Internally Imposed Constitutions
In: The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed Constitutions (Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades, and Alkmene Fotiadou eds., Routledge, 2018 Forthcoming)
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In: The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed Constitutions (Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades, and Alkmene Fotiadou eds., Routledge, 2018 Forthcoming)
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In: The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed Constitutions (Albert, Contiades & Fotiadou eds., Routledge 2018 Forthcoming)
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In: Connecticut Law Review, Band 37
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In: The Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., Cambridge University Press 2013, pp. 239-68)
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In: Comparative constitutional change
Introduction : imposition in making and changing constitutions / Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou -- Imposed constitutions : heteronomy and (un)amendability / Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou -- Imposed constitutions and romantic constitutions / David S. Law -- Internally imposed constitutions / Yaniv Roznai -- Legal theology in imposed constitutionalism / Antoni Abat Ninet -- Constitutions imposed with consent? / Richard Albert -- Are "octroyed constitutions" of the 19th century to be considered as imposed constitutions? / Jörg Gerkrath -- Inter-venire, sed ubi iri? : "imposed" constitutions, the "will of the people", and the eye of the beholder / Zoran Oklopcic -- On the priority that publius gives to national security in constitutional design : reflections on the longevity of article 9 of the Japanese constitution / Sanford Levinson -- The constituent power of the "imposed" constitution of Japan : an amalgam of internationalised revolutionary power and nationalistic devolutionary power / Yota Negishi -- The legitimacy of internationally imposed constitution-making in the context of state building / Manon Bonnet -- A post-national legal order : does the European Union have an imposed constitution? / Graham Butler -- Texts in a time of imposition : lessons from two imposed constitutions in Africa / James Fowkes.
In: Comparative constitutional change
Constitutions are often seen as the product of the free will of a people exercising their constituent power. This, however, is not always the case, particularly when it comes to 'imposed constitutions'. In recent years there has been renewed interest in the idea of imposition in constitutional design, but the literature does not yet provide a comprehensive resource to understand the meanings, causes and consequences of an imposed constitution. This volume examines the theoretical and practical questions emerging from what scholars have described as an imposed constitution. A diverse group of contributors interrogates the theory, forms and applications of imposed constitutions with the aim of refining our understanding of this variation on constitution-making. Divided into three parts, this book first considers the conceptualization of imposed constitutions, suggesting definitions, or corrections to the definition, of what exactly an imposed constitution is. The contributors then go on to explore the various ways in which constitutions are, and can be, imposed. The collection concludes by considering imposed constitutions that are currently in place in a number of polities worldwide, problematizing the consequences their imposition has caused. Cases are drawn from a broad range of countries with examples at both the national and supranational level. This book addresses some of the most important issues discussed in contemporary constitutional law: the relationship between constituent and constituted power, the source of constitutional legitimacy, the challenge of foreign and expert intervention and the role of comparative constitutional studies in constitution-making. The volume will be a valuable resource for those interested in the phenomenon of imposed constitutionalism as well as anyone interested in the current trends in the study of comparative constitutional law.
The paper considers 'octroyed', 'conceded' or 'granted' constitutions of 19th century Europe whose common roots are to be found in the French 'Charte constitutionnelle' of 1814. These Charters stem from a paternalistic process of domestic constitution-making engaged unilaterally by a monarch possessing the de facto constituent power and exercising it without the direct involvement of a body representing the people. Such octroyed constitutions, which are of course to be opposed to democratically established ones, show nevertheless a number of specific characteristics which distinguish them also from 'imposed constitutions' in the usual sense. The expression 'constitutional octroy' should not be used as a synonym for any process leading to an 'imposed Constitution'. The contribution aims to develop and to validate or invalidate the value of a series of distinctive criteria and possible elements of a definition of 'octroyed' or 'granted' constitutions in order to underline their specificity.
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In: Forthcoming in The Law and Legitimacy of Imposed Constitutions, Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou eds.
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Working paper
In: 2022, American Journal of Comparative Law (Forthcoming)
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In: The Parliamentarian: journal of the parliaments of the Commonwealth, Band 74, Heft 3, S. 3-12
ISSN: 0031-2282
In: Global Constitutionalism (2022 Forthcoming)
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In: The Parliamentarian: journal of the parliaments of the Commonwealth, Band 74, Heft 3
ISSN: 0031-2282
THE CYPRIOT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS BASED ON A RIGID CONSTITUTION IMPOSED BY EXTERNAL POWERS AND IS OFTEN STYMIED BY THE COMPLEX SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES DESIGNED TO ASSURE HARMONY BETWEEN THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES. IT IS NOT EXACTLY A PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM, DEFINITELY NOT A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND NOT ONE THE CYPRIOTS WOULD HAVE CHOSEN FOR THEMSELVES.
In: University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Band 44, Heft 1
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In: Columbia studies in political thought
"The attempt in 2004 to draft an interim constitution in Iraq and the effort to enact a permanent one in 2005 were unintended outcomes of the American occupation, which first sought to impose a constitution by its agents. This two-stage constitution-making paradigm, implemented in a wholly unplanned move by the Iraqis and their American sponsors, formed a kind of compromise between the populist-democratic project of Shi'ite clerics and America's external interference. As long as it was used in a coherent and legitimate way, the method held promise. Unfortunately, the logic of external imposition and political exclusion compromised the negotiations. Andrew Arato is the first person to record this historic process and analyze its special problems. He compares the drafting of the Iraqi constitution to similar, externally imposed constitutional revolutions by the United States, especially in Japan and Germany, and identifies the political missteps that contributed to problems of learning and legitimacy. Instead of claiming that the right model of constitution making would have maintained stability in Iraq, Arato focuses on the fragile opportunity for democratization that was strengthened only slightly by the methods used to draft a constitution. Arato contends that this event would have benefited greatly from an overall framework of internationalization, and he argues that a better set of guidelines (rather than the obsolete Hague and Geneva regulations) should be followed in the future. With access to an extensive body of literature, Arato highlights the difficulty of exporting democracy to a country that opposes all such foreign designs and fundamentally disagrees on matters of political identity."--Jacket
In: Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010