statute was necessary." In the spring of 1954, the Yugoslav Academy headed by Andrija Štampar definitely gave up on the concept of an inter-disciplinary research institute, although under the pressure of the 'young lions' from its largest institute, and in accordance with the Soviet model and the original ideas and decisions of Boris Kidrič (died on 11 April 1953), had an opportunity to take this path in its own development, too. Upon the Assembly's 'reply' to the Institute Council, the concept of multi- and inter-disciplinary approach to fundamental research in natural sciences in organic connection with the University as development model for the Ruđer Bošković Institute faced new risks, including those of political nature, but the research community gathered at the Institute, despite the circumstances, managed to live its 'dream' of self-governance and development in harmony with the University, as confirmed by a decision on the new organisation of the Institute passed on 7 September 1954. This step in the Institute's development was also approved by the Republic government, when on 22 November 1954, in agreement with the Yugoslav Academy, it decided that as from 1 January 1955 the Institute was no longer part of the Yugoslav Academy. Five months after the Republic's decision, another step towards the Institute's lasting 'independence' took place, when by a decision of the Federal Government of 30 April 1955 the Institute as a "self-financed institution" came under the authority of the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission headed by Aleksandar Ranković, and in this formally legal frame operated for eleven years – until Ranković's political downfall on 1 July 1966. Miroslav Krleža, to whom in the crucial days of early March 1954 Ivan Supek offered a mediating role, as a highly-positioned Academy member failed to see this historical opportunity to support the development of natural sciences in Croatia in a new direction, perhaps less exposed to political pressure. Ivan Supek and Mladen Paić, who on different legal grounds by 29 April 1954 no longer were correspondent members of JAZU, seven years later–on 16 June 1961–were elected full members, which is a unique case in the history of the Yugoslav Academy.

Do lokalnog se razvoja dolazi na temelju pažljivo pripremljene i provedene lokalne razvojne strategije. U jedinicama lokalne i područne (regionalne) samouprave nužno je usvojiti nov način strateškog planiranja, koji objedinjava proračunsko planiranje i strategiju razvoja lokalne jedinice s ciljem praćenja ostvarivanja rezultata trošečnjem proračunskih sredstava. U razvijenim se državama strategija lokalnog i regionalnog razvoja provodi putem participativnog pristupa u planiranju. To znači da u izradi strategije sudjeluju svi važni dionici koji djeluju na lokalnoj razini. U Hrvatskoj, slično kao i u većini drugih zemalja istone i jugoistočne Europe, ne postoji dovoljno iskustava u primjeni participativnog pristupa. Teorijska rješenja i praktična iskustva uspješnih država upućuju na važnost usklađivanja svih važnih elemenata da bi se pripremila uspješna strategija lokalnog razvoja. Suvremeni pristup strategiji lokalnog i regionalnog razvoja analizira se u okviru decentralizacije javnih poslova, odgovornosti za njihovo obavljanje i načina njihova financiranja. Lokalne i regionalne vlasti mogu najbolje upravljati lokalnim razvojem, a efektivnost se postiže u koordinaciji sa širom razinom vlasti, koja osigurava jasan okvir za strateško planiranje i donošenje odluka, kao i u suradnji i partnerstvu s privatnim i nevladinim sektorom. U oblikovanju lokalnih razvojnih strategija pristup dobrog upravljanja postaje ključnim pristupom za ostvarenje dobrih rezultata i korištenje konkurentskih prednosti. Premda fiskalna teorija poznaje više pristupa planiranju proračuna, programski proračun ključni je preduvjet za mjerenje lokalnih i regionalnih rezultata. Time se postiže veća učinkovitost i transparentnost, jer je programski proračun usmjeren na djelotvornost i mjerenje rezultata. Onda je odgovore na pitanja: što se želi postići? i Koliko će koštati ostvarenje cilja? Ta vrsta planiranja zahtijeva strateško planiranje koje uključuje jasno određenje misije, ciljeva i mjera za praćenje rezultata. Upravljanje na temelju mjerenja rezultata nalazi sve širu primjenu i u javnom sektoru, uključujući lokalnu i regionalnu razinu. Uspješno praćenje i vrednovanje rezultata ostvarenih u jednoj lokalnoj ili regionalnoj jedinici zahtijeva jasno prikazivanje rezultata u skladu s postavljenim strateškim ciljevima. ; Local development is the result of a care fully planned and implemented local development strategy. It is necessary to adopt a new way of strategic planning for local and regional self-government units, which would include budget planning and local unit(s) development strategy. The purpose is to monitor the results achieved by budget expenditures. In the developed countries, local and regional development strategies are implemented by using the participative approach. It means that all the relevant local and regional stake holders participate in designing a local and regional development strategy. Similar to the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, there is a lack of experience with the use of the participative approach in designing local and regional development strategies in Croatia. Theoretical solutions and real-life experiences of the successful countries stress