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In the paper I try to answer the question, whether there is a genuine constitutional theory of 'illiberal constitutionalism,' recently advocated in some East-Central European member states of the European Union, especially in Hungary and Poland. As I demonstrate, court ideologists of populist autocrats use Carl Schmitt's concept of political sovereignty and collective identity of the people, or misuse Max Weber's leader democracy or Richard Bellamy's or others' political constitutionalism ideas to legitimize authoritarian aims. I argue that the constitutional concept, which rejects liberalism as a constitutive precondition of democracy, cannot be in compliance with the traditional idea of liberal democratic constitutionalism. This concept has nothing to do with any majoritarian constitutional model based on the separation of power, or with political constitutionalism, or any kind of weak judicial review, and it misuses the concept of constitutional identity. One of the reasons of the illiberal turn has been that there was a lack of consensus about liberal democratic values at the time of the transition. In the beginning of the democratic transitions in these new democracies, preference was given to general economic effectiveness over mass civic and political engagement. According to some authors, the prospects for liberal constitutional democracy in the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe following the 1989–90 transition were diminished by a technocratic, judicial control of politics, which blunted the development of civic constitutionalism, civil society, and participatory democratic government as necessary counterpoints to the technocratic machinery of legal constitutionalism. But, there is nothing to suggest that an earlier and more participatory constitution-making process would have prevented the populist turn. Those proponents of participatory constitutionalism do not sufficiently take into account the rise of populism and the lack of civic interest in constitutional matters, due to poor constitutional culture. The recent success of illiberalism in the region seems to indicate that the special historical circumstances require a longer period of time the build up a liberal democratic political and constitutional culture. But the democratic backsliding is not a proof of the failure of liberal democracy altogether, as illiberal leaders and their court ideologists want people to believe.

This paper expands on the notion neo-illiberalism, signifying a symbiosis between neoliberal capitalism and variegated illiberal nationalisms, offering deeper reflections on its geopolitics, key drivers, and conceptual puzzles. It is argued that the West has entered an age of political illiberalization, replicating political operating logics of variegated illiberal(izing) regimes elsewhere, corroding domestic institutions and the western-dominated international liberal order, constituting an historic geopolitical shift. Although centrist parties have been variably attracted to the far right, particularly seeing center-right parties reinvent themselves as nationalist challengers to the 'globalist' status quo, in power they mostly radicalize the neoliberal encasement of capital, transforming a range of liberal-democratic institutions, procedures, and rights into illiberal political fortifications. Neoliberalism's illiberal mutation is being realized amidst the intersections of rampant financial offshoring and digitization defining contemporary capitalism, allowing billionaire-class factions to 'hack' liberal-democratic governments and operating systems. With the rollout of data-driven technologies increasingly requiring the rollback of liberal protections by design, the fusion of digitizing capitalism and illiberal nationalisms is increasingly escaping accepted notions of liberalism.

The emergence and persistence of right-wing populist parties (RWPs) in almost all advanced democracies in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and across the Atlantic is a result of a new cleavage that revolves around the question of how open borders should be for goods, services, capital, migrants, refugees, human rights, and the transfer of political power to supranational institutions: Cosmopolitans opt for opening the nation states' borders, while communitarians prefer more closed and controlled borders in a broader sense. An economic and cultural-discursive representation gap on the communitarian side allowed RWPs to enter the political stage along this cleavage. The composition of their electorate, their thematic focus and their discourse support our hypothesis. We demonstrate that whether RWPs pose a danger for democracy crucially depends on whether they are in government or opposition and whether the context is that of well-established or less consolidated democracies. We also discuss whether polarization is deemed harmful to democracy. RWPs can indeed have a positive impact on a re-intensified political participation. However, if the illiberalism of RWPs dominates policies, politics, and the political discourse in less consolidated democracies, such as in Hungary and Poland, liberal democracy is in danger.

This chapter explores illiberal trends in the party systems of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Focusing on ANO, SMER, Fidesz and PiS, it first provides a comparative analysis of the ideology these parties use to appeal to the voters. Secondly, it traces the parties in power and analyses how they are translating the illiberal political concepts into laws and policy-making practices. The overarching aim is to understand the relevance that rule of law and legal issues have for the self-positioning vis-á-vis the national public and EU. Based on comparison and the empirical findings, it provides a typology of Central European illiberalism based on the difference between pragmatic and ideological illiberalism.

