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The subject of this dissertation is the response to food safety incidents in logistics chains. In recent decades, the food industry has been confronted with many different incidents. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), unsafe food leads to an estimated 600 million cases of illness and 420,000 deaths worldwide. Food safety is considered important and socially relevant because of the public health, political, reputational and financial risks involved. Research into these food safety incidents usually focuses on one or a limited number of parties in the supply chain, while the chain as a whole is involved in the response. In this study of the entire food chain, five (chain) positions have been distinguished: producer, logistics service provider, wholesaler/retailer, sector organisation and food safety authority. It has been studied from which perspective these different positions act upon food safety incidents and which criteria are applied in decisions regarding the response. The research results indicate that the logistic response is primarily seen as a coordination process. The emphasis in all rounds of research was on information quality, with the challenges of transparency and traceability being mentioned. In addition to coordination, the data revealed three more critical decision criteria, namely: cooperation, communication and competence. The survey results show a clear difference in the positions' views on how to use the decision criteria for an effective response to a food safety incident. In particular, business risks are approached differently, with some positions focusing more on reputation and others more on cost-effectiveness. As a result, designing an effective logistical response in food chains can be challenging. Based on theory and data, a model was developed that distinguishes a timeline (five phases) in the logistic response process and includes decision criteria for each phase. In general, this dissertation shows the interdependence of the parties in the food chains. The research ...

Antarctica is one of the most remote regions on Earth. Mass casualty incident (MCI) responses in Antarctica are prone to complications from multiple environmental and operational challenges. This review of the current status of MCI risks and response strategies for Antarctica focuses on aeromedical evacuation, a critical component of many possible MCI scenarios. Extreme cold and weather, a lack of medical resources and a multitude of disparate international bases all exert unique demands on MCI response planning. Increasing cruise ship traffic is also escalating the risk of MCI occurrence. To be successful, MCI response must be well coordinated and undertaken by trained rescuers, especially in the setting of Antarctica. Helicopter rescue or aeromedical evacuation of victims to off-continent facilities may be necessary. Currently, military forces have the greatest capacity for mass air evacuation. Specific risks that are likely to occur include structure collapses, vehicle incapacitations, vehicle crashes and fires. All of these events pose concomitant risks of hypothermia among both victims and rescuers. Antarctica's unique environment requires flexible yet robust MCI response planning among the many entities in operation on the continent.

Antarctica is one of the most remote regions on Earth. Mass casualty incident (MCI) responses in Antarctica are prone to complications from multiple environmental and operational challenges. This review of the current status of MCI risks and response strategies for Antarctica focuses on aeromedical evacuation, a critical component of many possible MCI scenarios. Extreme cold and weather, a lack of medical resources and a multitude of disparate international bases all exert unique demands on MCI response planning. Increasing cruise ship traffic is also escalating the risk of MCI occurrence. To be successful, MCI response must be well coordinated and undertaken by trained rescuers, especially in the setting of Antarctica. Helicopter rescue or aeromedical evacuation of victims to off-continent facilities may be necessary. Currently, military forces have the greatest capacity for mass air evacuation. Specific risks that are likely to occur include structure collapses, vehicle incapacitations, vehicle crashes and fires. All of these events pose concomitant risks of hypothermia among both victims and rescuers. Antarctica's unique environment requires flexible yet robust MCI response planning among the many entities in operation on the continent. [West J Emerg Med. 2011;12(1):37-42.]

Responding to data breach incidents are a significant concern for businesses of all sizes and industry sectors. Recovering from these incidents is particularly challenging for small to midsize businesses (SMB) due to the limited support staff and institutional knowledge of incident response strategies for cyber attacks. Incident response is an organized approach to addressing and managing the aftermath of cybersecurity data breach attacks by information technology (IT) professionals. Military strategies present a unique opportunity for improving cybersecurity incident response. This case study examines incident response documentation of data breaches occurring at SMBs using the lens of military strategy. Industry best practices and the military strategies of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA, Boyd, 1978) and The Art ofWar (Tzu, 5 BC) are used as frameworks for the analysis of cybersecurity incident response. The study seeks to answer the central research question of whether incident response for SMBs can be improved when a military strategy is employed.

