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The Province of Gelderland has long boasted a large number of country houses and landed estates, which over time coalesced into estate landscapes around the historical capitals of the Duchy of Guelders quarters of Nijmegen, Arnhem and Zutphen. Rapidly increasing urbanization from the end of the nineteenth century onwards threatened the coherence and accessibility of these landscapes. Gelderland's largest cities, Arnhem and Nijmegen, watched in dismay as many country houses and landed estates fell victim to subdivision and development. In response they started to buy up portions of that estate landscape to ensure that they would remain available to city dwellers. In addition, the 'safety net' provided by newly established nature and landscape organizations, in particular Natuurmonumenten and Geldersch Landschap & Kasteelen, also contributed to preservation and permanent accessibility by offering landed families the opportunity to keep their estate intact, albeit no longer under their ownership. Similar motives – the need to preserve attractive, accessible walking areas for the increasingly urbanized society – underpinned the government's introduction of the Nature Conservation Act in 1928. The Act was invoked more frequently in Gelderland than in any other province. It promoted the opening up of private properties as well as the preservation of the cultural value of the kind of 'natural beauty' to be found on landed estates. After the Second World War, in addition to resorting to the Nature Conservation Act, the owners of country houses and landed estates could avail themselves of an increasing variety of grants aimed at preserving (publicly accessible) nature, landscape and heritage, although the emphasis was firmly on nature. Estate landscapes like the Veluwezoom and the County of Zutphen were eventually safeguarded by a patchwork of different government regulations. In the twenty-first century, government policy shifted towards providing financial support for both public and private contributions to ...

This article examines whether mayors' social capital increases local governments' performance. Putnam suggests that politicians' social networks with residents may deteriorate political transparency and thus decrease performance. However, no direct relationships have been clarified. So, we focus on the Philippines as a case and conduct a survey on national representative 300 cities and municipalities in 2011. We find that (1) by distributions, among three indexes of performance as dependent variables, valuing fundamentals of governance have the highest scores. Social governance and administrative governance follow. Among mayors' networks as independent variables, mayors meet residents most, and local politicians, provincial politicians, and the central government officers follow. (2) By regression analyses, meeting residents promotes social governance, while meeting central government officers increases administrative governance. Multi-level analyses support these results. Therefore, mayors' social capital increases local governments' performance. Yet different social capital promotes different performance.

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This thesis describes the parliamentary scrutiny system of the Dutch Government in the European decision-making process. More specifically, this study concerns the instruments of the British parliamentary scrutiny reserve and the Danish and Austrian mandating systems, and the added value that such instruments might have for the Netherlands. The main lesson to be learned from the British scrutiny reserve is that both the Government and Parliament are encouraged to become actively involved at an early stage of the European decision-making process. The system also ensures structural provision of information throughout the European decision-making process. In the Netherlands such structural information agreements between Parliament and the Government do not exist. The introduction of a parliamentary scrutiny reserve would solve this problem. The instrument of the parliamentary reserve that was introduced in the Netherlands when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force is much more limited than the British scrutiny reserve. The Dutch parliamentary reserve lacks the most essential aspect that makes the scrutiny reserve a valuable instrument. It is not linked to Government information and therefore does not stimulate as much dialogue between the Government and Parliament from the earliest stages of the European decision-making process as the British scrutiny reserve does. The Danish mandating system adds little to the Dutch Parliament's existing instruments to scrutinize the Government in the EU decision-making process. It may be doubted whether a mandating system would be suitable in a bicameral system such as the Dutch one. The Tweede Kamer (the Dutch House of Representatives) and the Eerste Kamer (the Dutch Senate) may occasionally give contradictory instructions. Furthermore, the fact that the presentation of the mandates often takes place at a later stage of the European decision-making process can be seen as a major drawback of the Danish mandating system. Despite the fact that the system ensures that Parliament is ...

For the Benefit of the Common Good? A Historical View on the Flemish Provinces as an Intermediary at the Level of AdministrationThe nation state of Belgium saw its provinces chiefly as intermediary administrative entities from which political dispute had to be excluded. Nevertheless, they disposed of elected provincial councils and enjoyed fiscal autonomy. Although the provincial governments underwent a slow process of politicisation, the effects of the broad socio-political developments over the course of the last two centuries on this level remained far less tangible, due above all to the slow democratisation of the provincial suffrage. The provinces only had a modicum of public visibility and a very limited scope for policymaking. To argue their relevance, the provincial governments referred occasionally to the shared history of their respective inhabitants or to their cultural coherence(s). But this discourse was not powerful enough to shape a common provincial cultural identity. Moreover, it clashed on the artificial borders of the provinces and with the much stronger feelings of local and regional coherence. By clustering these expressions of (sub)regionalism, the provincial governments may have provided building stones for the creation of identity-structures on a higher level. However, this role too remained very modest and can hardly be used to substantiate the institutional tenacity of this level of government.

