Suchergebnisse

... Michel, P.: The European identity : humanism, secularism or christianity ; mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. - S. 5-20 Melasuo, T.: Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East : visions from the extreme north. - S. 21-31 Crum, B.: United in diversity : European citizenship after the EU constitution. - S. 33-52

The author analyses the role of religion in the formation of national identities in Central and Eastern Europe on the example of the Catholic Church in Poland in the 2Oth century. In Poland, like in most Central-European and Eastern-European societies, national identity developed against the state and was founded on certain elements of ethnic culture and tradition, the central position belonging to the Church. During communism, the Polish Catholic Church had the leading position in defending national identity, which identified Polishness with Catholicism. The Church also had a crucial role in the destruction of the communist system. However, it has found increasingly difficult to adapt to the new political conditions. As has been shown through the debates on abortion and religious education in state schools, the attempt by the Church to achieve the status of moral arbiter, above all democratic institutions, has resulted in new divisions. (SOI : PM: S. 143)

The essay first highlights certain basic features of the attitude of the European immigrant countries towards the new (migrant) ethnic minorities in their midst, the attitude that at the same time is indicative of the existence of various forms of ethnicity in the development of the European nation-states. The differences in the individual "national responses" regarding the existence of new ethnic communities reflect these differences in the understanding of the ethnic/national identity of individual countries. The author then goes on to deal more specifically with the presence of the Muslim population in West-European countries, the population that - perhaps more than any other group of "aliens" - is torn between the Westeuropean practice of ethnic and increasingly cultural discrimination, and a belief in liberalism and pluralism. ln connection with this, the role of Islam and the "Muslim" identity in the Muslim communities in West- European countries is analyzed. (SOI : PM: S. 108)

The collapse of the communist systems has brought about the crisis of identity and the political efficacy of the left not solely in Eastern Europe but in the West as well. Due to this situation, the author claims, all the elements of the traditional leftist identity have come under scrutiny. This applies both to the political ingredients common to all leftist parties (the primacy of economy, rejection of private ownership and market, egalitarianism, collectivism and the theory of progress) as well as the elements which instigated irreconcilable differentiations within the left (internationalism vs. nationalism, parliamentary democracy, the attitude towards violence, reform vs. revolution). The author concludes that due to the complex structure of the problems facing leftist parties and other political protagonists as well, there is little possibility for the emergence of an all-embracing leftist political programme; instead, partial programme variations should be expected. (SOI : PM: S. 21)

In the process of an accelerated government centralization and national unitarization in the period 1918-1928, Croatia lost its autonomy, territorial integrity, and the right to national identity. This resulted in grave consequences, particularly in inequality of Croatia and Croats with Serbia and Serbs in political, economic, and cultural domains. (SOI : CSP: S. 76)

In numerous European countries, majority nations and national minorities that live in them, aware of the complexity of relations between majorities and minorities in the ethnic sense, and the ensuing dangers, have engaged in mutual accommodation and compromise, thus fashioning certain models of coexistence. Constitutional provisions of European states prove that there is no single model of the recognition of the rights of national minorities. Still, European states may be divided into three groups. The first group includes those states which advocate the constitutional principle of the integral nation and refuse to recognize any other ethnic origin of their citizens. The second group comprises those states which do not divide its ethnic communities into majority and minority ones, which practically means that they do not recognize the category of the national minority; they protect the ethnic identity of their members by dividing their equal citizens by the languages they use. The third group includes those countries which recognize the notion of the majority nation and national minorities. This group has elaborated the provisions regarding the rights of national minorities, particularly the protection of their national, cultural, religious and linguistic identity, with major differences in the scope of individual rights. (SOI : PM: S. 84)

In the course of its history, Europe has structured itself by means of two models. The first was based on the territorial expansion of regional forces that used violence to break down the resistance of their weaker neighbors and establish the balance of power. In this way, at least temporarily, the way was paved for more radical changes in their polities. This model was in use until the end of World War II. The second model has been built around European integration. The aim of this process has not been the expansion of regional powers and the territorial conquest of their neighbors; it is based on the initiative of the weak to join the organizations that can satisfy their interests and goals. The process of integration excludes coercive methods. However, there is certain asymmetry in the relationship between the center and the periphery (the strong and the weak). The countries that belong to the center define the membership standards for the 'periphery' and evaluate their implementation. The 'central' countries are in a better position than the peripheral ones since the process of integration bolsters their collective identity, while the weaker states - by accepting the standards of stronger countries - have to alter their original identity. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

The author analzes the types of support for political systems. His analysis shows that there are three basic types of political support (to the national identity and pride, to the legitimation and to confidence) which correspond to the three basic units of political system (political community, political government/regime, and authorities). Each form of support serves to maintain the political regime on the whole, but each is independent of the others - or the influence solely goes one way: from the lower to the higher forms of support (from confidence via legitimation and to political identity). While the higher forms of support are primarily abstract, normative and affective in their nature, the lower forms are mostly empirical, instrumental, and cognitive in their definition. In the future, citizens are going to increasingly appraise political systems on the whole according to the totality of their performances, i.e. according to their evaluation of how and how much a system meets their needs, demands, and expectations. This will broaden the meaning of legitimation; it will no longer refer to the validity of a system (its procedurality) but to its effica as well. This will make life more difficult and complex for those in the position of power. These types of confidence warrant empirical research in order to determine their level, etiology, and functionality. (SOI : PM: S. 120)

The author presents the thesis about the difference between the cultural/historical and the political identity by distinguishing the cultural/historical majorities and minorities from the political winners and losers. He points to the democratic paradox according to which states are not ruled by the losers' political majorities but by the winners' political minorities. According to the author, in multi-ethnic societies it is necessary to equally develop the popular and the political culture - that is the culture and political tolerance. (SOI : PM: S. 56)