Suchergebnisse

The author claims that we are living in a time of formal democracy & multipartyism. He advocates a thesis that the Croatian government tolerates the opposition but at the same time deligitimizes it & renders it untrustworthy. The government does not rule by the book & has no systematic ideology. Thus three types of opposition are immanent to it: the one that leads into totalitarianism, the one that strives towards democracy, & finally the one that is given to internal reforms. The key condition for the success of the move towards democracy in Croatia is in countering nationalism & in coexistence within a heterogeneous society with a functional elite & interdependence as a principle. Adapted from the source document.

The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is one of the World Trade Organisation's most important agreements. This accord is the first & only set of multilateral rules covering international trade in services. It is a framework for international trade in services & a legal basis for resolving conflicting national interests. For the past two decades, trade in services has grown faster than merchandise trade. Currently, they represent more than two thirds of the World Gross Domestic Product. As the term services covers a wide range of intangible & heterogeneous products & activities, there has been an increasing demand for detailed, relevant & internationally comparable statistical information on trade in services. In the last ten years, the share of transportation services in international trade in commercial services was steady & amounted to about one quarter. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Mnoge su ekonomske teorije bazirane na pretpostavci da su pravila tržišta rezultat »prirodne« težnje racionalnih pojedinaca da ispune svoje osobne interese te da takvi »prirodni zakoni« omogućuju tržištu da se samo regulira. Na drugoj strani, njihovi kritičari inzistiraju na većoj ulozi društva i države u reguliranju tržišta. Razlike između ova dva tabora su očigledne: prva se razlika temelji na racionalnom pojedincu, a druga na ukorijenjenosti tržišta u društveni i politički kontekst. Jedni smatraju da tržišni zakoni proizlaze iz ljudske prirode, a drugi da proizlaze iz društveno-političkih normi. Međutim, oba se pristupa baziraju na modernističkim dihotomijama između subjekta i objekta, pojedinca i kolektiva, prirode i društva, što im onemogućuje da predstave svu kompleksnost umrežavanja heterogenih aktera u tržište. Ovaj tekst će predstaviti akter-mreža teoriju kao jedan alternativni pristup razumijevanju tržišta. Takav pristup implicira da niti se tržište može samo-regulirati, niti ga država može regulirati. Tržište je radije viđeno kao akter-mreža u kojoj heterogeni akteri participiraju u njegovoj konstrukciji i održavanju. ; Many economic theories are based on the assumption that the rules of the market are the results of "natural" tendencies of rational individuals to gain their interests, and that those »natural laws« enable the market to be self-regulated. Their critics insist on a more significant role of state and society in the regulation of the market. Differences between these two camps are apparent: the first approach is based on rational individuals, the second one is based on the embeddedness of markets in the social and political context. However, both approaches are based on modernist dichotomies between subject and object, individual and collective, nature and society, which make it difficult to render the complexity of linking heterogeneous actors in the market. This text will propose Actor-Network Theory as an alternative approach to understanding markets. Such an approach implies that neither can market be self-regulated nor can a state regulate it. The market is instead viewed as an actor-network in which heterogeneous actors participate in its construction and maintenance.

In all the systems aspiring towards free trade it is of essence to reconcile this interest with the protection of other values; also, the member stets agree to certain restrictions of their regulatory autonomy for the system on the whole to strike an optimal balance among the relevant interests. In relatively heterogeneous systems such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the members hold on to a significant portion of their regulatory autonomy in order to protect their values though this hampers the liberalization of trade. In relatively homogeneous systems, however, such as the European Union (EU), the members find it opportune to agree to tighter restrictions of their regulatory autonomy since thus they allow for increased trade without severely harming the other values. For Croatia it is good that the liberalization of trade & the restriction of regulatory autonomy have been gradual, occurring in four stages: the WTO membership, the Stabilization & Accession Agreement, negotiations on the EU membership & eventually the full EU membership. References. Adapted from the source document.

In all the systems aspiring towards free trade it is of essence to reconcile this interest with the protection of other values; also, the member stets agree to certain restrictions of their regulatory autonomy for the system on the whole to strike an optimal balance among the relevant interests. In relatively heterogeneous systems such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the members hold on to a significant portion of their regulatory autonomy in order to protect their values though this hampers the liberalization of trade. In relatively homogeneous systems, however, such as the European Union (EU), the members find it opportune to agree to tighter restrictions of their regulatory autonomy since thus they allow for increased trade without severely harming the other values. For Croatia it is good that the liberalization of trade & the restriction of regulatory autonomy have been gradual, occurring in four stages: the WTO membership, the Stabilization & Accession Agreement, negotiations on the EU membership & eventually the full EU membership. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author discusses the basic structure of Mancur Olson's political economy. He highlights three concepts on which it is based: public goods, interest groups, & selective incentives. The last concept represents Olson's innovation in contemporary political science. The author's central methodical assumption is based on the insight that Olson's key theory is linked with the so-called public goods paradox. Unlike private goods, public goods are noncompetitive & nonexclusive, which means that it is not possible to bar those who do not share the costs of their production from using them. On the basis of this, Olson has developed the original theory of interest groups. By looking into the costs of organizing along interest lines as a collective activity whose result is a public good, he distinguishes between large, heterogeneous, & small, homogeneous groups. Besides, he has shown that, regarding public goods, individuals tend to behave as free riders, defaulters who try to avoid the costs of securing these goods. The author shows that Olson has, notwithstanding certain flimsiness of his reductionist methodology, significantly revamped political science. Adapted from the source document.