In a time of social liquefaction and a network approach to governance citizens and their organizations are increasingly expected to contribute to the revitalization of society. Civil society organizations are valued and used by governments for contributing to a diverse range of public issues. Sports is one of those domains in which voluntary organizations are expected to contribute to society. A range of governments increasingly use voluntary sport clubs (VSCs) as partners for contributing to public issues, like counteracting overweight among youth, improve social integration of immigrants, improving social cohesion in neighbourhoods and activating the elderly. In this dissertation this process is conceptualized as instrumentalization. In this dissertation the construction of the instrumental role of voluntary sport clubs in municipal sport policy and the way in which two VSCs in the Dutch municipality of Utrecht enact this instrumental role are studied in depth. The dissertation has three aims. First, it aims to describe and understand the process of instrumentalization of VSCs, showing tensions between instrumentalization by government and the relative autonomous position of VSCs. Second, the dissertation aims to conceptualize instrumentalization as such. The concept is used in a range of academic subdisciplines, but has not yet been extensively conceptualized. Therefore, this dissertation provides a foundational contribution for further use of this concept. Third, the dissertation aims to contribute to the ongoing development of a more on agency oriented institutional approach, by combining two recent streams in this theory. It belongs to a very select number of studies that combine the institutional logics approach and the institutional work approach. The dissertation answers the follow research question: How do voluntary sport clubs enact the instrumentalization by governments and what does that mean for the dominant institutional logic(s) in voluntary sport clubs? The design of the study was inspired by ...

The Japanese government published a list of the 1,945 most commonly-used basic kanji in 1981. This database contains 27 seperate descriptions (cells) of each basic Japanese kanji which cover such fields as classification, frequency of use, number of strokes, pronunciation, etc.

Few other countries are so interrelated with the world around us in political, economic, and social respects as the Netherlands. This means that the Dutch government needs to be alert in its response to the risks and opportunities presented by a rapidly changing world. Addressing this issue, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (wrr) offers some reflections in this report, guided by the question how the Netherlands can develop a foreign policy strategy that matches the changing power relations in the world and the radically changed character of international relations. The answer to this question is a reorientation. This means making transparent choices, making smarter use of Europe as our dominant arena, and, finally, choosing an approach that makes better use of the growing role of non-state actors. The report's recommendations not only underline the necessity of reorientation but also show how this could be accomplished in practice.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2).ResponseThe validity of my comparative approach (Somalia-Rwanda-Srebrenica) still stands, in my opinion. At the level of political responsibility and the process of coming to terms with events, the similarities are stronger than the differences. My estimation that the Inquiry reports were 'hijacked' by almost all of the stakeholders involved (especially the Canadian, Belgian and Dutch governments) is more of a matter of fact and a political reality than a reproach that ought to have legal implications. Finally, the question of how far the three governments that were involved learned lessons from the three affairs is difficult to answer. Was it not also the wider developments (for example, the switch from the 'blue' missions to the more robust 'green' missions) that compelled the lessons to be drawn out?

'Will the Netherlands be defended?' The debate about NATO's main lines of defence at the beginning of the 1950sAt the beginning of the 1950s, the Netherlands would not have been able to defend itself in the event of a Soviet attack. Despite the fact that NATO, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, and later General Ridgway, was in the process of rapidly building up its defences, it was still incapable of conducting a forward defence. The pivotal political and military issue in the short term centred on one question: Which areas in Western Europe could and should be kept and which not? Answers to this question exposed conflicting national interests and points of view, particularly those of the Dutch and the French. As it was taking a considerably long time to build up the Netherlands' defences, the Dutch government had very few trump cards to add weight to its demands. Indeed, in the summer of 1952, when Parliament asked to be given a precise account of how the Dutch defences were progressing, the government was practically boxed into a corner.

Dutch socioeconomic concertation has experienced some transformative changes in its modus operandi in recent years, which has given the 'Polder Model' a new lease on life for the time being. Building on an older tradition of sharing political space with civil society organizations, the recent liberal-social democratic government coalition, with Mark Rutte at the helm (2012-2017), has been able to enact a surprisingly successful structural reform agenda in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. Governing in times of significant economic, social and political uncertainty, it is no mean feat that the Rutte II administration – de facto a minority government – is the first Dutch coalition to complete its term since the administration under Wim Kok (1994-1998). After the foundational Social Accord (the so-called Mondriaan Akkoord) in April 2013, a series of reform agreements were reached in the policy areas of education, housing, healthcare, industrial and energy policy. For each of these more meso-level accords, a variety of civil society organizations participated that were beyond the traditional social partners of business and labor. Over time these seemingly ad hoc, open and non-hierarchical agreements materialized in a trajectory of cumulatively transformative policy change. The political tactic of the Rutte II government stands out in comparison with the halcyon Dutch miracle era of the Polder Model in the 1980s and 1990. We explain the new modes of Dutch socioeconomic policy concertation and its political tactic as a kind of rallying around existing institutional arrangements to bring the contested political and social center together behind a major adjustment strategy, including retrenchment, compensatory social meas­ures and investments, when reform output and outcomes are fundamentally uncertain. Whether the new Polder Model will prove robust remains an open question. Recently, new multiple party covenants were negotiated in the textile and banking industry. Meanwhile a number of issues concerning regional labor market regulation and work-life balance reconciliation have yet to be resolved.

