Suchergebnisse

PurposeInaction inertia is the phenomenon in which people are less likely to accept an opportunity after having previously missed a relatively superior one. This research explores how framing quantity promotions as either a freebie (e.g. "buy 1, get 1 free") or a price bundle (e.g. "buy 2, get 50% off") influences inaction inertia. Relevant mediators are also identified.Design/methodology/approachThree experiments, two using imaginary scenarios and one using an incentive-compatible design, test the hypotheses.FindingsConsumers who miss a freebie quantity promotion express higher inaction inertia than consumers who miss a price bundle promotion. The cause of this difference is higher perceived regret and greater devaluation that result from missing a superior freebie (vs price bundle) promotion.Research limitations/implicationsFuture research should examine how factors influencing perceived regret and devaluation moderate the quantity promotional frame effect on inaction inertia.Practical implicationsThe findings provide insights into which quantity promotional frames practitioners should use to reduce inaction inertia.Originality/valueThis study's comprehensive theoretical framework predicts quantity promotional frame effects on inaction inertia and identifies relevant internal mechanisms. The findings are evidence that inaction inertia is caused by both perceived regret and devaluation in certain contexts. Furthermore, this study identifies the conditions in which a price bundle promotional frame is more beneficial than a freebie promotional frame.

In international disputes, forgone settlement offers are frequently lamented, but their impact on the dynamics of ongoing negotiations is largely overlooked. In the psychological literature, however, the consequences of missing an advantageous action opportunity have been studied extensively in the context of the inaction inertia phenomenon. According to this literature, forgoing attractive action opportunities renders decision makers susceptible to regret and increases the likelihood that subsequent opportunities will also be missed. This article explores the explanatory potential of the inaction inertia effect in the context of international negotiations. Findings based on laboratory experiments and analysis of the negotiations between Israel and Hamas over the release of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit strongly suggest that the concept of inaction inertia can enrich the understanding of failures and deadlocks in international negotiations. The article defines the conditions that are instrumental in identifying inertia-induced deadlocks and discusses factors that encourage the termination of inaction inertia and promote dispute settlement.

Inaction inertia refers to the effect that missing a more attractive opportunity decreases the likelihood to act on an attractive current opportunity in the same domain. We studied the influence of how people cope with negative decision outcomes (i.e., action vs. state orientation) on this inaction inertia effect. Experiment 1 used an experimental induction of action vs. state orientation and confirmed our prediction that state oriented people showed more inaction inertia than action oriented people. Experiment 2 replicated these results with a measure of chronic action orientation and showed a mediating effect of valuation of the current opportunity. Experiment 3 showed that temporal segregation of the current from the missed opportunity decreased inaction inertia effects for state oriented, but not for action oriented people. We discuss the implications of these results for the inaction inertia and action vs. state orientation literatures.

Abstract
Negotiations aimed at resolving international disputes often end in deadlock. In the current article, we focus on deadlocks triggered by missed opportunities. The consequences of missing an advantageous opportunity have been studied extensively in the field of psychology within the context of the inaction inertia effect. The concept was recently introduced into the negotiation literature. Forgoing an attractive action opportunity creates vulnerability to regret and increases the likelihood of forgoing subsequent inferior opportunities, even if they still have positive value. The current article deepens the applicability of inaction inertia to international negotiations, by adopting a new multi-step multi-issue paradigm, which better approximates real-life negotiations. Using the new platform, we demonstrate the inaction inertia effect in a dynamic negotiation setting and link an individual's inertia mindset to the experience of regret. The methodology and analysis presented will help researchers and practitioners explain inertia-induced deadlocks, and facilitate interventions that expedite successful resolutions.

