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The United Kingdom is often considered a leader in multiculturalism. However, recent statements by British politicians, community leaders, and academics question the multiculturalist direction in policymaking. This article reports interviews about multiculturalism, national identity, social cohesion, and future policy directions with leading figures in the debate, including Home Affairs Select Committee members, authors of major reports, experts, researchers, and academics. The attitudes expressed when discussing overall policy directions in most cases indicate disquiet at the assumed segregative effects of current policies. However, when specific issues (sharia law, faith schooling, dress codes including veiling, dietary practices, political representation) are considered, most interviewees express a concern to accommodate differences in cultural and traditional standpoints through dialogue. We conclude that multiculturalism in Britain is not "dead," as some have argued. Instead it is developing in a more pragmatic direction that emphasizes the importance of interaction and accommodation rather than top‐down interventions.

International organizations, policy experts, and nongovernmental organizations promote greater governmental transparency as a crucial reform to enhance accountability and curb corruption. Transparency is predicted to deter corruption in part by expanding the possibilities for public or societal accountability, that is, for citizens and citizens associations to monitor, scrutinize, and act to hold public office holders to account. Although the societal accountability mechanism linking transparency and good government is often implied, it builds on a number of assumptions seldom examined empirically. This article unpacks the assumptions of principal‐agent theories of accountability and suggests that the logic of collective action can be used to understand why exposure of egregious and endemic corruption may instead demobilize the demos (i.e., resignation) rather than enhance accountability (i.e., indignation). We explore these theoretical contentions and examine how transparency affects three indicators of indignations versus resignation—institutional trust, political involvement, and political interest—given different levels of corruption. The empirical analyses confirm that an increase in transparency in highly corrupt countries tends to breed resignation rather than indignation.

This article explores the impact of political determinants on the survival of managers in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). Drawing on theories of bureaucratic delegation, it is argued that preference divergence between principals and agents as well as among principals is a major driver of managerial turnover. More specifically, the partisan affiliation of SOE‐managers with the government, the opposition, or individual ministers can serve to explain the length of their tenure. The analysis employs Cox proportional hazard regressions to test these hypotheses on an original data set of 1,671 managers serving in 87 public corporations in Austria between 1995 and 2010, thus presenting one of the first large‐n analyses of political appointments in a parliamentary system. The results strongly support the proposition that partisan affiliation drives managerial survival.