This paper deals with various issues concerning the establishment and inauguration of the first Croatian supplementary school in Italy, the shaping of the curriculum and the forming of heterogeneous learning groups. The paper also deals with the political aspect of the new institution. This school, located in Rome, has remained active to this day, with a curriculum that differs from the one in use in the Molise region, the home of the officially recognized Croatian national minority. The methodology is based on the analysis of the statistical data issued by the Italian Ministry of Education, of the legal regulations in effect at the time when the school was established, as well as today, and on the analysis of the pedagogical and linguistic theories by Bruner, Such, Widdicombe, Ivir-Ashsworth, Jelaska and Cvikić. The paper aims to show the modern and, indeed, progressive qualities of educational and cultural procedures in Croatian supplementary school in Rome, based on the principles set by the above mentioned authors. The task accomplished by the school is set in the context of creating/enforcing the national identity based on the cultural, historical, psychological and sociological principles, expounded by the monk Martinac, and by Fromm, Smith, Supek and Anholt. The establishing, organizing and functioning of the school is also analysed in consideration of the legal framework in the period from 1998 to 2015, as well as regarding the aspect of cultural diversity and cultural integration.

Ovaj rad pruža dokaze koji govore u prilog tome da društveni mediji omogućavaju javnu deliberaciju, što je u suprotnosti s hipotezom koja naglašava dominaciju učinka "eho-komore". Rad se bavi konverzacijskim interakcijama na Twitteru između podupiratelja suprotstavljenih strana u debati o katalonskoj nezavisnosti. Ta tema, o kojoj mišljenja mogu biti snažno polarizirana, upotrijebljena je za studiju slučaja. Istraživanje je provedeno na slučajnom uzorku komunikacija na Twitterovoj platformi za odgovore i uključuje zagovornike i protivnike nezavisnosti. Unatoč tendenciji stvaranja "homofilnih mreža" koje okupljaju ljude sličnih stavova, utvrdili smo da je komunikacija između suprotstavljenih političkih tabora relativno česta. Nadalje, heterogene konverzacije (u kojima se suprotstavljene strane upuštaju u dijalog) značajno su duže nego homogene (u kojima svi sudionici dijele isto mišljenje), što se može smatrati znakom prave deliberacije, utemeljene na racionalnoj razmjeni argumenata između suprotstavljenih perspektiva. ; This article provides evidence in favour of social media serving as facilitators of public deliberation, in contrast with the hypothesis that emphasises the dominance of the "echo chamber" effect. It focuses on conversational interactions on Twitter between supporters from opposite sides in a potentially highly polarised political issue, i.e. the debate on the independence of Catalonia, which is used as a case study. Methodologically we rely on a random sample of communications on the Twitter reply network, involving for and against independence supporters. Remarkably, despite the tendency of forming homophilic networks, we find that communication across political lines is relatively frequent. Furthermore, heterogeneous conversations (where opposing sides are engaged in a dialogue) tend to be significantly longer than homogenous ones (where all participants share the same view), which can be seen as a sign of genuine deliberation based on reasonably exchanging arguments between competing viewpoints.

