Suchergebnisse

Introduktion : Stormagtskonkurrencen i Arktis og Nordatlanten og dens implikationer -- Rusland i Arktis : Fra Arktis som ressourcebase til aikring af suverænitet -- Kina i Arktis : Stormagtsambitioner og indenrigspolitiske prioriteter -- USA i Arktis : Kampen om isbryderne og USA's arktiske sotrmagtsidentitet -- Vil stormagtskonkurrencen ændre Arktisk Råds betydning for USA? -- Danmark har gode muligheder for at mindske sotrmagtkonkurrencen i Arktis -- Grønlands betydning for Danmark og kernen i det dansk-grønlandske forhold -- Grønland som udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitisk aktør -- Grænser for færøsk paradiplomati? -- Dansk militær opbygning i Grønland og fastholdelse af arktisk lavspænding -- Kampen om flåden : kystvagt eller krig i farvandene omkring Grønland -- Flyvevåbnets opgaver og operative udfordringer ved indsættelse af luftmagt i Arktis -- Færøerne er en selvstændig overvejelse i forsvars- og sikkerhedspolitikken -- Konklusion : Nye perspektiver på stormagtskonkurrencen og dens implikationer.

Den norske klimapolitikken blir stadig tettere knyttet til EUs klimaregelverk. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan og hvorfor Norge har koblet klimapolitikken opp mot EU og hvilket handlingsrom samarbeidet med EU gir norske myndigheter. Gjennom EØS-avtalen har det europeiske kvotesystemet (EU ETS) siden 2008 dekket omtrent halvparten av de norske utslippene, i hovedsak fra industri og petroleumsvirksomhet. Siden 2021 er også de ikke-kvotepliktige utslippene fra transport, landbruk, bygg og avfall omfattet av en egen tidsavgrenset avtale med EU, som et tillegg til EØS-avtalen. Dette samarbeidet forplikter Norge til å kutte utslipp hvert år fram til 2030. Avtalen binder også Norge til å følge EUs regelverk for opptak av klimagasser knyttet til skog og annen arealbruk. I praksis er Norge fullt medlem av EUs klimapolitiske samarbeid fram til 2030. Analysen viser at denne tette tilknytningen har økt det politiske presset for å kutte klimagassutslipp innenlands. Samtidig har Norge valgt å holde alle fleksibilitetsmuligheter åpne for å gjennomføre kuttene i EU i stedet. Hvorvidt disse mulighetene vil bli benyttet er i stor grad et politisk spørsmål som trolig vil prege klimadebatten frem mot 2030. Den endelige utformingen og innretningen på EUs grønne giv og Norges tilknytning til denne vil også påvirke handlingsrommet for klimakutt hjemme versus ute.
Abstract in English:Ever Closer Union? Norway's Climate Collaboration with the EUNorwegian climate policy has increasingly become closely linked to EU climate regulations. This article analyzes how and why Norway has linked its climate policy to the EU's and what room for maneuvering the cooperation with the EU gives Norwegian authorities. Through the EEA agreement, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has covered about half of Norway's emissions, mainly from industry and the petroleum sector, since 2008. Since 2021, non-ETS emissions from transport, agriculture, construction and waste have also been covered by a separate time-limited agreement with the EU, as a supplement to the EEA agreement. This cooperation obliges Norway to cut emissions every year until 2030. The agreement also binds Norway to comply with EU regulations for the emissions and uptake of greenhouse gases related to forests and other land use. In practice, Norway is fully obliged to comply with the EU's climate policy regulations until 2030. The analysis shows that this close connection has increased the political pressure to cut greenhouse gas emissions domestically. At the same time, Norway has chosen to keep all flexibility options open to implement the cuts in the EU instead. Whether these opportunities will be used is largely a political question that probably will shape the climate debate until 2030. The final design and structure of the EU's Green Deal and Norway's connection to it will also affect the maneuvering room for climate cuts at home versus abroad.

BILATERAL RELATIONS ON THE MEND: Transforming the Mosaic of Opportunities into Policies of Stability and Reconciliation between Afghanistan & PakistanBilateral reconciliation and trust building between Afghanistan and Pakistan require determined individuals who will prioritize identification of workable solutions to regional instability.This report summarizes recommendations on how to approach such solutions. The recommendations emerged during two rounds of track-II dialogue – one in Kabul in May, and one in Islamabad in September, 2017 - between influential individuals from Afghanistan and Pakistan, organized by the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) and the Regional Peace Institute (RPI).In addition to discussing a host of other issues, the two rounds of the conference generated ideas and innovative suggestions on how to deal with peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, the future of Western engagement in Afghanistan, ways to resolve the Afghan refugee crisis and increasing the volume of trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan.The constructive and innovative development of recommendations during both rounds went beyond initial expectations in terms of volume and quality. However, generating innovative policy recommendations, by itself, is insufficient without their effective implementation.This report can be viewed as a mosaic of ideas and opportunities to enter a path of reconciliation and stability. If implemented, these ideas and recommendations can lead to addressing the outstanding issues between Afghanistan & Pakistan.By presenting this mosaic of progress, this report, and the authors behind it aspire to contribute in a meaningful manner to mending the existing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

""Den tidsmÃ?ssige sammenhÃ?ng mellem uddannelse og Ã?gteskab""""Konklusion""; ""Litteratur""; ""Andre kilder""; ""BeskÃ?ftigelsesmÃ?ssige effekter af de skÃ?rpede betingelser for familiesammenfÃ?ring""; ""Indvandring og velfÃ?rdssamfundets bÃ?redygtighed""; ""SkÃ?rpede betingelser for familiesammenfÃ?ring og de forventede effekter""; ""Teoretisk afsÃ?t""; ""UndersÃ?gelsens design og afgrÃ?nsning af den undersÃ?gte gruppe""; ""Variable og analysemetode""; ""UndersÃ?gelsens resultater og deres robusthed""; ""Konklusion og perspektivering""; ""Litteratur""; ""Del II. Partnervalg og Ã?gteskab""

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.