the importance of co-ordination of all the relevant elements in order to design a successful local development strategy. Modern approach to the local and regional development strategy is analysed within the framework of decentralisation of public affairs, responsibility for their performance and the manner of their financing. Local and regional authorities are able to manage local development most successfully. Effectiveness is achived in co-ordination with the broader level of government, which provides a clear frame work for strategic planning and decision-making, and in co-operation and partnership with the private and NGO sectors. The good governance approach has become essential for achieving good results and using the competitive advantages. Although fiscal theory has several approaches to budget planning, program budgeting is the key precondition for assessing the results achieved at the local and regional levels. It leads to increased effectiveness and transparency, since program budgeting is focused on the effectiveness (planning) and measuring the achieved results, as well as answering the questions such as "What is the goal?" and "What are the costs of achieving that goal?". In order to achieve these objectives, program budgeting requires strategic planning which means clearly defined mission, objectives, and measures for monitoring the results achieved by local self-government units. Performance management has been spreading in the public sector, and consequently at both local and regional levels. Successful monitoring and assessment of the results achieved by a municipality, town, or region is going to require their transparent description in accordance with the strategic goals.

U legitimiranju komunističke vlasti u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji nakon Drugog svjetskog rata važnu ulogu imale su i tradicionalne institucije zakonodavne, izvršne i sudbene vlasti. Njihovo oblikovanje u Federalnoj Državi/Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj započelo je 1943. te je nastavljeno do donošenja Ustava NRH 18. siječnja 1947., kojim dobivaju ustavnu potvrdu. U odnosu na njihove ustavne pozicije, u dosadašnjim istraživanjima poslijeratnog političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj zaključeno je da su stvarnu vlast i monopol odlučivanja imala najviša tijela KPJ, tj. KPH. Pri tome stvarni položaj i uloga središnjih državnih tijela u funkcioniranju političkog sustava vlasti u Hrvatskoj nakon 1945. do sada nisu sustavno istraženi te se ovim radom daje doprinos na tom području. Prezentiraju se rezultati istraživanja organizacije i djelovanja Sabora NRH u sustavu vlasti u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju formalnog federalizma i stvarnog centralizma (1945. – 1953.). Postavljeno je više istraživačkih ciljeva: odnos između njegova formalnog ustavnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja u sustavu vlasti, ustroj, sastav, zakonodavna djelatnost i druge funkcije, odnosi s KPH/SKH i republičkim institucijama vlasti, te utjecaj njegova djelovanja na svakodnevni život stanovništva. Njegova organizacija i djelovanje uspoređeni su s organizacijom i djelovanjem Narodne skupštine FNRJ, institucija zakonodavne vlasti drugih jugoslavenskih republika, te drugih država u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast, ponajprije Ruske Sovjetske Federativne Socijalističke Republike (RSFSR) i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika (SSSR). Postavljeno je nekoliko hipoteza koje su istraživanjem i potvrđene: ustavni položaj vrhovnog tijela državne vlasti u Hrvatskoj Sabor NRH nije ostvarivao u praksi; bio je organiziran po uzoru na Narodnu skupštinu FNRJ; njegova zakonodavna djelatnost nije uključivala stvarnu raspravu, već samo formalno normiranje prethodno definiranih političkih ciljeva i ideja KPH/SKH; u Saboru NRH nije bilo pluralizma političkoga mišljenja; građani su se obraćali Saboru NRH prvenstveno s ciljem ostvarivanja osobnih prava, ponajprije socijalnih. Osnovne metode korištene u istraživanju su kritička analiza izvora i komparativna metoda. Rezultati su prezentirani kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a u pojedinim poglavljima sistematizirani su u obliku grafičkih i tabličnih prikaza. Doktorskim radom daje se doprinos boljem poznavanju institucija i političkog sustava vlasti FD/NRH u razdoblju 1945. – 1953. Istraživanje može biti poticaj sličnim istraživanjima i u drugim bivšim jugoslavenskim republikama. Omogućuje se usporedba s političkim sustavima vlasti u drugim europskim državama u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast. ; The important role in legitimising the communist system of government in Croatia/Yugoslavia after the Second World War was played by the traditional institutions of legislative, executive and judicial government. Their organization in Federal State / People's Republic of Croatia began in 1943, and continued until the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia adoption on 18th January 1947, which gave them constitutional confirmation. As the supreme state governing institutions were declared People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament and its Presidium; Government of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme executive and administrative governing institution, and Supreme Court of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme judicial institution. In relation to their