U ovom se radu istražuje utjecaj regionalnih trgovinskih sporazuma (RTS) na razvoj intra-industrijske trgovine (IIT) za slučaj osam zemlja Srednje i istočne Europe (SIE) od 1997. do 2019. godine. Cilj rada je usporediti i objasniti mogući heterogeni utjecaj različitih RTS na IIT, kontrolirajući za razliku u ekonomskoj razvijenosti između zemalja partnera. Analiza se temelji na razini podataka zemlja-proizvod, a izvor podataka su UN Comtrade i CEPII baza podataka koja sadrži varijable gravitacijskog modela. Hipoteza rada je da CEFTA i EU ekonomske integracije imaju snažniji (pozitivni) učinak na IIT u usporedbi s ostalim RTS, ali snaga utjecaja varira između zemalja, s obzirom na razvojne nejednakosti zemalja, koje su u ovom radu mjerene kroz razliku u BDP po glavi stanovnika. U radu je razvijen i procijenjen model koristeći PPML procjenitelj. Doprinos rada jest uključivanje interakcijske varijable između RTS i razvojne nejednakosti. Rezultati rada su ukazali da je hipoteza rada validna, kao i da razvojne nejednakosti između zemalja članica integracije imaju negativan učinak na IIT, što potencijalno znači povećanje troškova prilagodbe zbog ekonomskog integriranja. Rezultati podupiru EU pred-pristupne i post-pristupne politike koje imaju za cilj smanjiti razvojne nejednakosti između zemalja članica integracije. ; This paper investigates the impact of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on the development of intra-industry trade (IIT) for eight Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEE) from 1997 to 2019. The aim of the paper is to compare and explain the possible heterogeneous impact of different RTAs on IIT across countries while controlling for differences in development levels between economic integration member states. Our analysis is based on country-product level data obtained from UN Comtrade. The main hypothesis of the paper is that the CEFTA and EU integration agreements have a highly positive effect on IIT in comparison with other RTAs. However, the scope of the impact varies across countries, primarily ...

U ovom se radu istražuje utjecaj regionalnih trgovinskih sporazuma (RTS) na razvoj intra-industrijske trgovine (IIT) za slučaj osam zemlja Srednje i istočne Europe (SIE) od 1997. do 2019. godine. Cilj rada je usporediti i objasniti mogući heterogeni utjecaj različitih RTS na IIT, kontrolirajući za razliku u ekonomskoj razvijenosti između zemalja partnera. Analiza se temelji na razini podataka zemlja-proizvod, a izvor podataka su UN Comtrade i CEPII baza podataka koja sadrži varijable gravitacijskog modela. Hipoteza rada je da CEFTA i EU ekonomske integracije imaju snažniji (pozitivni) učinak na IIT u usporedbi s ostalim RTS, ali snaga utjecaja varira između zemalja, s obzirom na razvojne nejednakosti zemalja, koje su u ovom radu mjerene kroz razliku u BDP po glavi stanovnika. U radu je razvijen i procijenjen model koristeći PPML procjenitelj. Doprinos rada jest uključivanje interakcijske varijable između RTS i razvojne nejednakosti. Rezultati rada su ukazali da je hipoteza rada validna, kao i da razvojne nejednakosti između zemalja članica integracije imaju negativan učinak na IIT, što potencijalno znači povećanje troškova prilagodbe zbog ekonomskog integriranja. Rezultati podupiru EU pred-pristupne i post-pristupne politike koje imaju za cilj smanjiti razvojne nejednakosti između zemalja članica integracije. ; This paper investigates the impact of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on the development of intra-industry trade (IIT) for eight Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEE) from 1997 to 2019. The aim of the paper is to compare and explain the possible heterogeneous impact of different RTAs on IIT across countries while controlling for differences in development levels between economic integration member states. Our analysis is based on country-product level data obtained from UN Comtrade. The main hypothesis of the paper is that the CEFTA and EU integration agreements have a highly positive effect on IIT in comparison with other RTAs. However, the scope of the impact varies across countries, primarily ...

Društvena okolina koja obuhvaća građane u širem smislu vrlo je heterogeno i dinamično područje okoline upravne organizacije. Njezino je značenje za funkcioniranje upravnih organizacija u stalnom porastu jer je suvremena javna uprava izložena sve snažnijim zahtjevima za uvažavanje mišljenja građana. Ovaj se rad bavi analiziranjem društvene okoline upravnih organizacija u Hrvatskoj na temelju analize obilježja sudionika e-savjetovanja kao neposredno zainteresiranih građana za sudjelovanje u izradi propisa i politika. Obilježja sudionika koja se analiziraju obuhvaćaju njihov broj, strukturu (vrsta sudionika) i vrstu komentara koje upućuju, a pokazatelji su intenziteta, stupnja organiziranosti i stupnja kompetentnosti relevantne društvene okoline upravnih organizacija. Empirijski su podaci prikupljeni metodom kvantitativne analize sadržaja izvješća o provedenim e-savjetovanjima od 2016. do 2018. Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju kako obilježja društvene okoline ovise o organizacijskim faktorima – razini političko-upravnog sustava na kojoj djeluje organizacija te njezinoj vrsti i funkciji. Osim toga, pokazuje se povezanost između samih obilježja društvene okoline – organiziranosti i kompetentnosti. ; Social context, which refers to the public / citizens, is a very heterogeneous and dynamic area of administrative organizations' environment. Its relevance for the functioning of administrative organizations is constantly increasing in contemporary public administration due to expanding requirements for responsiveness towards citizens' preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the social context of Croatian administrative organizations by analysing the characteristics of participants in e-consultations, i.e., the public involved in the process of policy formulation. Analysed characteristics include the number of participants, their structure (type of stakeholder,) and the type of comments they submit. These characteristics represent indicators of the intensity, organization degree, and the level of competence of the relevant social environment of administrative organizations. Empirical research encompassed quantitative content analysis of e-consultation reports in the period 2016-2018. The research findings suggest that the characteristics of social context are largely determined by organizational factors - the level of politico-administrative system, the type, and the function of an organization. In addition, it appears that the characteristics of social context (the level of organization and competence) are interrelated, too.

