Suchergebnisse

In this study, a data mining technique, specifically a decision tree, was applied to look at the similarities and differences between Islamists and Far Right extremists in the Profiles of Individual Radicalisation in the United States (PIRUS) dataset. The aim was to identify differences and similarities across various groups that may highlight overlaps and variations across both Islamists and Far Right extremists. The data mining technique analysed data in the PIRUS dataset according to the PIRUS codebook's grouping of variables. The decision tree technique generated a number of rules that provided insights about previously unknown similarities and differences between Islamists and Far Right extremists. This study demonstrates that data mining is a valuable approach for shedding light on factors and patterns related to different forms of violent extremism.

Blatantly observable in the U.S. currently, the political chasm grows, representing a prototype of political polarization in most if not all western democratic political systems. Differential political psychology strives to trace back increasingly polarized political convictions to differences on the individual level. Recent evolutionary informed approaches suggest that interindividual differences in political orientation reflect differences in group-mindedness and cooperativeness. Contrarily, the existence of meaningful associations between political orientation, personality traits, and interpersonal behavior has been questioned critically. Here, we shortly review evidence showing that these relationships do exist, which supports the assumption that political orientation is deeply rooted in the human condition. Potential reasons for the premature rejection of these relationships and directions for future research are outlined and implications for refinements and extensions of evolutionary informed approaches are derived.

A growing body of scholarship explores how incarceration contributes to inequality. The majority of this scholarship focuses on individual-level outcomes or aggregate outcomes within the United States. Despite substantial cross-national variation in incarceration rates, we know little about whether these differences contribute to cross-national variation in inequality outcomes. Using data from the period 1971-2010 from 15 advanced democracies, this study begins to fill this gap by exploring whether cross-national differences in incarceration rates help to explain cross-national differences in relative poverty rates. Although this research finds no average association, this null association obscures the important moderating role of country context. The association between incarceration and relative poverty is contingent upon a country's female employment rate and welfare state generosity.

A growing body of scholarship explores how incarceration contributes to inequality. The majority of this scholarship focuses on individual-level outcomes or aggregate outcomes within the United States. Despite substantial cross-national variation in incarceration rates, we know little about whether these differences contribute to cross-national variation in inequality outcomes. Using data from the period 1971–2010 from 15 advanced democracies, this study begins to fill this gap by exploring whether cross-national differences in incarceration rates help to explain cross-national differences in relative poverty rates. Although this research finds no average association, this null association obscures the important moderating role of country context. The association between incarceration and relative poverty is contingent upon a country's female employment rate and welfare state generosity.

The marked difference in the development of the North and the South of Italy represents a prototypical case of seemingly intractable within-country disparities. Recent research found that a plausible determinant of this socio-economic gap would be a difference in the ability to cooperate. Through a laboratory experiment we investigate whence this difference derives, whether from different preferences or from different beliefs. Our findings indicate that Northerners and Southerners share the same individual pro-social preferences, and that the cooperation gap lies rather in the pessimistic beliefs that Southerners have about their cooperativeness. Southerners, furthermore, manifest a stronger aversion to social risk, as compared to the risk of nature. A policy implication is that an intervention or an event that reduced pessimistic beliefs would directly boost cooperation levels.

This paper paradigmatically deals with the problem of understanding and explanation of established-outsider-figurations which have been mostly grasped in the dominant research, public understanding as well as political debates under the category 'cultural differences.' Further, I am going to evaluate the concept of an established-outsider figuration of Norbert Elias as much more adequate to understand group conflicts and their dynamics in time. In this paper, using the example of the "Sarrazin debate," I would like to work out how the differences in power ratios could be perceived in an established-outsider-relationship as differences of human beings in terms of their quality as well as their values as groups and as individuals. This connection is conceptualised by Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson as "the logic of the emotions."

The introductory chapter to this volume presented a number of theories and hypotheses on the determinants of endogamy; the following chapters described endogamy in different historical settings and tested some of those hypotheses. The tests looked especially at the effects of individual characteristics of spouses, and sometimes of their parents. Results relating to changes in macro characteristics over time and their effect on the likelihood of endogamy were presented. Because all these chapters refer to only one country or region, regional comparisons are seldom made (there are some exceptions: Bras and Kok on differences between parts of the province of Zeeland; Pélissier et al. on differences between rural and urban areas, and Van de Putte et al. on differences between several Belgian cities and villages).

