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The growth of non-ideal theory and of political realism has had a profound influence on methodological inquiry in political philosophy. It is now the norm for authors defending ideal theory to take special care to show that it can relate to the real world in the right sort of way. Two recent books—David Estlund's Utopophobia: On the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy ( 2020 ), and Ben Laurence's Agents of Change: Political Philosophy in Practice ( 2021 )—fit this mold. Both authors argue that ideal theory can be practical, and Estlund additionally argues that it can be valuable even if it lacks practical value. In this commentary, I argue that something important is missing from these defenses of ideal theory: they both fail to be realistic in a "second-order" way. I suggest that other recent work comes closer to meeting this standard.

This article characterizes the aims of a practice-based method of justification and explains why its form of "ideal theory" need to only assume that a group of agents "ideationally" endorse an aim or end. Our interpretation of a practice, according to its aims or ends, can thus be quite realistic about the selfish or corrupt motives of any particular agent. This helps to answer "selectorate theory" cynics that view rules (in trade, etc.) as equilibrium solutions among elites optimizing for their personal "political survival." Even when that is so, reason can still have an audience in politics in the "ideational" recognition of values (e.g. as upheld in the classical theory of free trade).

In this review piece I assess the theoretical approach employed by Elizabeth Anderson in her book The Imperative of Integration. Anderson advocates a non-ideal theoretical approach to questions of normative political theory. She uses non-ideal arguments to offer a compelling justification of racial integration as a social policy. I unpack her argument to identify some of the important strengths of non-ideal theory. In doing so, I argue that non-ideal approaches provide insights that are necessary for the development of persuasive answers to normative questions, but that are not achievable with ideal theoretical alternatives.

Abstract:When a constitutional court faces opposition from other branches of government or significant segments of the public, should it always hold fast to what it considers constitutionally right, even where this would potentially harm its status and perceived legitimacy? Or are constitutional compromises sometimes justified? Such 'institutionally hard' cases – those characterised by a sharp tension between constitutional principle and institutional prudence – pose a true dilemma for constitutionalism. This article advances a realistic, yet principled, liberal-constitutional approach to this dilemma, put forth in the vein of Rawlsian non-ideal theory. It addresses a troubling gap between, on the one hand, the idealising discourse of constitutional theory – which overlooks or downplays the actual social and political pressures that courts must confront – and, on the other, a growing political science literature which, in the name of 'realism', views judges solely as strategic actors, leaving no role for principled reasoning. What has stepped into the gap in normative theory is a vague notion of 'judicial statesmanship', which praises or criticises judges post hoc, on an intuitive basis, without any tangible prescriptive bite. Developing evaluative and prescriptive guidelines for institutionally-hard cases, a non-ideal theory of constitutional adjudication should construct principles that both reinforce the commitment to ideal constitutional principle, and properly situate constitutional courts within the real – contingent and often very non-ideal – social and political contexts in which they operate.

SUMMARY The aim of South African industrial decentralisation policy is to facilitate racial segregation by increasing the proportion of Africans resident in the 'homelands'. Policy implementation is based on the concept of growth centres. There are theoretical deficiences in this concept, the most useful idea being that of an industrial complex of high‐linkage industries at a key location. This suggests that South Africa should have only two or three growth points. Instead, there is a multiplicity of growth points both in the 'core' and in the 'homelands'. Since the theoretical foundations for such a dispersal of industry are weak, it is not surprising that the programme has yielded poor results. It is unlikely to reduce the flow of 'homeland' labour to the core or to play a major role in 'homeland' employment creation.RÉSUMÉ Décentralisation industrielle : Idéal, théorie et réalitéLe but de la politique de décentralisation industrielle en Afrique du Sud est de faciliter la ségrégation raciale en augmentant la proportion d'Africains résidant dans les 'homelands'. La mise en place de cette politique est basée sur le concept des centres de développement. Ce concept n'est pas sans faiblesses théoriques; l'idée la plus utile est celle d'un complexe industriel d'industries étroitment apparentées implanté à un emplacement clé. Ceci suggère que l'Afrique du Sud ne devrait avoir que deux ou trois points de développement. Au lieu de cela, il y a une multiplicité de points de développement, tant dans le 'core' que dans les 'homelands'. Etant donné que les fondements théoriques d'un tel dispersement de l'industrie sont faibles, il n'est pas surprenant que le programme ait produit de si mauvais résultats. ll est peu probable qu'il puisse réduire l'afflux de main‐d'oeuvre des 'homelands' vers le 'core' ou qu'il puisse jouer un rôle important dans la création d'emplois dans les 'homelands'.RESUMEN Descentralización industrial : ideal, teoría y realidadEl propósito de la política de descentralización industrial de Sudéfrica consiste en facilitar la segregación aumentando la proporción de residentes africanos en los 'territorios nacionales'. La ejecución de la política se basa en el concepto de los centras de crecimiento. Hay deficiencias teóricas en este concepto, siendo la idea más útil la de un complejo industrial de industries muy vinculadas en una situación clave. Esto sugiere que Sudáfrica debiera tener solamente dos o tres puntos de crecimiento. En su lugar hay múltiples puntos de crecimiento, tanto en el 'núcleo' como en los 'territorios nacionales'. Como los cimientos teóricos para dicha dispersión industrial son débiles, no sorprende que el programa haya conseguido escasos resultados. Es improbable que reduzca el flujo de mano de obra de los 'territorios nacionales' hacia el núcleo ó para desempeñar una función importante en la creación de empleo en los 'territorios nacionales'.