Namjera ovoga priloga je prikazati kako i zašto su tekle promjene u vlastima Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (NDH) u Banja Luci tijekom 1941. i 1942., a dijelom i 1943. godine. Time mislim na različite osobe koje su kao dužnosnici NDH u Banja Luci obnašale vlast. Na promjene kod tih dužnosnika utjecao je odnos vlasti NDH, odnosno ustaškog pokreta prema bosanskohercegovačkim muslimanima, koje su oni smatrali sastavnim dijelom hrvatske nacije. Također je na te promjene utjecala i politika NDH prema srpskom stanovništvu, odnosno državni teror koji je NDH, nakon proglašenja, pokrenula prema njemu, a zatim ustanak tog stanovništva protiv NDH, što je njezine vlasti prisiljavalo na promjene prethodnih postupaka. ; The article presents the personal changes within the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) in the town of Banja Luka in north-western Bosnia. After the Axis attack on Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the proclamation of NDH ruled by Ustasha movement, whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into its territory. Banja Luka was an important centre in north-western Bosnia. The majority of population in that part of Bosnia was made up of Orthodox Serbs, while the rest were Catholic Croats and Moslems. Immediately after the establishment of NDH authority in Banja Luka the main role was played by Viktor Gutić, a pre-war lawyer. Gutić became the head of the ruling Ustasha movement in Banja Luka and north-western Bosnia, but he was also the head of the civilian administration. New Ustasha regime immediately began with policies directed against the Serbs, ranging from abolishment of their national and religious identity to forced resettlements of certain parts of Serbs to Serbia. The new regime also committed mass killings of parts of Serb population. As a strongman in Banja Luka, Gutić distinguished himself in implementation of such policies. But in July of 1941 mass uprising of Serbs broke out in north-western Bosnia and it soon brought NDH authorities in a difficult situation. The uprising would gradually develop into two mutually opposed movements, the Partisans led by Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the royalist Chetnik movement. With the challenge put by mass uprising of Serbs, NDH authorities gradually realized that the arbitrary violence against Serbs, that went even beyond the official anti-Serb measures, backfired. Therefore, NDH introduced certain measures aimed at de-escalation of violence and peaceful efforts to dissuade Serbs from rebellion. This was best seen in the activities of the Committee for the examination and establishment of public safety and order that was established in Banja Luka in late 1941. The committee was headed by Croatian air-force colonel Ivan Mrak and its duty, among others, was to investigate and punish those who committed atrocities against the Serb population, while simultaneously calling Serbs who have rebelled to return to their homes, guaranteeing them safety. In August of 1941 Viktor Gutić was recalled from his duty in Banja Luka. He formally became a high official in the Ministry of internal affairs, but in fact he was stripped of real authority and removed from Banja Luka. Position of Moslem community in Banja Luka and north-western Bosnia was also of great importance. According to the Ustasha ideology, Moslems of Bosnia-Herzegovina were integral and equal part of the Croatian nation. Therefore, for Ante Pavelić, as head of NDH and Ustasha movement, it was of crucial importance to gain the support of the Moslems. Before the proclamation of NDH the Ustasha movement had a certain number of Moslem supporters. But after Ustasha came to power, Pavelić realized that he needs the support of those Moslem politicians who headed former Yugoslav Moslem Organization, the strongest political party of the Moslem community in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the period of Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For these reasons Džafer Kulenović, distinguished representative of the Yugoslav Moslem Organization, became the vice-president of Government of NDH. Contrary to such general policy, Viktor Gutić, while he was in power in Banja Luka, led sectarian policies that caused the discontent of the Moslem community. But Moslem representatives from Banja Luka, counting on Moslem members of the NDH government, could influence the decision making in Zagreb and were able to counter Gutić's policies. Although Gutić was removed from Banja Luka he still had supporters there, among others in the hierarchy of the Catholic church. Therefore, conflict between Gutić's group and the Moslems continued. Ultimately in summer of 1942. Ante Pavelić appointed Dragan Hadrović as a head of Great County of Sana-Luka in Banja Luka. Hadrović was a Catholic, but with the obvious support of Pavelić and Moslem members of NDH government he began leading a pro-Moslem policy, entering into a conflict with Gutić and his supporters. In a wider sense Hadrović was leading a policy of moderation, opposed to the various excesses of certain other institutions of NDH and representatives of the Ustasha movement. With such policies Hadrović soon gathered enemies within the NDH structures and was also in conflict with the Catholic bishop in Banja Luka, Jozo Garić. Finally, in July of 1943 Hadrović was assassinated by a bomb planted in a postal parcel. It was never officially established who assassinated him, but all sources suggest that the bomb was planted by certain elements within the Ustasha movement who opposed Hadrović's policies. The article follows these events through all important changes and developments within the NDH administration in Banja Luka. Ultimately it can be concluded that NDH regime itself was heterogeneous, with various splits within its ranks. These splits occurred between Catholic and Moslems as well as between those who, according to the changing circumstances, opted and called for more moderate policies, while other remained sectarian and prone to uncompromising and/or violent solutions.

