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"Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy" published on by Oxford University Press.

The epistemic continuum of anthropology extends "ideally" from the position of a detached observer to that of an implicated actor. Yet this sketch raises questions. From the side of detached observation, do not structures and forms takes the place of the actor, who becomes, so to speak, the observer verifying his own models? Is not participant observation self‐limiting when it posits the ideal of fusion of consciousness, which forbids it from asking the question of otherness? Finally, when the actor assumes the status of observer, is there not the risk of seeing what one already believes, of failing to achieve detachment?The extreme position of objective observer comes up against the specific otherness (the identity) of a subjectivity that is out of reach, and the extreme position of subjective actor comes up against the impossibility of objectivation. An ideally theoretical ethnography is blocked by the actor's irreducible quiddity and an ideally naïve ethnography by the exoticism of theory. In one case, the approach comes down to "anthropology in the absence of Man"; in the other to "Man in the absence of anthropology".The purpose of the article is to show that an anthropology that conjoins actor and observer is possible in an approach that combines a "state of the issue" and an essay in anthropological epistemology.

The epistemic continuum of anthropology extends "ideally" from the position of a detached observer to that of an implicated actor. Yet this sketch raises questions. From the side of detached observation, do not structures & forms takes the place of the actor, who becomes, so to speak, the observer verifying his own models? Is not participant observation self-limiting when it posits the ideal of fusion of consciousness, which forbids it from asking the question of otherness? Finally, when the actor assumes the status of observer, is there not the risk of seeing what one already believes, of failing to achieve detachment? The extreme position of objective observer comes up against the specific otherness (the identity) of a subjectivity that is out of reach, & the extreme position of subjective actor comes up against the impossibility of objectivation. An ideally theoretical ethnography is blocked by the actor's irreducible quiddity & an ideally naive ethnography by the exoticism of theory. In one case, the approach comes down to "anthropology in the absence of Man"; in the other to "Man in the absence of anthropology." The purpose of the article is to show that an anthropology that conjoins actor & observer is possible in an approach that combines a "state of the issue" & an essay in anthropological epistemology. 46 References. Adapted from the source document.

It is tempting and not at all uncommon to find the striking—even noble—visage of an Ideal Observer staring out from the center of Hume's moral theory. When Hume claims, for instance, that virtue is "whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation," it is only natural to think that he must have in mind not just any spectator but a spectator who is fully informed and unsullied by prejudice. And when Hume writes that "the true standard of taste and beauty" is set by those who exhibit "[s]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice," he appears to describe a character no ordinary human could actually possess. Indeed, Hume's frequent appeals to the moral sentiments of spectators, his insistence that those sentiments depend upon taking "the general survey," and his persistent invocation of the general point of view (and the corrections it requires), together make the temptation almost irresistible.

Deceptive interpersonal interactions are an ideal venue in which to examine the issue of reality. Interpersonal deception theory offers a framework for considering why deceivers (by convention called senders), coparticipants (i.e., targeted receivers), and observers arrive at discordant views of reality. Deceivers' ulterior motives lead them to construct through communication a version of reality contrary to what they hold to be true. Due to adherence to Gricean principles of cooperative discourse, conversational demands, and the nature of the relationship between participants, interlocutors as well as nonparticipative observers may be inclined to accept the alter reality created by senders rather than apprehend the "true" state of affairs. Recent research findings are reviewed, and original data from a pilot investigation of deception strategies are presented to illustrate ways in which senders may perpetrate deception and the extent to which receivers and observers recognize such machinations.

One: A Brentanist Theory of Moral Judgments -- 1.1. The Theory -- 1.2. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Non-Cognitivist Theories -- 1.3. Grounds for Preferring the Brentanist Theory to the Standard Cognitivist Theories -- 1.4. Answers to Some Objections to the Brentanist Theory -- Two: The Ideal Observer Theory and Moral Objectivism -- 2.1. An Argument for Accepting the Ideal Observer Theory as a Standard for Determining the Correctness of Moral Judgments -- 2.2. Firth's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- 2.3. My Characterization of the Ideal Observer -- 2.4 Three Versions of the Ideal Observer Theory and Their Implications for the Objectivity of Moral Judgments -- 2.5. Sermonette on the Importance of Empathy -- 2.6. Intuitionism and the Ideal Observer Theory -- Three: Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.1 Some Different Meanings of the Term 'Ethical Relativism' -- 3.2. The Definition of 'Meta-Ethical Relativism' -- 3.3. Some Necessary Conditions of One's Accepting a Moral Judgment or a Moral Principle -- 3.4. Meta-Ethical Relativism and Nihilism -- 3.5. A Non-Nihilistic Version of Meta-Ethical Relativism -- 3.6. Conclusion -- Four: The Wages of Relativism -- 4.1. What Sorts of Attitudes and Commitments Presuppose a Belief in the Objectivity of Normative Judgments? -- 4.2. Causal or Psychological Connections Between Meta-Ethical Views and Attitudes and First-Order Normative Standards -- Appendix I: Nietzsche on the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.1. Nietzsche's Claims Concerning the Genealogy of Morals -- 1.2. What Are Nietzsche's Genetic Claims Intended to Show? -- Appendix II: Normative Relativism and Nihilism -- Appendix III: Hare's Version of the Ideal Observer Theory -- Notes -- Selected Bibliography.

