Suchergebnisse

The author looks into the concept of the "smal1 nation" and whether it is high time for its scientific or linguistic revision. If "small nations" are a qualitative category, why define them quantitatively as "small"? Small nations gained independence in two waves: between the German-French war (1870-1871) and the end of World War One, and after the close of the "cold war" in 1990. However, not all small nations gained independence (e.g. Basques, Catalonians, Bretons, etc.). They pose a major challenge for Western Europe. The example of Croatia and its relationship with Serbs serves to illustrate the vacillations in the European ideology and attitudes towards small nations. The pressures exerted on the Croatian state regarding the political attitude of the Croatian people towards small nations did not stem from the logic of globalist economism or neoliberal political doctrine but were the.consequence of the war which the mother country Serbia of the Serbs in Croatia waged with the aim of annexing the territories on which they were a majority population. (SOI : PM: S. 98)

Taking into consideration all the benefits and pitfalls of its political, economic, military, and cultural legacies, the People's Republic of China has adopted a policy of reliance on rapid economic growth and improvement of the standard of living, conducive to political and social stability of Chinese society and state. This goal has been accomplished only temporarily and partially, while the final result primarily depends on the ability of the Chinese leadership to find the golden mean between the two opposites: the closed political system and the need to maintain an open economy. In its search for a place in today's world, the People's Republic of China is faced with the central choice of the equitable participation in global community: full acceptance of its mechanisms and principles (beginning with the United Nations) and international trade norms, the protection of human rights, armament control, environmental protection and so on. However, the Chinese see in this a threat of the erosion of Chinese independence and the possibility of choice and political independence of the Chinese state. (SOI : PM: S. 44)

The author describes the political and geopolitical genesis of the Kosovo crisis and offers a polemically intoned criticism of the great powers regarding their policies on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia, and particularly on Kosovo. The author advocates the continuation of the military struggle of the Kosovo Albanians until they have achieved their total political independence. (SOI : S. 50)

The author analyses the genesis and the scenarios of the Kosovo crisis resolution, as well as the possible political reverberations of the NATO military intervention. The premise is that the Kosovo crisis is only a continuation of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, that Kosovo has for centuries been a separate entity largely populated by Albanians, that the policy of Serbian nationalism has permanently discriminated against the Albanian population and that prior to the recent air strikes against Yugoslavia Serbia had systematically led an ethnic-cleansing campaign on Kosovo. Although the author recognises that the support for the NATO military action can hardly be found in the tenets of the UN Charter, he argues that it can nevertheless be justified by international law. He points out that NATO's military campaign enjoyed a broad support of the people of NATO member countries, but that it has made a rift in the European left. The new left was in the forefront of the action, while the old, dogmatic and sectarian left, found itself in the ranks of its most vocal opponents. The author claims that Milosevic, with his overall politics, and particularly his policy on Kosovo, had propelled the West into an action it could not extricate itself from. He concludes that the consequences of Belgrade's defeat will be: 1. The collapse of Milosevic' regime (the beginning of his end); 2. The final incapacitation of Milosevic' politics to create new conflicts; 3. The protectorate over Kosovo and its autonomy, with a factual independence from Serbia; 4 The independence of Montenegro; 5. Reinforcing the Dayton policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (eliminating centrifugal tendencies); 6. The organised participation of the West in the transitional processes in this region (The Pact on the Stability of Southeast Europe); 7. Bolstering the democratic and weakening the undemocratic tendencies in the region. (SOI : S. 14)

Supilo, as one of the most significant Croatian politicians left an indellible mark on Croatian political life due to his discerning political judgements. After his attempts to secure the unification of Croatia with Bosnia-Herzegovina within the Austro-Hungarian Empire by means of a joint Croato-Serbian effort had fallen through, he became one of the most fervent advocates of the unification of all South Slavs within a common state. But he was also the first to recognize the destructiveness of the Greater Serbian politics for a harmonious political life of the future South-Slavonic state; With the same ardour with which he once advocated the unification, he began his fight against it and for the independence of Croatia hoping in this way to save its territorial and national integrity. (SOI : PM: S. 280)

Croatia is the only postcommunist country in which the process of democratic transition coincided with the process of creating the state by means of a war. These three processes are in a special interaction: the transition enabled the realization of the state-building programme, which triggered off the war which, in turn, jeopardized the completion of both projects. The author illustrates the dynamics of the political changes in Croatia since the eighties, which started with the liberalization of political life and continued with two stages of democratic transition, before and after gaining independence. The Serbian insurgence and later an open aggression have somewhat hampered the transition and brought about the "ethnification" of politics. At the end the author analyses the pattern of the creation of democratic institutions which has been, in both stages (before and after the 1990 elections) under the control of the ruling political party. (SOI : PM: S. 99)

