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Inequality has become a malignant, contagious disease. It feeds, it grows, it attaches itself to nearly all aspects of life. It poisons or impedes many of our relationships. Above all, it is a threat to the health and stability of our democratic republic. It has become the major issue of our time. We can see more clearly how and why it has become so as we review eight major features of our society. Refer to the diagram below as you read.

"We revisit to what extent the increase in income inequality over the last 30 years has been mirrored by consumption inequality. We do so by constructing two alternative measures of consumption expenditure, using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE). We first use reports of active savings and after tax income to construct the measure of consumption implied by the budget constraint. We find that the consumption inequality implied by savings behavior largely tracks income inequality between 1980 and 2007. Second, we use a demand system to correct for systematic measurement error in the CE's expenditure data. Specifically, we consider trends in the relative expenditure of high income and low income households for different goods with different income (total expenditure) elasticities. Our estimation exploits the difference in the growth rate of luxury consumption inequality versus necessity consumption inequality. This "double-differencing,'' which we implement in a a regression framework, corrects for mis-measurement that can systematically vary over time by good and income group. This second exercise indicates that consumption inequality has closely tracked income inequality over the period 1980-2007. Both of our measures show a significantly greater increase in consumption inequality than what is obtained from the CE's total household expenditure data directly"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

We revisit to what extent the increase in income inequality since 1980 was mirrored by consumption inequality. We do so by constructing an alternative measure of consumption expenditure using a demand system to correct for systematic measurement error in the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Our estimation exploits the relative expenditure of high- and low-income households on luxuries versus necessities. This double differencing corrects for measurement error that can vary over time by good and income. We find consumption inequality tracked income inequality much more closely than estimated by direct responses on expenditures. (JEL D31, D63, E21)

Social scientists study two kinds of inequality: inequality between persons (as in income inequality) and inequality between subgroups (as in racial inequality). This paper analyzes the mathematical connections between the two kinds of inequality. The paper proceeds by exploring a set of two-parameter continuous probability distributions widely used in economic and sociological applications. We define a general inequality parameter, which governs all measures of personal inequality (such as the Gini coefficient), and we link this parameter to the gap (difference or ratio) between the means of subdistributions. In this way we establish that, at least in the two-parameter distributions analyzed here, and for the case of two nonoverlapping subgroups, as personal inequality increases, so does inequality between subgroups. This general inequality parameter also governs Lorenz dominance. Further, we explore the connection between subgroup inequality (in particular, the ratio of the bottom subgroup mean to the top subgroup mean) and decomposition of personal inequality into between-subgroup and within-subgroup components, focusing on an important decomposable measure, Theil's MLD, and its operation in the Pareto case. This allows us to establish that all the quantities in the decomposition are monotonic functions of the general inequality parameter. Thus, the general inequality parameter captures the deep structureʺ of inequality. We also introduce a whole-distribution graphical tool for assessing personal and subgroup inequality. Substantively, this work suggests that in at least some societies, characterized by special income distributions, whenever inequality disrupts social harmony and social cohesion, it attacks on two fronts, via subgroup inequality as well as personal inequality.

This paper shows that higher levels of perceived wage inequality are associated with a weaker (stronger) belief into meritocratic (non-meritocratic) principles as being important in determining individual wages. This finding is robust to the use of an instrumental-variable estimation strategy which takes the potential issue of reverse causality into account, and it is further corroborated using various complementary measures of individuals' perception of the chances and risks associated with an unequal distribution of economic resources, such as their perception of the chances of upward mobility. I finally show that those individuals perceiving a high level of wage inequality also tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies and progressive taxation, and that they tend to favor the political left, suggesting a feedback effect of inequality perceptions into the political-economic sphere. Taken together, these findings suggest that high levels of perceived wage inequality have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of market outcomes.

This paper shows that higher levels of perceived wage inequality are associated with a weaker (stronger) belief into meritocratic (non-meritocratic) principles as being important in determining individual wages. This finding is robust to the use of an instrumental-variable estimation strategy which takes the potential issue of reverse causality into account, and it is further corroborated using various complementary measures of individuals' perception of the chances and risks associated with an unequal distribution of economic resources, such as their perception of the chances of upward mobility. I finally show that those individuals perceiving a high level of wage inequality also tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies and progressive taxation, and that they tend to favor the political left, suggesting a feedback effect of inequality perceptions into the political-economic sphere. Taken together, these findings suggest that high levels of perceived wage inequality have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of market outcomes.

A critique of the APSA Task Force on Inequality & American Democracy report challenges claims that the US is experiencing a reinforcing cycle of political & economic inequality. Attention is called to countertendencies & opportunities to lessen the forces that create inequality in voice, governance, & public policy. It is maintained that political scientists must focus more on the internal dynamics/processes of groups like the Sierra Club which have the potential to create a more engaged & mobilized base. State & local factors that produce or exacerbate inequality are explored, especially the concentration of Latinos & African Americans in low-income urban areas; the ineffectiveness of policies designed to address problems of low-income minorities; & the impact of large-scale immigration. Emphasis is placed on the capacity of churches to teach the skills of participation & the importance of the "war of ideas." It is concluded that discussions about inequality must move beyond the realm of government responsibility to cultural outlets that will encourage people to imagine new forms of democratic engagement. 20 References. J. Lindroth

Contents -- Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Part I: Introduction: Foundations of a Prismatic Metropolis -- Chapter 1: Analyzing Inequality in Los Angeles // Lawrence D. Bobo, Melvin L. Oliver, James H. Johnson Jr., and Abel Valenzuela Jr. -- Chapter 2: A Demographic Portrait of Los Angeles County, 1970 to 1990 // David M. Grant -- Chapter 3: Racial Attitudes in a Prismatic Metropolis: Mapping Identity, Stereotypes, Competition, and Views on Affirmative Action // Lawrence D. Bobo and Devon Johnson -- Part II: Opportunities Divided: Race, Space, and Gender in Los Angeles

The international is already constituted through the legitimation of specific forms of inequality. This paper explores four: (1) worldwide patterns of economic inequality; (2) the principle & historical experience of the "great powers" as a guarantee of international "order"; (3) the capacities of specific kinds of political community to participate in the modern system of states; & (4) the constitutive value field in which the international is judged as the negation of the positive values ascribed to statist forms of political community. It does so in relation to claims about freedom, scale, & the necessary practices of modern discrimination. This exploration leads to the conclusion that the primary significance of claims about new inequalities in an international context is that they express the increasing difficulty of thinking about equality/inequality in political terms, let alone of responding adequately to the "violences" & injustices that might be attributed to multiple kinds of inequalities in various settings. Adapted from the source document.

Since Aristotle, a vast literature has suggested that economic inequality has important political consequences. Higher inequality is thought to increase demand for government income redistribution in democracies and to discourage democratization and promote class conflict and revolution in dictatorships. Most such arguments crucially assume that ordinary people know how high inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution. Using a variety of large, cross-national surveys, we show that, in recent years, ordinary people have had little idea about such things. What they think they know is often wrong. Widespread ignorance and misperceptions of inequality emerge robustly, regardless of the data source, operationalization, and method of measurement. Moreover, we show that the perceived level of inequality – and not the actual level – correlates strongly with demand for redistribution and reported conflict between rich and poor. We suggest that most theories about political effects of inequality need to be either abandoned or reframed as theories about the effects of perceived inequality.