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In: Journal of economics, Band 109, Heft 2, S. 193-200
ISSN: 1617-7134
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In: Journal of economics, Band 109, Heft 2, S. 193-200
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan, Band 23, Heft 0, S. 31-36
ISSN: 2185-0593
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 63, Heft 1, S. 23-30
In: Journal of the City Planning Institute of Japan, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 772-779
ISSN: 2185-0593
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 61-68
In: The Canadian Journal of Economics, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 177
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 19, Heft 1
ISSN: 1935-1704
AbstractThis paper explores the impact of intensity of rivalry in downstream market on the equilibrium locations of the downstream firms under a vertical market structure á la Hotelling. We find that: (i) the presence of upstream firms softens the spatial competition in downstream market; (ii) minimum differentiation cannot be achieved as the equilibrium outcome and the equilibrium product differentiation is insufficient relative to socially optimum; (iii) social welfare is higher with a higher weight attached to intensity of rivalry, which is different from the non-monotonic relationship under the horizontal market case; (iv) the equilibrium product differentiation is independent of bargaining power under the two-part tariff contracts, which is different from Brekke and Straume (2004) under linear pricing.
In: Decision sciences, Band 51, Heft 2, S. 395-422
ISSN: 1540-5915
ABSTRACTMass customization provides a mechanism by which firms can better target a broad scope of consumer preferences and thus, in so doing, potentially increase their profits. We study product‐design and price competition between two mass‐customizing firms that serve consumers with varying tastes and finite reservation prices. Mass customization has recently received notable attention in both industry and academia, but yet there have been few studies concerning its impact in competitive settings. We contribute to this sparse literature by analyzing a two‐stage non‐cooperative game between two firms serving a Hotelling linear city. By comparing symmetric equilibrium results in settings with and without mass customization, we find that customization changes the nature of competition. More specifically, we show that with customization, a symmetric equilibrium emerges only if the firms' customization cost lies below a threshold, however, the magnitude of that cost does not influence product design decisions in equilibrium. We find that the equilibrium with customizing firms will not sustain cost levels above that threshold. Furthermore, we show that mass customizers earn higher equilibrium profits when consumers' fit sensitivity either significantly or only slightly exceeds the product valuation. On the contrary, traditional firms are better off when facing moderate fit sensitivity. We also establish that competition with mass customization may lead to lower profits and consumer surplus.
In: This is a pre-print of an article published in Communications in Nonlinear Science and Numerical Simulation (2021). The final authenticated version is available online at DOI: doi.org/10.1016/j.cnsns.2021.105805
SSRN
Working paper
In: Statistical papers, Band 47, Heft 4, S. 569-593
ISSN: 1613-9798
In: Dynamic Games in Economic Analysis; Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, S. 163-169
SSRN
In: Aydinonat, N. Emrah & Emin Köksal (2019) Explanatory value in context: the curious case of Hotelling's location model, The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 26:5, 879-910, DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2019.1626460
SSRN
In: Capitalism, nature, socialism: CNS ; a journal of socialist ecology, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 81-98
ISSN: 1548-3290
In: Capitalism, nature, socialism: CNS ; a journal of socialist ecology, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 81-98
ISSN: 1045-5752