Because it was the estate of a junior branch of the Habsburg family, Belje was treated as land confiscated by the state after 1918. At first it was occupied by the army, then it came under the administration of the National government of Baranja, Backa and Banat, and finally it fell under the control of the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Finances in Belgrade, which meant that it was officially the property of the crown. All this had a negative effect on the economy of the estate, which became a problematic enterprise instead of a model of successful agricultural production. Following the death of King Alexander, and with the establishment of commercial ties between the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Third Reich, Belje attained relative independence in its export policy. Nonetheless, as regards the hiring of labourers and connections with Croatia, Great Serbian policy continued to hold sway. (SOI : CSP: S. 525)

These assertions are corroborated with the statistical data on the trends in Croatian trade and other economic relations, before and after Croatia's independence. The author also pleads for the necessity of Croatia's economic co-operation with its neighbouring states, in line with its interests - the real measure of the relations among sovereign states. (SOI : PM: S. 54) + The real reasons which run counter to the conclusion that "the Balkan market" is essential for the economic development of Croatia are discussed. The author's thesis is that the Westeuropean market (particularly Italian and German markets) is crucial for Croatia and that it has always been so, even when Croatia was a part of the former Yugoslavia. That is why it is thought that Croatia's acceptance of the American notion of an economic integration of Southeasteuropean states would be detrimental to Croatia. The same applies to the European Union's "regional approach" which links EU's co-operation with Croatia to Croatia's co-operation with the states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia

The Republic of Slovenia, having obtained independence and sovereignty in the June-July war of 1991, launched the intensive buildup of the system of nationa security. As guidelines it used the experiences of other states, its own historical experience and the attitudes of the public and the political parties. The analysis of Slovenian national security shows that the threats to it come in the forms of military threats, internal threats and the threat to the living space. This was the reason that the system of national security was outlined as including the defense system, the security system, and the system of protection and preservation. Though encountering momentous problems in the build-up of the system of national security (particularly its military aspect), Slovenia has made remarkable shifts in order to embrace the NATO standards. However, it was not enough and Slovenia was not among the countries that were admitted to this organisation in the first wave - Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. (SOI : PM: S. 102)

The Serbo-Albanian conflict on Kosovo has had direct repercussions for the Balkan security in the last 150 years. That is why the international community would from time to time pay more attention to this conflict, but never long enough to resolve it for good. Both the Serbian and the Albanian side put in a lot of effort towards the resolution of the conflict and came up with several proposals, ranging from various modes of Kosovo autonomy to the idea of cantonisation and re-federalisation of SR Yugoslavia to the independence of Kosovo or its being turned into a protectorate. All these suggestions had mostly been one-sided, either pro-Serbian or pro-Albanian, none of them conducive to a compromise. All this eventually resulted in a military conflict and the attempt to impose solutions by force. Nevertheless, after the NATO intervention, negotiations will have to be resumed and the familiar proposals for the resolution of the Kosovo question will have to be rehashed, only this time this will require much more good will and willingness to make compromises, both on the Albanian and the Serbian side, as well as a considerable support of international community. (SOI : S. 60)

Slovakian political development following the collapse of communism is analysed in the text. The instigator of the democratic change in Slovakia was the organization "Public against violence" /VPN/ (the equivalent to the Czech "Citizens' Forum"), in which Vladimir Meciar came to prominence very early. Following his clash with the leadership of VPN in spring of 1991, he emerged as a charismatic political leader. Relying on his populist party called "Movement for Democratic Slovakia" /HZDS/, Meciar in 1992 won the Slovakian parliamentary elections and became Prime Minister. HZDS' radicalization of the nationalist discourse and its striving for a total institutional transformation of the Czechoslovakian federation led to the so called "velvet divorce" and Slovakian independence early in 1993. Meciar and HZDS briefly lost power in 1994 due to the party rift, but made a triumphant comeback after the elections in autumn of the same year. The authors' thesis is that this is responsible for the fact that in Slovakia national populism and client-patrimonial type of government have prevailed over democratic constitutionalism. The authors claim that the causes for such a development can be found in the social repercussions of the forced postwar industrialization and in the powerful tradition of cultural and political nationalism. (SOI : PM: S. 151)