Hans Schippers assesses the position of the Islamic AK Party led by Prime Minister Erdogan in the light of the relationship between religion and the state in Turkey. Although the AK Party won the general elections in 2002, Erdogan has the Damocletian sword of a military coup hanging above his head ever since. The military consider themselves to be the guardians of Kemal Atatürk's legacy of Turkey as a secular state. In the past decades they intervened four times in politics, the most recent one the 1998 'post modern' coup to oust the Islamic Prime Minister Erbakan, whose approach to Iran, critical opinions on the EU and NATO and favourisation of religious education had gone too far in the eyes of the military. Erdogan cleverly avoided the mistakes of his predecessor. He declared the AKP to be a conservative, pro-EU and pro-NATO party that would seek adherence to the mostly christian-democratic European Peoples Party. His government would be liberal and respect people with different opinions on religion. Erdogan did well in regional elections of 2004. However, he met with growing criticism in the following two years. The organisational structure of the AKP is undemocratic and the number of women active in the party is far too limited, his critics remarked. The party is accused of conducting a campaign of 'creeping islamisation' of Turkish society. The military closely monitor every decision of the government near two-thirds majority in parliament and he could They have the support of the secular president have a party member elected. This would increase Sezer who has amended or rejected a large number the chances of military intervention. Erdogan will of Erdogans proposals. A crucial moment for the probably opt for a compromise candidate. However, AKP-government will be the election by parliament until the arliamentary elections of November, the of a new president, coming May. Erdogan has a political.

Traditionally, the Netherlands has enjoyed being a test market for many ideas in the media. But over the last decade, progress has been severely hampered by lengthy discussions on the future structure of just one sector of media, namely public broadcasting via radio and television. The narrow approach results in a lot of paper, speeches and theories, but little in the way of definitive policy making. In a report to the government, published in February 2005, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) argued for very different approaches to policy making. The recommendations are not only much broader than "broadcasting"; they tackle the challenges of making robust policy from new angles. Instead of trying to repair the old compass, the approach has been to find new instruments to help policymakers navigate the stormy and often confusing waters ahead. Perhaps the problem in the Netherlands is not accepting the new media, but rather accepting that the role "old" media has undergone a paradigm shift. Since the bulk of the WRR findings were published in the Dutch language, this summary is intended to provide readers outside the Netherlands with an insight into the issues at stake - and the solutions suggested by the WRR. Also available in English: "http://www.aup.nl/do.php?a=show_visitor_book&isbn=9789053568262&l=2">Media Policy for the Digital Age

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.

The central question of this dissertation is what role national identity has played in the interdepartmental policy field of international cultural policy (ICP) in the Netherlands between 1970 and 2012. In four chapters I analyse the history of ICP and the related political debate, using a theoretical framework consisting of the main concepts of a Discourse Historic Analysis (critique, ideology, and power), and tensions within the discourses on ICP and national identity. The role of national identity in the first period (1970-1986) is characterized as 'cultural nationalism'. Culture plays an important role in distinguishing the nation state from the rest of the world, and due to the decreasing autonomy in the field of economics and politics culture is considered (by some) to be the last bearer of the national identity. The debates focus on the question whether or not the government has a role in (actively) protecting that identity. The publication of the report "Culture without borders" by the Scientific Council for Government Policy marks the beginning of the second period (1987-1996). Gradually the primacy of the policy shifts from foreign to cultural policy, and attempts are made to combine within ICP the growing cultural diversity of the Dutch society with the uniting role of a national identity. Therefore the role of national identity is characterized as 'multiculturalism'. Extra funding for international cultural activities in 1997 marks the beginning of the third period (1997-2006), in which the role of national identity is characterized as 'cultural relativism'. The relationship between culture and the nation becomes more loose, and cultural activities abroad no longer seem to represent the nation's identity. This approach in ICP contrasts strongly with the growing discontent and heated public and political debate on national identity. Characteristic for the fourth period (2007-2012) is the return to the primacy of foreign policy and the focus on diplomatic and economic goals. Culture is treated as a ...