Las contribuciones filosóficas de Celia Ortiz de Montoya (Paraná, Entre Ríos, Argentina, 1895–1985) a la educación pública entrerriana desde los años 30 y hasta los "largos" 60 se propusieron superar prácticas discursivas reñidas con la noción de humanismo entendido como forma de vida e ideal formativo. Su entusiasmo por el escolanovismo (de origen europeo) se tradujo en la efímera experiencia de la Escuela Integral Activa (1931–32), donde la filosofía y la pedagogía asumían la corresponsabilidad generacional de la trascendencia de la cultura. El análisis de contenido propuesto por la Historia de las Ideas y la Teoría del Contexto permite observar en las ideas filosóficas de la pedagoga, la inspiración de su lucha democrática a favor de un pragmatismo educativo reflexivamente solidario dentro del ideario educativo regional. Este fue concebido como la proyección de nuevas demandas y capacidades impuestas históricamente, a las que ella definió como ético–estéticas, lingüísticas, históricas, políticas y sociales. ; Philosophical contributions of Celia Ortiz de Montoya (Paraná, Entre Ríos, Argentina, 1895–1985) to regional public education since the 30s and even the "long" 60s were proposed to overcome discursive practices faced the notion of humanism understood as a way of life and ideal training. Her enthusiasm for the escolanovismo (originally European) resulted in the ephemeral experience of the Escuela Integral Activa (1931–32), where philosophy and pedagogy assumed generational co–responsibility to the transcendence of culture. Content analysis proposed by the History of Ideas and Theory Context allow to observe in the philosophical ideas of the pedagogue, the inspiration for her democratic struggle in favor of a reflexively supportive educational pragmatism within the regional educational ideology. They were conceived as the projection of new demands and capabilities historically imposed, which she defined as ethical and aesthetic, linguistic, historical, political and social. ; Fil: Aranda, María Marcela. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras

In the pages of this slim, powerful book Rob Riemen argues with passion that "nobility of spirit" is the quintessence of a civilized world. It is, as Thomas Mann believed, the sole corrective for human history. Without nobility of spirit, culture vanishes. Yet in the early twenty-first century, a time when human dignity and freedom are imperiled, the concept of nobility of spirit is scarcely considered. Riemen insists that if we hope to move beyond the war on terror and create a life-affirming culture, we must address timeless but neglected questions: What is a good society? Why art? Why culture? What is the responsibility of intellectuals? Why anti-Americanism? Why nihilism? Why the cult of death of fundamentalists? In a series of three essays, the author identifies nobility of spirit in the life and work of Baruch Spinoza and of Thomas Mann; explores the quest for the good society in our own time; and addresses the pursuit of truth and freedom that engaged figures as disparate as Socrates and Leone Ginzburg, a Jewish Italian intellectual murdered by Nazis. "The forces now aligned against humanistic values are manifold," observes George Steiner in the foreword to the book. In this imaginative and compelling volume, Riemen addresses these forces and speaks to every reader who believes in the power of classical ideas to restore Western civilization's highest values

Context The estimation of alert (vigilance) and flight-initiation (escape) distances (AD and FID, respectively) has underpinned theoretical and applied studies of the escape behaviour and management of disturbance to wildlife. Many studies use multiple observers, and some conduct meta-analyses; these efforts assume no observer effects in the estimation of these distances. Aims and methods We compared the estimates of FID and AD under ideal conditions (i.e. of black swans, Cygnus atratus, a large species with obvious behaviour, and at a location where swans allowed close approaches in open habitats), by one experienced and four inexperienced observers. Key results FID did not differ among observers but AD differed between the experienced and all inexperienced observers, and among inexperienced observers. Thus, FID estimates appear more repeatable than those of AD. Experience apparently results in more conservative estimates of AD. Conclusions FID represents a repeatable measure that is consistent across observers. This study supports its broad application in the study of wildlife escape behaviour. Implications We recommend the use of FID rather than AD for comparative analyses that involve multiple observers, because FID is more reliably measured.

In recent years there has been a conceptual merging of influence from open education, behavioral psychology, environmental psychology, and architecture into an approach that can be labeled "environmental design." In this study an elementary school teacher and an architect trained a group of third grade students in the principles of designing an ideal classroom. An evaluation of the training demonstrated that the subject's ability to observe and design environments was significantly greater than comparable students not receiving the training. The study demonstrated that children as young as eight or nine can be systematically taught to participate in the designing of their own environments.