AbstractHow do consumers who miss extremely attractive sales promotions respond to merely attractive opportunities they later encounter when prices return to higher levels? The literature on inaction inertia suggests that the more attractive the missed opportunity, the less likely a consumer is to accept the subsequently encountered inferior opportunity, indicating that consumers may stay undecided. Thus, consumers are believed to be negatively influenced by the shadow of the attractive opportunities they missed. This has adverse consequences for both consumer and firm welfare. Yet, we sometimes do see consumers buying even after missing a sale. We draw from the literature on regret and personal responsibility to hypothesize the conditions that would allow the consumer to remain uninfluenced by the attractiveness of the missed opportunity. In three studies, we find support for the idea that personal responsibility for missing the first opportunity allows consumers to be less influenced by its attractiveness when they see a second inferior opportunity compared to conditions in which they were not personally responsible for missing the first opportunity; this bodes well both for consumer and marketer welfare.

"War Termination" published on by Oxford University Press.

This article examines the case of institutional inertia in Japanese financial regulation, focusing on the reasons why institutions centered on informal modes of organization and interaction proved particularly 'sticky.' The Japanese case serves as a particularly tough test for theories of institutional adaptation and change because even crisis – a time when the costs of inaction tend to far exceed the benefits – failed to produce timely institutional change. The paper argues that informal, exclusionary and opaque relational ties served as a functional substitute for formal regulation and promoted cooperative government-bank relationships in an earlier period. Yet, when the informal attributes of the system began to impede the sound functioning of the financial system, the very opacity of these ties and the informational dynamics underlying them meant that the Diet and the general public were less than fully aware of the extent of dysfunction present as time went on.

International audience ; L'attention portée aux villes de tradition industrielle aux États-Unis concerne avant tout les initiatives de renouvellement urbain. Or une large part des anciens quartiers industriels demeure en marge de cette dynamique et semble plutôt marquée par un délabrement durable. À partir de l'exemple de Kensington à Philadelphie, nous avons cherché à savoir si cette persistance du délaissement témoignait du désintérêt des principaux acteurs en présence ou, au contraire, révélait les stratégies de contrôle de l'espace mises en place par le secteur privé. Au terme de notre travail, il est apparu que la léthargie de ce quartier-visible à travers le grand nombre de propriétés vacantes-découle à la fois de l'immobilisme calculé de certains acteurs privés et de l'impuissance des services municipaux. D'une part, la rétention foncière et la spéculation immobilière de nombreux propriétaires contribuent à entretenir une situation figée qui exclut toute rénovation. D'autre part, la municipalité est paralysée par un budget insuffisant et un manque d'organisation hérité de longue date, de sorte qu'elle ne parvient pas à limiter l'ampleur de la vacance. En définitive, l'abandon apparent de tels espaces résulte en réalité d'intérêts locaux contradictoires tant sur le plan politique que sur le plan économique. Abstract US cities with an industrial past have mostly been studied through the scope of urban renewal initiatives. Yet, many former industrial neighborhoods do not participate in this dynamic and are increasingly affected by urban blight. Based on the case study of Kensington in Philadelphia (Pennsylvania), this paper aims at understanding the mechanisms accounting for this persistent abandonment. Far from revealing the indifference of the stakeholders in this neighborhood, this inertia indicates in fact that they developed strategies to control the area, therefore hindering any development. Indeed, the slump in this neighborhood-made visible through the large amount of vacant properties-results from ...

We investigated the influence of humiliation on inter-group conflict in three studies of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. We demonstrate that experienced humiliation produces an inertia effect; a tendency towards inaction that suppresses rebellious or violent action but which paradoxically also suppresses support for acts of inter-group compromise. In Study 1, Palestinians who felt more humiliated by the Israeli occupation were less likely to support suicide attacks against Israelis. In Study 2, priming Palestinians with a humiliating experience caused fewer expressions of joy when subsequently hearing about suicide attacks. In Study 3, Palestinians who felt more humiliated by peace deals were less likely to support those deals, while Israeli symbolic compromises that decreased feelings of humiliation increased support for the same deals. While the experience of humiliation does not seem to contribute to political violence, it does seem to suppress support for conflict resolution