Suchergebnisse

Das Buch möchte zeigen,dass Entscheidungsautismus weit verbreitet ist, dass es aber wirkungsvolle psychologische Gegenmaßnahmen gibt, die der Autor vorstellen und diskutieren möchte.

This article reviews the major tenets of the groupthink hypothesis of Irving Janis, as well as the research on which it is based. In addition, previous research on group dynamics related to groupthink is briefly reviewed and compared to groupthink propositions. Finally, guidelinesfor research to test the propositions of groupthink are proposed.

Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction: The Rules of Groupthink -- Part 1: Political correctness - a firstcase study -- Chapter 1: The Origins of Political Correctness -- Chapter 2: Hatred and Make-believe Rule, OK? -- Chapter 3: The Real Nature of 'Political Correctness' -- Part 2: Groupthink and times of change -a detour into history -- Chapter 4: Times of Change: How Dreams become Nightmares -- Chapter 5: The 'Fantasy Cycle' and the 'Swinging Sixties' -- Chapter 6: Groupthink and the 'European Project' -- Chapter 7: Global Warming -- Chapter 8: The Strange Story of Darwinism -- A Conclusion by Richard North -- Afterword by Nicholas Booker -- Index.

'Groupthink' refers to a situation in which decision makers seek to achieve concurrence among group members more than to make calculated, carefully considered decisions. In this study, the theory is explored in the case of the 1990–91 Persian Gulf crisis, with particular emphasis on President George Bush's inner circle. Using rare interviews and primary sources, it is revealed that some important conditions of the theory were present that affected how decisions were made, and it is explained theoretically why the outcome was none the less positive, contrary to what the theory would seem to predict.

'Groupthink' refers to a situation in which decision makers seek to achieve concurrence among group members more than to make calculated, carefully considered decisions. In this study, the theory is explored in the case of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, with particular emphasis on President George Bush's inner circle. Using rare interviews and primary sources, it is revealed that some important conditions of the theory were present that affected how decisions were made, and it is explained theoretically why the outcome was none the less positive, contrary to what the theory would seem to predict. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)