constitutional position, in previous researches of post-war political system in Croatia, was concluded that the real authority and decision-making monopoly had the highest body of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, ie. Communist Party of Croatia. In doing so, the actual position and the role of republic governmental institutions in the communist system of government in Croatia after 1945 haven't been systematically researched, and this doctoral thesis makes a contribution in this scope. The doctoral thesis presents the results of researching the organisation and activity of People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament during the period of formal federalism and actual centralism (1945 – 1953). The aim is to explain the realation between the constitutional and actual position of the Parliament in the communist system of government, its structure, composition, legislative activity, relations with the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communists of Croatia and republic governmental institutions, as well as the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population. Parliament's organisation and activity is also compared to the organisation and activity of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia, as well as with legislative institutions of the former Yugoslavian republics and other European states with established communist rule, primarily Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A number of hypotheses are confirmed by research: the constitutional position of the supreme state governing institution, Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia didn't achieve in practice; it was organized on the model of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia; its legislative activity didn't include the actual debate, but only a formal adoption and promulgation of pre-defined political goals and ideas of the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communist of Croatia; in People's Republic of Croatia'a Parliament, there wasn't pluralism of political opinion; citizens addressed the Parliament, primarily with the aim of solving personal problems, especially social. Main methods used in research were critical analysis of resources (notably original, unpublished archival documents) and comparative method. The research results are presented by a combination of thematic and chronological approach. In certain chapters, they are systematized in the form of graphical and tabular overviews. Doctoral thesis is structured as follows. In the first, introductory chapter are explained the research topic, main goals, hypotheses and scientific contribution, methodology, as well as literature and resources used in the research. The chapter gives an overview of the previous researches relevant to the topic, and the classification of legislatures in such researches. The second chapter gives an overview of the Yugoslav/Croatian communist system of government and the position of legislatures in this system in theory. There are explained the main characteristics of the then revolutionary ideology of the ruling Communist Party, as well as formal constitutional provision. They are compared with the main characteristics of the Soviet communist system of government. It also gives an overview of the classical Marxist theory about the state, government and legislatures, and demonstrates how it was used in the writings and speeches of Yugoslav theoreticians and politicians. The third and fourth chapter give an overview of the People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament organization and activity in practice, divided into two chronological periods: until the adoption of the People's Republic of Croatia's Constitution in January 1947, and thereafter up in 1953. The fifth, concluding chapter, summarizes the main research results. Chapter six contains several appendixes: the results of parliamentary elections in Croatia 1946, 1947 and 1950; a list of councilors, ie. representatives in State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia and in People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament 1943 – 1953; a list of members of the Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia 1945 – 1953; a list of representatives from Croatia in Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia / National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1945 – 1953; a list of laws adopted by the National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1946 – 1953; a list of tables and figures used in doctoral thesis). Seventh chapter contains a list of sources and literature used in the research. Doctoral thesis contributes to better understanding of institutions and the political system of government in Croatia in the period 1945 – 1953. Comparative approach in the presentation of research results, gives a contribution to knowledge of the political system of government and central governing institutions in the former Yugoslavia, as well in the other former Yugoslavian republics. At the same time, it can be a impulse for similar researces in those states. It also enables comparation with the political systems of government and legislatures in other European states with established communist rule. Through the analysis of the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population, it gives contribution to the history of everyday life in communist Croatia and Yugoslavia.