Carl Schmitt je jedan od najposvećenijih protivnika liberalnog univerzalizma sa svojim pojmom pluralističke, racionalne i uključive konsenzualne politike kao progresivnog demokratskog projekta i svojeg razumijevanja političke arene kao pročišćene, od sukoba slobodne, i na taj način progresivne kretnje demokratske logike. U ovom radu nastojat ću pokazati Schmittove pesimističke i negativne stavove, zasnovane na ontološkim i teološkim temeljima, o deliberativnom modelu politike koja tvrdi da partikularna volja može doći do koncepta zajedničkog javnog interesa ili zajedničkog dobra kroz raspravu i dijalog. Nadalje, pokušat ću pokazati da unutar Schmittovog projekta koncept diktature suverena postoji kao nužni kontrapunkt pojmu politič- kog. Schmitt odbija razumijevati politički život kao medij dijalog koji vodi razumskom konsenzusu. U ovom kontekstu, suveren iz Schmittove teorije mora se razumijevati upravo kao sila napravljena da proizvodi homogenost kroz hegemoniju. Hegemonija, u Gramscijevom smislu, nije gola opresivna sila. Namjesto toga, odnosi se na vladajuću silu sposobnu upisati vlastitu ideologiju i pogled na svijet u javnost kroz uvjeravanje. U tom okviru, ljevičarski mislitelji poput Mouffea, koji preporuča da moramo misliti »sa Schmittom protiv Schmitta« kako bismo razvili novo demokratsko političko razumijevanje, svraćaju pozornost na Schmittovu tezu da je svaki politički identitet u funkciju »mi–oni« antinomije, ali im promiče činjenica da je nemoguće deducirati koncept zbiljski demokratske javne sfere iz Schmittove teorije. Kao što će biti naglašenu u radu, demokracija u Schmittovom smislu može biti savršena forma suverenosti, takva kakva usuprot liberalnoj demokraciji rezultira homogenizacijom i isključenjem heterogenosti, te na taj način mora biti začeta kao fundamentalno hegemonijski sistem. Schmittov ideal demokracije zahtijeva da politički identiteti, javno mišljenje, javna sfera i formiranje volje vudu rezultati suverenove volje i bez prostora za raspravu. ; Carl Schmitt is one of the most dedicated opponents of liberal universalism, with its notion of pluralist, rational and non-exclusivist consensus politics as a progressive democratic project and its understanding of the political arena – "purified", being free from struggles and conflict – as the progressive move of democratic logic. In this paper I will first try to show Schmitt's pessimistic and negative stance based on ontological and theological grounds on the deliberative model of politics with its claim about the possibility of making particular wills reach the conception of common public interest or the common good through discussion and dialogue. Secondly, I'll try to show that, within Schmitt's project, the concept of the sovereign dictatorship exists as the necessary counterpoint to the concept of the political. Schmitt refuses to understand political life as a medium of dialogue leading to a rational consensus. In this context, the sovereign in Schmitt's theory should be precisely understood as a force constructed to reproduce homogeneity in a hegemonic manner. Hegemonia, in a Gramscian sense, is not a bare oppressive force. Rather, it refers to a ruling force which is able to inject its own ideology and world view into the public through persuasion. In this framework, leftist thinkers like mouffe, who recommended that we should think "with Schmitt against Schmitt" in order to develop a new democratic political understanding, draw attention to Schmitt's thesis that every political identity functions as "we-they" antinomy, yet they miss the fact that it is impossible to deduce a conception of a truly democratic public sphere from Schmitt's theory. As it will be emphasized in this paper, democracy in the Schmittian sense can be the perfect form of sovereignty, one which in contrast to liberal democracy results in homogenization and the exclusion of the heterogeneous and thus must be conceived as a fundamentally hegemonic system. The Schmittian ideal of democracy requires that political identities, public opinion, public sphere and will formation are the products of a sovereign will and not of open and free discussion. ; Carl Schmitt est l'un des opposants les plus puissants de l'universalisme libérale de par sa notion de consensus politique pluraliste, rationnel et non exclusiviste en tant que projet démocratique progressiste, mais aussi de par sa compréhension de l'arène politique - « purifiée », libre de toutes luttes et de tout conflit – en tant que mouvement progressiste de la logique dé- mocratique. Dans cet article, je vais en premier lieu