We expand Denzau and Munger's 1986 model of 'How Unorganized Interests Get Represented' to address cross-national differences in electoral systems. We look at how individual legislators allocate their efforts to serving unorganized constituents versus organized groups. Our model shows how the optimal allocation of effort is affected by differences in nominating processes and electoral rules. Our findings include the following: (1) Closed-list proportional representation (PR) makes legislators generally more responsive to interest groups and less responsive to unorganized voters than single-member districts (SMD). (2) This difference becomes smaller as the personal component of the SMD vote diminishes. (3) Legislators elected via lists in a mixed system may be even less responsive to the unorganized than legislators in a pure list system.

Two studies used questionnaires to assess how subjects thought they would feel about themselves in a variety of competitive and noncompetitive situations. Self-evaluations were on semantic differential items, which revealed two dimensions, "instrumental" and "expressive. " In Study 1, losing affected self-evaluations negatively on both dimensions, and winning negatively on the expressive dimension compared to some noncompetitive settings. In Study 2, the factors of success/failure and group/individual were separated from the competitive or cooperative nature of the task; gender and general self-evaluation were also controlled. Differences between winning and losing were similar to differences between succeeding and failing in noncompetitive settings, although competition had a positive effect on instrumental self-esteem. A group setting affected both dimensions positively. A few gender differences appeared.

Characteristics of interpersonal feedback and responses to feedback, as a function of time (early versus later sessions), sender (trainers, male members, female members), and individual group, were studied in four NTL Bethel Tgroups. Over time, member feedback became more expressive and less focused upon here-and-now events, while trainer feedback became more nondirective. During early sessions, trainer feedback was less expressive, less focused upon self-other relationships, less here-and-now, more negative and confronting, more abstract, and more interpretive than member feedback, although these differences diminished by later sessions. No significant differences were apparent between male and female senders. Group differences outweighed their similarities. Acceptance versus rejection of member feedback was related only to the extent to which feedback was positive and supportive.

The media plays a prominent role in shaping individuals' declared levels of political interest, but its role regarding gender differences remains largely unexplored. To what extent are media contents and their reflection of gender roles related to declared levels of political interest in men and women? This article argues that more egalitarian media environments, where a larger share of women are represented, should be associated with smaller gender differences in political interest. Data from the European Social Survey and the Global Media Monitoring Programme have been merged to test this argument. Results suggest that more women being reported shows some association with more minor differences between men's and women's declared levels of political interest. This difference is particularly present when the increase occurs in more hard-news-oriented media like the printed press and in topics like economic affairs, or when more women are quoted as experts, which are traditionally identified as more masculinised.

The fundamental question is whether the non-Western world is capable of developing our form of liberal democratic self-government, despite our differences in tradition and culture. The author taps on several critical differences of interpretation of what we consider to be integral to our form of government, such as John Locke's concept of "civil society"; the idea of "pluralism"; and the concept of "inherent human rights" counsel, which have distinctly different meanings in the West compared to those of Central and Eastern Europe. Interestingly, the differences are indicative of the profound cultural and historic differences of the societies engaged in the interpretation and adaption of these ideas. The author is optimistic in the regard of democracy "traveling," provided that individuals recognize their own identity within the democratic society and acquire practice in exercising their freedoms. In this way, not only will democracy flourish under previously dictatorial regimes, but will continue to persist where it is already established.

2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
The etiology of psychological differences among those who pursue distinct lines of work have long been of scholarly interest. A prevalent early and continuing assumption is that experiences on the job influence psychological development; contemporary analysts focus on dimensions indicative of mental health. Still, such work-related psychological differences may instead be attributable to selection processes to the extent that individuals can choose, or be selected to, different lines of work, based on their prior characteristics. Whereas much attention has been directed to employment per se as a key determinant of mental health, we consider work status (employed or not) and hours of work, as well as work quality, including both intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions among those who are employed. We also investigate differences in the effects of work experiences on mental health in distinct phases of the work career. Drawing on eleven waves of longitudinal data obtained from a cohort of ninth grade students followed prospectively to age 45–46 (54% female; 73% white), we examine whether key psychological dimensions indicative of mental health (mastery, depressive affect, and self-esteem) change in response to employment and to particular experiences on the job. The findings, based on a fixed-effects modeling strategy, indicate that observed psychological differences related to employment and work quality are not attributable to stable individual proclivities. Evidence suggests that mental health is responsive to changing experiences at work from mid-adolescence to mid-life.