This paper draws on Laclau's theory of discourse, hegemony, and populism to analyse competing forms of populism in the Czech Republic within the discursive context of 'post-November transformation' as well as in relation to hegemonic struggles over the construction of social order. It is argued that the discourses of Public Affairs (VV), ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy, and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) all feature a populist opposition between the 'people' or 'citizens' on the one hand and 'political dinosaurs', ('traditional') 'parties', or 'godfather party mafias' of both 'left' and 'right' on the other, while also radicalizing in different ways the exclusionary constructions of 'work' in the established discourses of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and Social Democrats (ČSSD). While ANO constructs 'hard work' in a populist manner against the ('traditional') 'parties', VV and Dawn/SPD articulate an exclusion of non-working 'unadaptables' that points to a notable interplay of hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism and anti-minorities illiberalism.

How consistently has the EU used membership conditionality to address illiberalism? Has it sufficiently and effectively used its conditional, transformative capacity in the first place, i.e., independent of the domestic factors gaining ground in third countries and paving the way for illiberalism? This paper proposes to assess this question by focusing on the EU's recent relations with Turkey, as the longest standing EU candidate, within the context of the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis. This episode of EU-Turkey relations provides a real test case for the EU's ability and willingness to consistently use conditionality since doing so coincided with the EU's other foreign policy aims linked with external border security (relatedly also, the integrity of the Schengen area) and even, protection against terrorism.

Populism, particularly in its radical right-wing variants, is often posited as antithetical to the principles of liberalism. Yet a number of contemporary cases of populist radical right parties from Northern Europe complicate this characterisation of populism: rather than being directly opposed to liberalism, these parties selectively reconfigure traditionally liberal defences of discriminated-against groups—such as homosexuals or women—in their own image, positing these groups as part of 'the people' who must be protected, and presenting themselves as defenders of liberty, free speech and 'Enlightenment values'. This article examines this situation, and argues that that while populist radical right parties in Northern Europe may only invoke such liberal values to opportunistically attack their enemies—in many of these cases, Muslims and 'the elite' who allegedly are abetting the 'Islamisation' of Europe'—this discursive shift represents a move towards a 'liberal illiberalism'. Drawing on party manifestoes and press materials, it outlines the ways in which these actors articulate liberal illiberalism, the reasons they do so, and the ramifications of this shift.

Populism, particularly in its radical right-wing variants, is often posited as antithetical to the principles of liberalism. Yet a number of contemporary cases of populist radical right parties from Northern Europe complicate this characterisation of populism: rather than being directly opposed to liberalism, these parties selectively reconfigure traditionally liberal defences of discriminated-against groups—such as homosexuals or women—in their own image, positing these groups as part of 'the people' who must be protected, and presenting themselves as defenders of liberty, free speech and 'Enlightenment values'. This article examines this situation, and argues that that while populist radical right parties in Northern Europe may only invoke such liberal values to opportunistically attack their enemies—in many of these cases, Muslims and 'the elite' who allegedly are abetting the 'Islamisation' of Europe'—this discursive shift represents a move towards a 'liberal illiberalism'. Drawing on party manifestoes and press materials, it outlines the ways in which these actors articulate liberal illiberalism, the reasons they do so, and the ramifications of this shift.

Hungary once represented a school-book case of transition to democracy. Now it offers insights into both contemporary Europe and theories of populism and nationalism. Resisting the traditional linear perspective to transition and a 'demographic' view of democracy, this article explores the relationships among democracy, populism and nationalism. This article operationalises performative and post-foundational theory of populism as a logic of articulation to explain Fidesz and the party leader Viktor Orbán's illiberal measures, dichotomies between them and us, ultimately leading to nationalism and xenophobia. It shows how revolution, 'illiberalism' and migrants have served for populist meaning-making and are related to the political polarisation in Hungary. This article enhances the understanding of democracy by discussing the performative features of nation-building, populism and law-making in contemporary politics and finally the 'Janus-face' of populism. It sees 1989 as a populist moment of constitution of the foundations of a new era but also of the people central to democracy, and recognises attempts to generate similar moments in the 2010s. ; Peer reviewed

Deeply-embedded norms of liberalism and protectionism alongside EU policies focusing on promoting development and regional integration have shaped EU-Mercosur relations. These stand in stark contrast to the policies of the US, the historic hegemon in the region. This paper utilizes historical institutionalism to understand how the liberal tenets of EU competition policy and the protectionism of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have affected EU-Mercosur relations. Particular foci include Spain's role in spearheading efforts to promote EU-Latin American relations and the way EU competition policies directed against monopolies in Europe spurred increased investment in Latin America, especially the Southern Cone. The latter prompted the EU to forge closer ties with Mercosur, encouraged cooperation and development programs and spurred regional integration and liberal trade regimes in Latin America.