Globalization has brought about the collapse of the bipolar system of international relations, which was the foundation of the structure of global security based on the technological means of mass production, which predominated at that time. The change from the mass to the flexible way of production has made it necessary to build a new system of global security on the technological resources of flexible production and the political implications of globalization. There are many indications that it was just this new system of global security that began to take shape the day the first NATO bomb fell on Serbia, which means that it came into being: in South- Eastern Europe i.e. in the region that at the beginning of the 20th century ignited the fuse of the world wars and which would, if not for this intervention, still pose a threat. The intervention, a novelty in the postwar international relations, and which consequently brought up a plethora of questions, paved the way to the realization of the project Europe for the 21th century. That project, based on adjusting international relations to globalization, whose outlines are becoming visible in the region of South- Eastern Europe, is in Croatia's interest, and is the major guarantor of the preservation of its independence and sovereignty. (SOI : PM: S. 33)

Recent historical developments in the relationship between Croats and Serbs are discussed, refering to an article by V. Vujacic (Theory and Society, No. 6, 1996). The idea of an Illyrian and later a Yugoslav commonwealth of all South Slavs, originating in Croatia in the 19th century, had its legitimating psychological foundation in a "illusion of centrality", developed at the time by a part of the Croatian political and intellectual elite, a view of the preeminent position of Croatia and the Croats among all the Slav ethnic groups in the region and, therefore, of a natural central role of Croatia in the future commonwealth. In a similar way, the armed struggle of the Serbs for independence from the Ottoman empire in the 19th century and for the expansion of the Serbian State in the 19th and 20th century has generated a Serbian belief in the dominant role of Serbia and the Serbs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established in 1918, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. These incompatible illusions are believed to be the roots of a number of political positions and decisions taken by both Croats and Serbs in the 20th century. The views of Max Weber on nationality and nationalism are discussed in relation to the problem of cooperation and conflict between Croats and Serbs in the 20th century. (SOI : PM: S. 17)

The relations between the civil and military sector in SFRY greatly affected its development and survival as well as its collapse. Within the political system of the former Yugoslavia, the military secured a certain degree of independence, which later evolved into a power per se, in any moment ready to impose its own interest (when and if jeopardized) as the general public interest. Due to such status of the military, the political system of SFRY was deformed and, to a certain extent continually endangered by such autonomous functioning of the military. This sense of imperilment was the more intensive the deeper the divisions among certain social groups and interests, the bitter the struggles and conflicts along economic, national and ideological divide, the less prominent the role of the communist party. Such situations encouraged and facilitated the process of the transformation of the military (particularly its top echelon) into a "neutral force" and - formally and factually -into the key political institution on federal level. + Among the several basic models of the relations between the civil and the military sector, the one in SFRY meant that the military was a factor in political decision-making and the factor in certain crises. This required a certain degree of political clout on the part of the military. This clout, required for its meddling into politics, was based on the military and political position of the country, the military communist party organization, the ownership i.e. financial resources, the existence of the external and "internal" enemies, the impotence of civil institutions in certain periods and the charisma of individual military officers. (SOI : PM: S. 82)

The SANU-Memorandum of 1986 is the ultimate manifesto of the Greater Serbian idea; in the economic department, it is manifested in the form of vying for investments into Serbia, of the elimination of the "political and economic domination of Slovenia and Croatia", and of "disencumbering Serbia from contributing to the Federation fund". Its authors put the blame for the alleged lagging of Serbia exclusively on Slovenia and Croatia, and thus consequently make them responsible for all unsound economic policies in the former Yugoslavia. Particularly venomous charges are reserved for the Constitution of 1974, which makes for the independence ("secession") of Slovenia and Croatia, viewed as a precursor of a possible catastrophe. These two republics, they believe, are "morally obliged" to aid the development of the underdeveloped republics, since Serbia has sacrificed most, and the price of that has been its own thwarted development. + Two issues are central to Serbian economists: the 1961-1965 five-year plan and the system of financing a faster development of the underdeveloped regions (the Federation Fund). They demand that Serbia should be completely exempted from aiding the underdeveloped and, at the same time, extra measures for a faster development of Serbia proper should be decreed. The impossibility of solving these problems in this dictated manner brought about the economic disintegration of Yugoslavia, followed by the strategy of violence which ended in the aggression. Nevertheless, the Serbian political elite thinks that their political and economic standing has been enhanced and thus, in the negotiations about the succession, they flaunt the Memorandum propositions, and continue to live under the illusion that the Greater Serbia is a viable option, both economically and politically. (SOI : PM: S. 27)