Following the discovery of horsemeat in beef products in Europe in 2013, restoring consumers' confidence in processed meat products as well as in all the agencies involved - producers, food safety authorities, retailers - soon became a key priority. However, the European public's confidence in processed meat products and their views about government and industry actions to manage fraudulent practices in the wake of this incident are poorly understood. The objective of this study was to identify the core issues affecting consumers' confidence in the food industry, particularly in the meat processing sector, and to explore the impact of the horsemeat incident on consumers' purchasing and eating behaviour. It involved the use of an online deliberation tool VIZZATA™ to collect detailed views of 61 consumers in the UK and the Republic of Ireland. Many participants reported buying fewer products containing processed meat as a result of the horsemeat incident. These respondents also claimed that their confidence in processed foods containing meat was lower than before the incident. Participants suggested restoring consumer confidence through improved traceability, sourcing local ingredients, providing clearer and correct labelling and stating the origin of meat on pack. Overall, findings indicate that rebuilding consumer confidence in processed meat products following a food adulteration episode is a multifaceted and difficult process. Food authorities and the food industry can benefit from the insights provided by this study to address issues affecting consumer confidence and to improve their communication strategies during future food adulteration incidents.

During recent years, knowledge gaps on drinking water-related gastrointestinal illness have been identified, especially for non-epidemic cases. Pathogen contamination of drinking water during distribution has been suggested to contribute to these cases, but the risk factors are not yet fully understood. During 2014–2015, we conducted an epidemiological study in five municipalities in Sweden, to assess whether incidents in the drinking water distribution system influence the risk of gastrointestinal illness. Telephone interviews were conducted in the affected areas and in reference areas 7–14 days after a reported incident. Symptoms of gastrointestinal illness occurring during the period were documented for each household member. The results showed a significantly elevated risk of vomiting and acute gastrointestinal illness (AGI) in the affected areas, compared to the reference areas (ORvom. = 2.0, 95% CI: 1.2–3.3; ORAGI = 1.9, 95% CI: 1.2–3.0). Certain conditions, or risk factors, during the incidents, such as sewage and drinking water pipelines at the same level in the trench, were associated with an elevated risk of AGI and vomiting. Safety measures taken during repair work, like flushing, were also associated with an elevated risk of AGI and vomiting. These results show that incidents in the drinking water distribution network contribute to endemic gastrointestinal illness, especially AGI and vomiting, and that external pathogen contamination of the drinking water is a likely cause of these cases of gastrointestinal illness. The results also indicate that safety measures used today may not be sufficient for eliminating the risk of gastrointestinal illness. ; Funding details: MSB dnr 2012-172, MSB, Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap; Funding text: This study was funded by a Swedish non-profitable governmental agency, the Civil Contingencies Agency (grant number MSB dnr 2012-172).

Response plans developed thoroughly are suggestive of a successful action, but there is a gap in the literature with respect to the way concerted efforts among organizations are planned and change during crises. Using organizational network data extracted from the South Korean government's MERS response manuals, we examined the changes in the response coordination network planned during the epidemic's distinct stages. The greatest difference in predicting tie formation was found in the networks planned before the event and revised during the outbreak. Local and governmental actors tend to form more ties consistently in the revised manuals. Two actors that are intended to transfer medical and/or personnel resources tend to form more ties across all stages. These findings suggest that transferring material and/or human resources are key activities in the epidemic response and planners tend to increase the connection of local and governmental actors over time.