tenter de montrer l'opinion pessimiste et négative de Schmitt – basée sur des fondements ontologiques et théologiques – concernant le modèle délibératif de la politique et sa prétention à penser que la formation de volontés particulières pourrait toucher l'intérêt public commun ou le bien commun à travers la discussion et le dialogue. En second lieu, je vais tenter de montrer qu'à l'intérieur du projet de Schmitt le concept de dictature souveraine existe comme contrepartie nécessaire au concept du politique. Schmitt refuse de penser la vie politique comme instrument de dialogue menant au consensus rationnel. Ainsi, le souverain dans la théorie de Schmitt doit précisément être compris comme une force construite pour reproduire une telle homogénéité de manière hégémonique. Hegemonia, au sens gramscien, n'est pas une simple force oppressive ; il s'agit plutôt d'un terme qui se réfère à une force dirigeante capable d'injecter sa propre idéologie et vision du monde dans le domaine public à travers la persuasion. Dans ce contexte, certains penseurs de gauche telle que mouffe qui nous recommande de penser « avec, et contre, Schmitt » dans le but de développer une nouvelle compréhension de la politique démocratique, attirent notre attention sur la thèse de Schmitt où chaque identité politique fonctionne par l'antinomie « nous/eux ». Toutefois, ces penseurs passent à côté du fait qu'il est impossible de déduire une conception de réelle sphère publique démocratique sur la base de la théorie de Schmitt. Comme cet article le souligne bien, la démocratie au sens schmittien peut être la forme parfaite de souveraineté, une forme qui – en contraste avec la démocratie libérale – aboutit à une homogénéisation en excluant l'hétérogé- néité, et ainsi doit être conçue comme un système fondamentalement hégémonique. Selon l'idéal schmittien de démocratie, les identités politiques, l'opinion publique, la sphère publique et la formation de volontés doivent être les produits, non pas d'une discussion ouverte et libre, mais d'une volonté souveraine. ; Carl Schmitt ist einer der mächtigsten Gegner des liberalen Universalismus mit dessen Vorstellung von pluralistischer, rationaler und nicht exklusivistischer Konsenspolitik als einem progressiven demokratischen Projekt und dessen Verständnis der politischen Arena – "gereinigt", frei von Kämpfen und Konflikten – als eines progressiven Schritts der demokratischen Logik. In diesem Beitrag werde ich zunächst versuchen, Schmitts pessimistische, negative und auf ontologischer und theologischer Grundlage ruhende Haltung zum Beratungsmodell der Politik darzulegen, mit dessen Behauptung über die möglichkeit, partikulare Willen zu veranlassen, durch Diskussion und Dialog die Konzeption des gemeinschaftlichen öffentlichen Interesses oder Gemeinwohls zu erreichen. Zweitens werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, dass im Rahmen des schmittschen Projekts der Begriff der souveränen Diktatur als notwendiger Kontrapunkt zum Begriff des Politischen existiert. Schmitt weigert sich, das politische Leben als ein medium des Dialogs zu begreifen, das zu einem rationalen Konsens führt. In diesem Zusammenhang soll das Souveräne in der schmittschen Theorie eben als eine Gewalt aufgefasst werden, die konstruiert ist, um eine solche Homogenität in einer hegemonialen Art zu reproduzieren. Die hegemonia im gramscischen Sinne ist nicht eine bloß repressive Kraft; vielmehr bezieht sie sich auf eine herrschende Kraft, die imstande ist, durch Überzeugungsvermögen ihre eigene Ideologie und Weltanschauung in die Öffentlichkeit zu injizieren. Linksorientierte Denker wie mouffe, die empfohlen haben, wir sollten "mit Schmitt gegen Schmitt" denken, um ein neues demokratisches politisches Verständnis zu entwickeln, lenken in diesem Kontext das Augenmerk auf Schmitts These, jede politische Identität funktioniere durch die "wir – sie"-Antinomie, doch sie übersehen die Tatsache, dass es unmöglich ist, aus der schmittschen Theorie die Vorstellung von einer wahrhaft demokratischen öffentlichen Sphäre abzuleiten. Wie es in dieser Arbeit betont wird, kann die Demokratie im schmittschen Sinne die perfekte Form der Souveränität sein, die – im Gegensatz zur liberalen Demokratie – in der Homogenisierung und Ausgrenzung des Heterogenen resultiert und daher als ein grundlegend hegemoniales System erachtet werden muss. Das schmittsche Ideal der Demokratie erheischt, dass politische Identitäten, öffentliche meinung, öffentliche Sphäre und Willensbildung keine Produkte einer offenen und freien Diskussion, sondern eines souveränen Willens sind.

