Suchergebnisse

The Chinese state acts in concert with the patriarchal family to sustain its authoritarian legitimacy, and both institutions are grounded in paternalistic cultural norms. The state also harnesses the "quality" of Chinese families through the law, which often saddles women with more burdens and responsibilities than it does men. From the 1950 Marriage Law to the 2015 Universal Two-Child Policy, the state has directly politicized the family through explicit mandates on marriage and reproductive control as well as repressive deployment of families as a tool for social stability and national security. To unpack this state-family project, this article addresses how the patriarchal state constructs and manages a filial nationalist population in order to secure its authoritarian rule. Through the lens of emerging Chinese feminist and queer scholarship on families, this article also asks how the state-family project has affected people and families that are intersectionally marginalized by gender, sexuality, class, household registration [hukou 户口], and so on. Lastly, this article spotlights new developments in feminist and lgbtq movements as they advocate for marginalized individuals and families.

Any source that provides insights into the view of the world from the Ministry of Information Industries (MII) is particularly valuable at a time when debate is raging over the political impact of the Internet in the PRC. This is even more so as China joins the WTO, after which domestic Internet firms will have to gain approval from the MII before they can receive foreign capital, co-operate with foreign businesses or list domestic or overseas stocks.

'On Analysis of China's National Interests (Guanyu Zhongguo de Guojia Liyi Fenxi)' by Yan Xuetong is reviewed.

In the terminology of Chinese planning the "state plan" ("guojia jihua") embraces both the central and provincial plans, while the "local plan" ("difang jihua") refers exclusively to the one for the xian (county) and its administrative equivalent, namely the provincial municipality. This distinction is seldom made in relevant western studies. The prevalent practice is to regard provincial and local planning as synonymous, in contrast to central planning. As a result, the xian as a separate planning authority has scarcely received any attention, except for some sporadic references made in connection with studies on local, especially rural, industries.

The connotations of the interests of the PRC in the official scientific and political discourse during the period of the existence of the new Chinese state first transformed from class (jieji liyi, 1949–1978) to actually national (national-state – guojia liyi, 1979–2008), and then transition to "indigenous (core) national" (hexin guojia liyi, or simply "indigenous" – hexin liyi), and this emphasis became dominant after 2012. This process reflects substantive changes in the state's strategy. At the same time, the spatial and geographical range of his interests was expanding – from a predominant focus on domestic needs to regional and global ones. Since the 12th Chinese Communist Party Congress of 1982 declared that China would adopt foreign policy according to its national interests, the term "national interests" has been frequently used in Chinese official documents. The problems of national interests in the Chinese academic community were first raised in 1987 at the Shanghai Scientific Conference on the Theory of International Relations. In 1995, Yan Xuetong published China's first monograph on this subject, "Analysis of China's National Interests", on which he worked for two years (grant from the Chinese Academy of Contemporary International Relations) after returning from the United States, where he defended his doctoral dissertation. The publication of this book even sparked a "great debate" between young scholars and traditionalists about the normative requirements for writing papers. The article shows the dynamics of changes in the national interests of the PRC, their connotations and hierarchy both in academic discourse and in the practice of Chinese diplomacy (case of Russia and Ukraine).

Abstract
This article explores the shifting connotations of two key terms in propaganda texts on bilingual education policy in Inner Mongolia. The two terms are dumdadu-yin ündüsten (Ch.: Zhonghua minzu, Chinese nation) and ulus-un neidem hereglehü üge hel (Ch.: guojia tongyong yuyan, national common language). I examine how the meanings of these key terms have begun to shift as China strives to shed its multinational character and build a linguistically homogenous Chinese nation-state. The new prominence given to the term dumdadu-yin ündüsten (Chinese nation) and the gradual substitution of the terms neitelig hel (Ch.: putonghua) and khitad hel (Han language) with the term ulus-un neidem hereglehü üge hel (national common language) in propaganda texts in Inner Mongolia reflect and shape China's changing policies on its borderlands. In this brief exploratory article, I underline how the Mongolian terms referring to the Chinese nation and national common language undergo shifts in their meanings as what sits at the very core of these terms – the Han – irrepressibly exposes itself and subsumes other meaning potentials.

During the past decade China's leaders have called repeatedly for reductions in administrative interventions in the economy, for greater reliance on economic "levers," for decentralization of economic decision-making, and for an increased role of markets. Although the need for liberalization is fairly widely accepted, debate over how far and how fast to proceed has continued. One view initially proposed by Chen Yun sees China moving towards a system where a "planned economy is primary, and markets are supplementary" (jihua jingji wei zhu, shichang tiaojie wei bu). Others advocate moving beyond Chen Yun's vision to a system where, in fact if not in name, allocation takes place primarily through markets. Li Peng's government work report to the first session of the Seventh National People's Congress suggests that the current consensus leans towards the latter, more progressive view:The focus of reform of the planning system is to transform the function of state planning organs, gradually reduce mandatory planning and expand guidance planning, … use economic instruments, and gradually establish a new economic mechanism where "the state regulates markets, and markets guide enterprises" (guojia tiaojie shichang, shichang yindao qiye).