Purpose — The purpose of this study is to examine security incident response practices of IT security practitioners as a diagnostic work process, including the preparation phase, detection, and analysis of anomalies. Design/methodology/approach — The data set consisted of 16 semi-structured interviews with IT security practitioners from 7 organizational types (e.g., academic, government, private). The interviews were analyzed using qualitative description with constant comparison and inductive analysis of the data to analyze diagnostic work during security incident response. Findings — Our analysis shows that security incident response is a highly collaborative activity, which may involve practitioners developing their own tools to perform specific tasks. Our results also show that diagnosis during incident response is complicated by practitioners' need to rely on tacit knowledge, as well as usability issues with security tools. Research limitations/implications — Due to the nature of semi-structured interviews, not all participants discussed security incident response at the same level of detail. More data are required to generalize and refine our findings. Originality/value — The contribution of our work is twofold. First, using empirical data, we analyze and describe the tasks, skills, strategies, and tools that security practitioners use to diagnose security incidents. Our findings enhance the research community's understanding of the diagnostic work during security incident response. Second, we identify opportunities for future research directions related to improving security tools.

At present, the Colombian government shares information on threats or vulnerabilities in the area of cybersecurity and cyberdefense, from other government agencies or departments, on an ad-hoc basis but not in real time, with the surveillance entities of the Government of the Republic of Colombia such as the Joint Command of Cybernetic Operations (CCOCI) and the Cybernetic Emergencies Response Team of Colombia (ColCERT). This research presents the MS-CSIRT (Management System Computer Security Incident Response Teams) methodology, that is used to unify the guidelines of a CSIRT towards a joint communication command in cybersecurity for the surveillance of Information Technology (IT), Technological Operations (TO), Internet Connection Sharing (ICS) or Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures. This methodology evaluates the level of maturity, by means of a roadmap, to establish a CSIRT as a reference framework for government entities and as a guide for the areas of information security, IT and TO to strengthen the growth of the industry 4.0. This allows the organizations to draw a line of cybersecurity policy with scope, objectives, controls, metrics, procedures and use cases for the correct coordination between ColCERT and CCOCI, as support entities in cybersecurity, and the different companies (ICS, IoT, gas and energy, mining, maritime, agroindustrial, among others) or government agencies that use this methodology.

The Exxon Valdez was an oil tanker owned by the ExxonMobil Shipping Company, which gained its infamy after running aground in Prince William Sound spilling more than 11 million galleons (approximately 258,000 barrels) of crude oil [1]. It is currently operating under the name Oriental Nicety, and is owned by Hong Kong Bloom Shipping Ltd. In the early hours of March 24th, 1989 the vessel struck Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound, Alaska. The oil impacted over 1,100 miles of non-continuous coastline, making the Exxon Valdez the largest oil spill in U.S. history [2]. Exxon and the U.S. Coast Guard began a massive cleanup effort that included over 11,000 personnel, 1,400 vessels, and 85 aircrafts [2]. The spill affected one of the nations most vulnerable ecosystems, which included a national forest, four national wildlife refuges, five state parks, 3 national parks, four state critical habitat areas, and a state game sanctuary. Total toll on marine wildlife included approximately 300 harbour seals, 2,800 sea otters, and between 250,000 and 500,000 seabirds [3]. The remote location, the large spill size, and the character of the oil spill tested spill preparedness and response capabilities. Government and industry response plans proved to be completely insufficient to maintain an oil spill of this magnitude. Initial industry response to get equipment on site was exceptionally slow, and once deployed the equipment could not cope with the scale of the oil spill. In the aftermath of the incident, Exxon Mobil undertook substantial operational reforms and implemented an extremely thorough operational management system to prevent future incidents. This report will explore the Exxon Valdez incident, environmental losses, economic losses, loss prevention measures, and the impact on design codes, practices and regulations.

This thesis explores the nature of the relationship between foreign news media and network incidents against DoD networks. A rank correlation was performed between the number of network incidents against DoD networks and foreign news media reports covering U.S. Military events. Further analysis was conducted to determine the key terms used in the contents of foreign news media reports for the months the reports were significantly correlated with network incidents. Several significant correlations were found between various combinations of regions and categories of network incidents. However, the correlations were only moderate and the key terms only led to a slightly better understanding of such relationships.

Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses the challenges of effective emergency preparedness for, response to, and recovery from major emergencies, including catastrophic incidents. Effective emergency preparedness and response for major events requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple players from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well as nongovernmental entities. Effective emergency preparedness and response requires putting aside parochialism and working together prior to and after an emergency incident. September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed the context of emergency management preparedness in the United States, including federal involvement in preparedness and response. The biggest challenge in emergency preparedness is getting effective cooperation in planning, exercises, and capability assessment and building across first responder disciplines and intergovernmental lines. DHS has developed several policy documents designed to define the federal government's role in supporting state and local first responders in emergencies, implement a uniform incident command structure across the nation, and identify performance standards that can be used in assessing state and local first responder capabilities. Realistic exercises are a key component of testing and assessing emergency plans and first responder capabilities, and the Hurricane PAM planning exercise demonstrated their value. With regard to the status of emergency preparedness across the nation, we know relatively little about how states and localities (1) finance their efforts in this area, (2) have used their federal funds, and (3) are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds. Katrina has raised a host of questions about the nation's readiness to respond effectively to catastrophic emergencies. Effective emergency preparedness is a task that is never done, but requires continuing commitment and leadership because circumstances change and continuing trade-offs because we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do."

This article appeared in Homeland Security Affairs (September 2007), v.3 no.3 ; The analysis of domestic incidents of terrorism has revealed many gaps in our nation's capability to effectively manage the multi-jurisdictional response. Although many gaps have been addressed through implementation of measures based on lessons learned, the most pervasive unresolved issue remains the ability to properly identify first response personnel on incident scenes. The nature of incidents of terrorism requires force protection to be a priority because of the threat of a secondary attack. Identity must be established and authenticated to protect responders and prevent infiltration. This article defines the problem of identity management for terrorism incident response and examines two potential options for closing this glaring capability gap. The first option, a typed Identity Management Team response resource, is developed and defined through analysis of the response to previous domestic incidents of terrorism. The second option, a comprehensive nationwide identity solution for first responders, is examined in light of the federal government implementation of HSPD-12. The article recommends immediate development of typed identity management response resources and a thorough study of federal HSPD-12 implementation for its applicability to incident response deficiencies. ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Despite high rates of critical incidents (CIs) in working class occupations, there is a significant gap in our understanding of responses to these events. In this study, we aimed to inform a response training module by synthesising the key elements of pre-, during- and post-incident responses to CIs and suicide in the workplace. A rapid review identified studies on responses to CIs or suicide deaths in the workplace published between January 2015 and June 2020. A systematic search of six databases (Medline, CINAHL, PsycINFO, Sociology Collection, Academic Search and Business Search Complete) and grey literature was performed. Studies were excluded if the focus was on non-colleagues. Two reviewers independently conducted record screening, a review of the full text and assessed study quality. The existing evidence was synthesised and interventions were categorised using Haddon's Matrix. Five studies were included, reporting on CIs across a range of workplace settings, including railways, factories, police and military, along with external critical response units. Overall, study quality was assessed as being poor. Most of the evidence focused on the pre-incident and post-incident stage. There is little evidence on responses to CIs in the workplace. Evidence-based education and training is necessary to establish organisational responses to assist with supporting workers exposed to workplace CIs.

Laboratory Response Network (LRN) laboratories help protect populations from biological and chemical public health threats. We examined the role of LRN biological laboratories in enhancing capacity to detect and respond to public health infectious disease emergencies in South Korea. The model for responding to infectious disease emergencies leverages standardized laboratory testing procedures, a repository of standardized testing reagents, laboratory testing cooperation among hospital sentinel laboratories and reference laboratories, and maintenance of a trained workforce through traditional and on-demand training. Cooperation among all network stakeholders helps ensure that laboratory response is an integrated part of the national response. The added laboratory testing capacity provided by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention LRN assets helps protect persons who reside in South Korea, US military personnel and civilians in South Korea, and those who reside in the continental United States.