Utemeljen na polazištima kritički orijentiranih sigurnosnih studija i studija terorizma, rad propituje metodološke, epistemološke pa i ontološke aspekte fenomena državnog terorizma. Tvrdi se kako je državni terorizam sustavno zanemareno područje znanja o terorizmu, iako je empirijski vrlo evidentan fenomen. U prvom dijelu rada propituje se klasična i suvremena politološka, sociološka, pravna i filozofska misao važna za razumijevanje države, sigurnosti, terorizma i državnog terorizma. Počevši od Weberove definicije države kao nositeljice monopola na nasilje i njegova koncepta razlikovanja vladavine (Herrschaft) i sile (Macht) tvrdi se da monopol na silu ne podrazumijeva korištenje svakog oblika sile i da država ne može biti ekskulpirana u situacijama kada koristi silu koja ima sva obilježja terorizma. Upravo za ključnim obilježjima terorizma traga se u drugom dijelu rada gdje se analizira postojeće znanje o terorizmu i državnom terorizmu. Na temelju postojećih definicija koje čine bazu od ukupno 373 definicije, sadržajnom i frekvencijskom analizom, dolazi se do operacionalne definicije terorizma i državnog terorizma. Izlučenih šest konstitutivnih elemenata terorizma ukazali su da je državni terorizam organizirana upotreba sile i nasilja ili prijetnja upotrebom nasilja kojom se posredstvom intencionalnog širenja straha odnosno terora, a na temelju anticipiranih reakcija širih psiholoških učinaka, nastoje ostvariti politički ciljevi, a kojega provodi i/ili sponzorira država. U fokusiranoj studiji s mnogo slučajeva u trećem dijelu analizira se državni terorizam na empirijskim primjerima dvadeset i jedne države (N=21). Slučajevi su selektirani na stogodišnjem dijakronijskom kontinuumu, počevši od 1914. godine i sarajevskog atentata na austro-ugarskog prijestolonasljednika Franju Ferdinanda pa do recentnih primjera protuterorističkih politika. Kroz povijesnu perspektivu, komparativnom metodom uz primjenu dizajna najrazličitijih slučajeva, potvrđena je polazna pretpostavka: terorizam jest ciljno racionalno sredstvo za postizanje političkih ciljeva država i njegova je pojavnost neovisna o tipu političkog režima. Kvalitativna i kvantitativna obilježja državnog terorizma nerijetko se razlikuju kako između tako i unutar triju poduzoraka (režima), no usprkos kontekstualnim razlikama, može se utvrditi da je u totalitarnim režimima državni terorizmu ekstremnih razmjera i predstavlja važnu polugu vladavine, dok je u autoritarnima, a napose u demokratskima riječ o fokusiranijem državnom nasilju, najčešće sa specifičnim oblicima djelovanja. ; The basis of this doctoral work rests on the fact that the state terrorism is ignored in the context of mainstream security and terrorism knowledge. Security studies as well as rapidly growing terrorism studies are predominantly focused on non-state terrorism. Critical voices which indicating the importance of the state terrorism phenomenon have emerged in the mid-1990s. Based on the starting points of critically oriented security studies and terrorism studies, this work analyzes the methodological, epistemological and even ontological aspects of the phenomenon of state terrorism. It is argued that the state terrorism is systematically neglected area of knowledge, although it is very evident phenomenon. In the first part of this doctoral work the classical and the contemporary political, social, philosophical thought and jurisprudence important for the understanding of the state security, terrorism and state terrorism have been examined. Max Weber's concept of the state and difference between legitimate domination (Herrschaft) and coercive power (Macht) in the exercise of sovereign state functions is at the center of theoretical discussions. We claim that this distinction remained outside of much Western scholarship. Their concepts are based on logic of what the state and its relations to society should be not what it is. In contrast to this mainstream normative oriented model we examine the empirical reality which is laden of state terrorism examples. Therefore, the second part of this work is dedicated to analysis of existing knowledge about terrorism and state terrorism. The emphasis is on the definitions of terrorism, so for this purpose the database of 373 terrorism definitions was constructed. Definitions collected from the scientific and academic sources, the expert sources, the available official sources of various institutions and organizations, news, etc. were subjected to content and frequency analysis. Those analyses indicated six key elements used for defining state terrorism, which is relevant to the selection of empirical cases. It is found that the state terrorism is the use of organized force and violence or threat to use violence as a means of intentional spreading fear and terror based on the anticipated reactions of broader psychological effects which seeks to achieve political objectives and which is conducted and/or sponsored by the state. It is not an ideology, but the strategy and tactic that can be used by all, including the states. Despite the fact that the most of the definitios are actor-neutral and that their contents coincide, there is no unified definition. According to such understanding, the third part is a focused study with a lot of cases (N=21) where the unit of analysis was state terrorism and analytical sub-units were states (cases) selected from the one century time span (1914th-2014th) complemented with the most recent cases (until the end of 2016th). Thus, it is a diachronic analysis (cross-historical analysis). Since the selected