Napor na uključenju načela održivosti u osnove prostornog planiranja u današnjem postsocijalističkom svijetu traži nove odnose između ustaljenih i suvremenih sudionika. Pojedini interesenti uključeni u razvoj, upravljanje i politiku djeluju na ishod regionalnih i urbanih sustava u Hrvatskoj ponekad bez obraćanja pozornosti na održivost. Njihovo djelovanje pokazuje nedostatak svijesti i negativan odnos prema održivosti u planerskoj praksi gdje je glavni cilj unaprijediti kakvoću života sadašnjih i budućih naraštaja. Bez dobrih ideja o nosivim kapacitetima i održivosti, neki od ovih sudionika zanemaruju planerska znanja i ekspertizu (CAVRIĆ, NEDOVIĆ – BUDIĆ, 2007.). Vještinama i znanjima planeri ih savjetuju, međutim, glavna pokretačka sila još je uvijek politički utjecaj. Takvi predlagači uspijevaju zaštititi svoje osobne probitke glede prostora i zemljišta nauštrb javnosti i običnih građana, podržavajući sustav izrade "preslikanih" planerskih izvješća, pogodujući tek daljem urbanom širenju i nenadziranoj izgradnji. Na žalost, poradi dužega vremenskog društvenog ignoriranja i jake sveze lobija investitora, arhitekata i građevinara, različite međunarodne planerske ideje s "održivošću na umu" još ne utječu na hrvatsku teoriju i praksu planiranja. Neke su od njih jednostavno neprihvaćane, netočno tumačene ili odbacivane zahvaljujući krutoj zakonskoj regulativi, nepostojanju formalnog školovanja planera i povlaštenom položaju tek jednog tipa ovlaštenih planera tj. arhitekata . Osjetljivost za alternativna razvojna rješenja, sudjelovanje javnosti, novine u ponašanju, organizaciji i tehnologijama, raznovrsnost pomagala za provedbu u planerskoj "kutiji s alatima", kao i različite vrste planerskih poslova u usmjeravanju održivih promjena, tek treba prepoznati u zemlji koja je u procesu pristupanja EU. Unatoč tomu, ovaj rad teži sumirati održivost i njezine sastavnice kao nove postavke, u kojima je glavna misao vodilja novoga globalnog pristupa planiranju, objavljena od Centra za ljudska naselja Ujedinjenih Naroda (UNCHS) kako slijedi: "Novo planiranje je manje kodirano i tehničko, više inovativno i poduzetničko. Ono je više sudioničko i usmjerenije projektima nego cjelovitim prostornim sustavima. Plansku ekspertizu sve češće ne zahtijeva samo država već i dioničarski i javni dijelovi građanskog društva. Prijeporno nije planiranje samo po sebi, nego njegov cilj: da li ga voditi uglavnom učinkovitošću, jačajući postojeću razdiobu bogatstva i moći, ili bi trebalo odigrati distribucijsku ulogu da može pomoći pri stvaranju minimalnih standarda urbanog življenja" (Hague, 2001.). ; Effort to incorporate sustainability aspects into the spatial planning agenda requires new relationships between conventional and new players in today's post-socialist world. Some stakeholders engaged in development, management and governance are sometimes tailoring the destiny of regional and urban systems in Croatia without sustainability concerns. Their activities show the lack of awareness and negative attitude towards sustainable planning practices where the major goal is to improve the quality of life of current and future generations. Without sound ideas about carrying capacities and sustainability, some of these actors have ignored the planning knowledge and expertise (CAVRIĆ, NEDOVIĆ – BUDIĆ, 2007). Planners advise upon them with their professional skill and knowledge but the driving force is still political power. These proponents have managed to safeguard their own spatial and land interests on the expense of the public and ordinary citizens, by maintaining the system of "copy-paste" planning blue prints, suitable for supporting emerging urban sprawl and uncontrolled construction activities. Unfortunately, due to the long-term social ignorance and strong alliance of developer's lobbies, architects and constructors, various international planning ideas with "sustainability in mind" have not affected Croatian planning theory and practice, yet. Some of them are petrified, misinterpreted or simply abolished owing to obstinate legislation, the non-existence of formal planning education, and the privileged position of only one brand of chartered planners (e.g. architects) . Alternative development solutions, such as public participation, behavioral, organizational and technological advances, diversity of implementing instruments in the planner's "toolkit", and the planner's numerous tasks in guiding sustainable change, are still to be recognized in this EU accession country. Notwithstanding, this paper aims to summaries sustainability and its derivates as the new paradigms, in which the guiding leitmotif of the new global agenda for planning is spelled out by the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (2001b) as follows: "The new planning is less coded and technical, more innovative and entrepreneurial. It is more participatory and concerned with projects rather than whole spatial systems. Planning expertise is increasingly sought not only by the state, but also by the corporate sector and civil society. What is controversial is not planning per se, but its goal: whether it should be directed chiefly at efficiency, reinforcing the current distribution of wealth and power, or whether it should play a distributive role to help create minimum standards of urban liveability" (Hague, 2001).