This paper offers an analysis of the illiberal practices and discourse of the Global War on Terror (GWoT) and demonstrates how the United States of America used the liberal argument as a qualitative metric of its success and failure in the GWoT. I argue that 'the othering' of Salafi Jihadists as well the full military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were both philosophically rooted in the liberal thinking of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill, which have traditionally guided US foreign policy. More significantly, these liberal philosophies of history and international relations hold within them the seeds of illiberalism by depicting non-liberal, undemocratic societies/organisations as 'barbaric' – and as such prime candidates for intervention and regime change. Predicated upon this logic, the discourse of the GWoT framed Al Qaeda as a key existential threat to not only the United States but also the 'civilised world' in general and one which required a 'liberal defensive war' in response. It was the successful securitisation of Al Qaeda that essentially enabled the United States to adopt deeply illiberal policies to counter this so-called existential threat by using any means at its disposal.

This article examines how the emergence of 'illiberal democracy' in Hungary and Poland has impacted the behaviour of these two countries in the EU's international development policy making processes. Adapting Hirschmann's concepts of voice, exit and loyalty, the article argues that three factors may have undermined the loyalty of these member states towards EU development policy, increasing the likelihood of them using more extreme forms of voice (vetoes) or even enact partial exits from the policy area. Erosion of loyalty is seen to be more likely if (1) illiberalism actually impacts bilateral development policies in the two countries; (2) they have poor track records in influencing EU development policy; and (3) alternatives to EU level action emerge. Applying this framework, a greater erosion of loyalty is expected in the case of Hungary than for Poland. Hungary's recent actions in EU development policy are in line with the expectations from the framework: it has increasingly been using more extreme forms of voice following the 2015 refugee crisis, while Poland has been a less 'problematic' member state in the policy area.

In Central Europe, especially in Hungary and Poland, over the last years there are serious problems related to democracy, constitutional balance and the rule of law. In a short time, the illiberal political leaders put into practice an order that calls into question principles that form part of the axiological foundation of the European Union. This article explains why illiberalism has been so successful in this region and which techniques have been used to reinforce the political capture of various state institutions, especially the judiciary. The article also contains a critical analysis of the European Union's attitude towards Hungarian and Polish illiberalism. The general hypothesis of this study is that Hungary and Poland have gone so far towards constitutional illiberalism, that it is extremely difficult to indicate the simple legal remedies for rapid return of these countries to liberal democracy. ; En Europa Central, sobre todo en Hungría y en Polonia, en los últimos años se evidencian varios problemas relacionados con la democracia, el equilibrio constitucional y el Estado de Derecho. En poco tiempo, los dirigentes políticos iliberales pusieron en práctica un orden que cuestiona directamente varios principios que forman parte del fundamento axiológico de la Unión Europea. El presente artículo explica por qué el iliberalismo ha tenido tanto éxito en esta región y que técnicas se han utilizado para el refuerzo del secuestro político de varias instituciones del Estado, sobre todo el poder judicial. El artículo contiene también un análisis crítico de la postura y la reacción de la Unión Europea. Una de las principales hipótesis del presente estudio es que Hungría y Polonia han avanzado tanto en su camino hacia el iliberalismo constitucional que resulta extremadamente difícil indicar técnicas legislativas simples para el rápido restablecimiento de la democracia liberal en estos dos países.

Senior Project submitted to The Division of Social Studies of Bard College.

En este artículo analizaremos la respuesta a la crisis provocada por el COVID-19 por parte de Polonia, un Estado caracterizado por haber tomado la senda del iliberalismo desde la llegada al poder del partido político Ley y Justicia (PiS). Los principales elementos del análisis serán el contexto político-constitucional del país antes y después del triunfo electoral de PiS en 2015, la regulación constitucional de los poderes de emergencia y la respuesta que realmente ha dado el Gobierno a la crisis del COVID-19. Para ello, utilizaremos como base los estudios realizados sobre el Estado de Derecho en Polonia, así como un estudio de caso: las elecciones presidenciales que estaban fijadas el 10 de mayo de 2020. Teniendo en cuenta todos estos elementos de forma conjunta, comprobaremos que se trata de la continuación de una misma estrategia, cuyo objetivo es la erosión del Estado de Derecho y del principio de separación de poderes. ; In this paper we will study Poland's response to the COVID-19 crisis, because said State is characterized by having taken the illiberal way since the accession to power of the political party Law and Justice (PiS). The main elements of the analysis will be, therefore, the politic and constitutional context of the country before and after PiS' electoral success in 2015, the constitutional provisions about emergency powers and the effective governmental response to the COVID-19 crisis. For that purpose, we will use as a basis the studies of the Rule of Law in Poland, as well as a case study: the scheduled presidential elections of 10 May 2020. Having into account all these elements as a whole, we will ascertain that it is all part of the same strategy, whose target is the erosion of the Rule of Law and the principle of the separation of powers. ; peerReviewed