cases differ in several relevant independent variables (social, economic, geographic, cultural) the comparative analysis is based on the most different systems research designs. The basic criterion of comparison was the regime (totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic) in accordance with the tipology of Juan Linz. The main aim of such typology and case selection was to test the general thesis: terrorism is an integral instrument of state action that occurs in all types of political regimes and which states used/use as a form of rational choice to achieve their goals. The third part includes political and sociological analysis of primary and secondary sources for each case (state). The analysis of state terrorism included Italy during Mussolini, Nazi Germany, Lenin and Stalin Russia/Soviet Union, communist Poland, Mao Zednog's China, North Korea regime and Idi Amin's Uganda as a totalitarian regimes. The second group of states are, according to Linz proposal, authoritarian regimes. Here is a Serbian example of state sponsored terrorism in Sarajevo 1914 and assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Another example is Yugoslavia from the mid of 1960 even if it is not purely clear is it predominantly totalitarian or authoritarian regime. Other examples are the rule of Francisco Franco in Spain, death squad in Argentina, Gaddafi's Libya, the rule of Shah Reza Pahlavi in Iran and Suadi Arabia sponsoring of terrorism. Within a democratic cluster the United States of America, Israel, United Kingdom, France, Russian Federation, modern Turkey and Macedonia were analysed. The main findings in turn suggest that the state terrorism was/is practiced in totalitarian, authoritarian and democratic systems, was/is used in war or peace, was/is used by the rich and the poor countries of different cultural, political, economic, geographic and other features. In other words, terrorism is an universal form of state action, but the specific context of each of the analyzed cases does not provide the right to generalize or compare countries according to the basic independent variables - the type of regime. Divided societies and various social cleavages like political (ideological), ethnic, cultural, language, religious, economic and other are evident in the most of the internal state terrorism cases. Although the contexts of countries are quite heterogeneous, in each case analyzed rationality is a common feature of state terrorism. Statet are trying to achieve political goals in the most effective way, what is decisively for using a specific form of violence or threats of violence that we call terrorism. Although it is one of the most frequently used terms in the social sciences, it is evident that terrorism is not conceptually cleared. It is deeply socially constructed concept which depends on a variety of interests. This also affects the contemporary counterterrorism policy. Within the science and policy, terrorism is predominantly viewed as a war and/or criminal. Terrorism is not treated as a phenomenon that is generated from the political area and counterterrorism policies do not target the real causes of terrorism. The perspective of terrorism as a war and crime which is imposed by politics that cooperates with science, leads to a spiral of violence. Illegal and immoral state counterterrorism actions lead to the even more brutal reactions of non-state groups. This trend is especially noticeable from September 9/11 when the "war on terror" started. From this moment it is especially evident that in the name of national security, the degradation of democratic values and endangering human rights and civil liberties have begun. This is best reflected in the new security policies, counterterrorism laws and the state of emergency institute. Also, the democratic deficits are obvious in the examples of interventions in other countries. Illegal character of the war in Iraq shows that international law is not a guarantee nor law nor justice. Those are some contemporary examples of state illegal actions which could be classified as state terrorism in democratic states, but the history is full of state terrorism evidence. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in the 20th century, as well as some actual examples, suggesting that the scientific community is biased and ignores the important historical facts as well as contemporary trends. By securitization of terrorism concept, the state harnessed science to its own interest – first of all creating counterterrorism policies. Instrumented science can act only within the limits defined by the state. The main characteristic of the joint state and scientific activity is hypocrisy where identical phenomena do not have identical names. State and science are taking a morally superior position, so state terrorist actions are called "necessary security measures", and terrorism as a pejorative term is reserved only for non-state actors. Further scientific and political ignoring of state terrorism topic, denying a unique definition of terrorism, refusing the recognition of state crimes that fall into the category of terrorism and insistence on counterterrorism as war strategy only feeds the modern evil of non-state terrorism. As long as there is not a change of paradigm in which the force will be firmly under the auspices of the law and policy of double standards will not exist, it is not realistic to expect that the state will eliminate the problem of contemporary non-state terrorism.

Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.