Promjenom paradigme visokoga obrazovanja (VO) u globalnom kontekstu javna se sveučilišta sve više okreću razvoju internacionalnih aktivnosti. Internacionalizacija može predstavljati komparativnu prednost sveučilišta, koja razvijena kroz specifičnu inovativnu stratešku odrednicu (nišu), može postati osnova sveučilišne politike koja se provodi i implementira u različitim policy arenama. Što je sveučilište inovativnije u izboru i razvijanju ove specifične niše, ono ima veće razvojne mogućnosti te postaje kompetitivnije. Cilj je ovoga doktorskoga rada istražiti utjecaj globalizacije na internacionalizaciju javnih europskih sveučilišta. Pritom se u glavnoj tezi rada tvrdi da se promjenom paradigme visokoga obrazovanja u globalnom kontekstu javna sveučilišta sve više okreću razvoju internacionalnih aktivnosti (npr. Knight, 2008; Teichler, 2009; Kehm, 2003; Van der Wende, 2001) ali pritom odabiru različite specifične strategije (niše) internacionalizacije, dok se u postavljenoj hipotezi kaže da razlike između nacionalnih konteksta i načina na koji države upravljaju financijskom i ekonomskom krizom utječu na razlike u strategijama internacionalizacije pojedinih javnih europskih sveučilišta. Nacionalni kontekst pritom obuhvaća različitosti u tradiciji, kulturi i povijesnoj ulozi države u kojoj sveučilište djeluje, što sve utječe na razlike u nacionalnim strategijama internacionalizacije i strategijama koje u ovom području razvijaju javna sveučilišta. Budući da u literaturi ne postoji opće prihvaćena definicija globalizacije, internacionalizacije i europeizacije u području visokoga obrazovanja, niti suglasje o njihovom međusobnom odnosu te indikatorima koji ih determiniraju, provođenju komparativne analize triju studija slučaja u svrhu istraživanja utjecaja globalizacije na internacionalizaciju javnih europskih sveučilišta u ovom je doktorskom radu prethodilo empirijsko istraživanje putem delfi metode među stručnjacima širom svijeta. Minimalne definicije triju pojmova i indikatori globalizacije i internacionalizacije u području VO-a, dobiveni empirijskim istraživanjem provedenim putem delfi metode na temelju konsenzusa među ekspertima, poslužili su kao osnova komparativne analize triju studija slučaja (tri sveučilišta – Beč, Lausanne, Granada; u trima državama – Austrija, Švicarska, Španjolska), koja je provedena na temelju istraživačkog modela posebno osmišljenog za potrebe ovoga doktorskoga rada. Na temelju uvida dobivenih komparacijom triju studija slučaja u radu je utvrđen utjecaj globalizacije na internacionalizaciju javnih europskih sveučilišta, čime je potvrđena glavna teza ovoga doktorskoga rada. Također, analizom je utvrđeno i da su različiti nacionalni sustavi VO-a i specifične VO institucije na različit način odgovorili na promjene nastale djelovanjem faktora s globalne i međunarodne razine, koje se vezuju uz zadnji val globalizacije. Sukladno tome, moguće je reći i da su različitosti u prilagodbi ovim promjenama utjecale i na različitost sveučilišnih politika internacionalizacije te na različitost strateških dokumenata koje su u ovom području razvila tri analizirana sveučilišta. S obzirom na činjenicu da se nacionalni kontekst u hipotezi vezivao uz različitosti u tradiciji, kulturi i povijesnoj ulozi države, zbog čega je u analizi trebalo provjeriti je li moguće utvrditi poveznice između specifičnih strateških odrednica (niša) internacionalizacije u ovom području na Sveučilištu u Beču s tradicijom i politikom Austro-Ugarske Monarhije, na Sveučilištu u Lausanni s politikom neutralnosti, a na Sveučilištu u Granadi sa španjolskom kolonijalnom politikom prema Sjevernoj Africi, na temelju analize ovakva izravna poveznica u službenim dokumentima nije utvrđena. Ipak, kroz intervjue i boravak u trima sveučilišnim sredinama, utvrđeno je da je specifične strateške odrednice internacionalizacije moguće vezivati uz pojedine karakteristike koje se mogu smatrati povijesnim, kulturalnim i tradicijskim 'ostacima' ili tekovinama spomenutih koncepata, koji su danas, pretvoreni u nova, suvremena obilježja, ipak prisutni u samoj srži triju sveučilišta. Zaključno, kroz uvide dobivene komparativnim istraživanjem putem istraživačkog modela utvrđen je utjecaj financijske i ekonomske krize na sveučilišta u Španjolskoj, što je onda bilo moguće povezati i s provedbom sveučilišne politike u području internacionalizacije te aktivnostima i inicijativama Sveučilišta u Granadi u okviru strategije internacionalizacije, što se posebno očituje kroz izrazitu okrenutost programima za koje postoji osigurano financiranje na EU razini (npr. Erasmus+ program). Suprotno tome, uvidima nije utvrđeno postojanje utjecaja financijske i ekonomske krize na strategije internacionalizacije Sveučilišta u Beču i Sveučilišta u Lausanni te na njihovo djelovanje u ovom području. ; Although according to the opinion of many researchers universities have been among the most globalised institutions (Marginson and Considine, 2000: 8) historically, in last decades universities have had to adapt to many changes under the pressure of