Suchergebnisse

Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Conventional theory explains moral hazard as a consequence of information asymmetries. The present paper proposes an alternative approach. We argue that information asymmetries are just one among several causes of moral hazard & that they entail negative consequences for third parties only accidentally. By contrast, moral hazard also results from government interventionism. & in this case negative consequences are systematic & do result even in the absence of information asymmetries. References. Adapted from the source document.

In this article we analyze how the enlargement of a monetary union may affect the design of the common monetary policy when the latter transmits asymmetrically between the member countries. We find that the use of national information about inflation & unemployment in the design of the common monetary policy allows for tackling the heterogeneity induced by this asymmetry. This implies that if enlargement contributes to augmenting the transmission asymmetry of monetary policy in EMU, it will raise the need to take into account information about national economies in the formulation of optimal monetary policies in the monetary union. Furthermore, the choice for a new EU Member State to enter EMU will also depend on the monetary strategy implemented by the European Central Bank &, in particular, whether the latter would take the asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy actions into account. 4 Figures, 11 References. Adapted from the source document.

The issue of quality of service is becoming increasingly important in the public service as a result of new approaches that are being adopted to management, notably the development of contract-based management. Argues that the concept of quality is a particularly difficult one for the public services, because of problems of information asymmetries. (Abstract amended)

Information disclosure is the most obvious manifestation of the transparency turn in global governance, as evident from a growing uptake of environmental disclosure practices by countries, corporations and international organizations. Any analytic examination of environmental disclosure measures needs to grasp their relation to wider conagurations of political and economic authority. Highlighting these relations of power reveals that transparency measures do not necessarily overcome asymmetries in information access, and may even exacerbate them. Adapted from the source document.

Dieser Artikel behauptet, dass die Effektivität der Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank und fester Wechselkurse von zwei Schlüsselfaktoren abhängt: politischen Institutionen und asymmetrischer Information. Die Wirkung dieser beiden Faktoren ist jedoch unterschiedlich. Während die Gegenwart einer Institution - multiple politische Veto-Spieler - für die Wirksamkeit einer unabhängigen Zentralbank entscheidend sein sollte, sollte sie keinen Einfluss auf die Wirksamkeit eines festen Wechselkurses haben. Eine Wechselkursanbindung sollte im Gegensatz hierzu grössere antiinflationäre Wirkung besitzen, wenn es für die Öffentlichkeit schwierig ist,zwischen politisch induzierter Inflation und Inflation durch externe Schocks zu unterscheiden. Solche Informationsasymmetrien zwischen der Regierung und den Marktakteuren erhöhen jedoch nicht die Wirksamkeit einer unabhängigen Zentralbank. Empirische Tests anhand neuer Daten zu politischen Institutionen belegen diese Hypothesen.(SWP-Jns)