Suchergebnisse

Electoral institutions shape the incentive that elected representatives have to cultivate a personal vote, a geographically-concentrated personal vote in particular. But are electoral institutions able to make representatives do what they would not do otherwise and to make them not do what they otherwise would have done? Using data from the cross-national PARTIREP MP Survey, it is demonstrated that electoral institutions shape elected representatives' local orientation. Local orientation decreases as district magnitude grows - regardless of what representatives think about political representation. But representatives' conceptions of representation do shape their uptake in the legislative arena from their contacts with individual constituents. The effect of the electoral incentive grows stronger as elected representatives think of representation as a bottom-up rather than a top-down process. Adapted from the source document.

Summary

THE CONTOURS OF A THEORY OF STATUS POLITICS ARE SKETCHED. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IS 1ST CONSIDERED IN TERMS OF THE PLAY & COUNTERPLAY OF 3 GROUPS OF FACTORS: (1) PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE AMBITION TO PARTICIPATE, (2) INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL RESOURCES, & (3) INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS. SECONDLY, A THEORY OF POLITICAL STRIVING IS CONSTRUCTED. EMPHASIS IS PUT ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL AMBITION & THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE OF THE POLITY. POLITICAL POSITIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN TERMS OF DEMAND & SUPPLY, & INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL RESOURCES ARE INTERPRETED AS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF THE INCUMBENCY OF POLITICAL POSITIONS. A MODEL CONTAINING 6 RELATIONS IS PRESENTED. 3RD IS THE INTRODUCTION OF INCENTIVES. THE THEORY OF POLITICAL STRIVING ASSUMES POLITICAL AMBITION TO VARY ACCORDING TO CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES & THE SUPPLY OF POLITICAL POSITIONS, BUT THE THEORY OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES ADDS THE ELEMENT OF SATISFACTIONS CONNECTED WITH POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. INCENTIVES ARE VIEWED AS EMOTIONAL NEEDS, SUCH AS STATUS, WHICH ARE SATISFIED BY MEANS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION. THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE MODEL OF POLITICAL STRIVING IN THE DIRECTION OF STATUS IS ANALYZED. STATUS & PROGRAM ARE ASSUMED TO BE POLAR TYPES OF INCENTIVES. THE 3 VARIABLES OF THE MODEL ARE (A) POLITICAL AMBITION BASED ON EMOTIONAL NEED OF SOCIAL PRESTIGE, (B) POLITICAL RESOURCES THAT ARE PARTICULARLY SUITED FOR SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION IN STATUS POLITICS, & (C) STATUS POSITIONS IN THE OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE. THE SUPPLY OF POLITICAL POSITIONS HAS CONSIDERABLY INCREASED IN HOLLAND IN RECENT YEARS. RESEARCHING WHETHER THIS IS BECAUSE OF A TREND TOWARDS STATUS POLITICS IS A DELICATE MATTER BECAUSE OF TABOOS & POLITICIANS' DEFENSE MECHANISMS. 4 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.

The legislation and regulations which seek to guarantee good governance in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom are similar to the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the administrative performance in the West is significantly inferior to that of the latter. To explain this difference, this thesis highlights the fact that the legislation in the West codifies norms of conduct that are dominant in modern Western societies. However, due to the small-scale, the poverty and the stratification of the insular societies other norms of conduct are dominant in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom. To maintain their position politicians depend on electoral support. Therefore they should act according to the norms of conduct that are generally accepted within society. As a result an incentive for politicians is manifest to act contrary to the appropriate line. In the practice of the Caribbean overseas territories this incentive results especially in political patronage. Yet, the examples of Barbados and Anguilla learn that despite the fact that small-scale, poverty and social stratification are unalterable good governance is still possible. Where, however, the high quality of governance in Barbados should especially be ascribed to the de-politicization of the distribution power of public goods of the executive branch, the high quality of governance in Anguilla is mainly due to the supervision of London. Because it should not to be expected that the administrative elite in the Caribbean parts of the Dutch Kingdom will adjust their state system on their own initiative, good governance will in the first place depend on the willingness of the Netherlands to play an active role in the local administrative affairs of the islands in the West.