the last wave of globalisation (e.g. increased competitiveness, high importance of rankings, new forms of international activities, use of new communication technologies in teaching and learning, etc.). The processes that universities use to adapt to the pressure of globalisation tend to include: new strategic determinants and policies, new organisational and governance models in order to achieve greater competitiveness and better rankings results, the search for alternative and additional sources of financing due to the decrease in public funding allocation, the development of new concepts and activities with an international dimension, the establishment of new partnerships, the development of various models for international collaboration, etc. (for example, see publications by Frølich, Gornitzka, Kehm, Knight, Maassen, Neave, Stensaker, Teichler, Van der Wende, etc.). The aim of this PhD thesis is to explore the impact of globalisation on the internationalisation of European public universities. This primarily includes verifying the main thesis that by changing the paradigm of higher education (HE) in the global context, public universities are increasingly turning to the development of international activities (eg. Knight, 2008; Teichler, 2009; Kehm, 2003; Van der Wende, 2001), but they choose different internationalisation strategies. Internationalisation can be a comparative advantage of the university which, developed through specific innovative strategic orientation (niche), becomes the framework for the official university policy implemented in different political arenas and communicated to stakeholders at all levels. This niche can be based on tradition, culture and the historical role of the state in which the university operates. More the university becomes innovative in the selection and development of this niche, it gets better development opportunities and it can achieve greater global competitiveness. Therefore, this project is secondly oriented on verifying the hypothesis that differences between national contexts xi (tradition, culture and historical role of the state) and the ways in which countries manage the economic and financial crisis, affect the different selection of internationalisation strategies of European public universities. Since scientific understanding of internationalisation have changed over time, this term is today widely understood as a broad umbrella term that covers many dimensions, components, approaches and activities (de Wit and Hunter, 2015: 45). However, in the literature there is no specific answer what is exactly globalisation in HE, what are the pressures of globalisation in HE field, what do we mean by the internationalisation of universities and where and how does Europeanisation fit in. Literature has offered various definitions of these three terms and their mutual relations (for example, see publications by Altbach, de Wit, Knight, Marginson, Rhodes, Robertson, Scott, Stromquist, Sawir, Teichler, Van der Wende), and the researchers in the field of HE adopted various approaches to its operationalisation (see Knight, 2008; Teichler, 2004, 2009; Marginson i Van der Wende, 2007; de Wit, 2010, etc.) Although this PhD project is dealing with the impact of globalisation on the internationalisation of European public universities, a theoretical concept of Europeanisation is also included in the theoretical framework. The Bologna process, which highly promotes internationalisation policies and efforts, as well as other European initiatives in HE, some researchers consider to be linked with the Europeanisation in HE and therefore all three terms are analysed and discussed in this project. There are two gaps in literature that this PhD project addresses: the problem with the lack of generally accepted definitions of globalisation, internationalisation and Europeanisation and their mutual relations in HE, as well as their indicators; and the lack of projects which use analysis of the role of the context in HE field in order to explore differences between individual national (and subnational) policies. This PhD thesis had three main objectives: (1) to explore the impact of globalisation on the internationalisation of European public universities; (2) to analyse the factors that determine and redefine the characteristics of internationalisation of universities and factors that indicate the degree of policy change in strategies of HE institutions and national HE policies; (3) to explore the differences in national contexts and ways in which countries 'filter' globalisation pressures and the impact of financial and economic crisis, which affects the characteristics of national HE policies and university strategies in the field of internationalisation. In order to fulfil these goals, triangulation of literature review and empirical research was used. Therefore, in this PhD project, two empirical researches were conducted: a Delphi method research and a comparison of three case studies.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.