Suchergebnisse

Informationsasymmetrien sind ein typisches Merkmal der Beziehung zwischen Investoren und dem Management eines Unternehmens. Diese Asymmetrien können zu einer ineffizienten Ressourcenallokation und Wohlfahrtsverlusten führen. Ziel dieser Thesis ist es, aktuelle Einflüsse auf diese Informationsasymmetrien besser zu verstehen. Zu diesem Zweck werden drei generische Mitigationsstrategien (Screening, Einbeziehung von Informationsintermediären und Signaling) analysiert. Anders als in einem Großteil der finanzwirtschaftlichen Literatur, die sich diesem Themengebiet häufig mit marktbasierten Ansätz...

Informationsasymmetrien sind ein typisches Merkmal der Beziehung zwischen Investoren und dem Management eines Unternehmens. Diese Asymmetrien können zu einer ineffizienten Ressourcenallokation und Wohlfahrtsverlusten führen. Ziel dieser Thesis ist es, aktuelle Einflüsse auf diese Informationsasymmetrien besser zu verstehen. Zu diesem Zweck werden drei generische Mitigationsstrategien (Screening, Einbeziehung von Informationsintermediären und Signaling) analysiert. Anders als in einem Großteil der finanzwirtschaftlichen Literatur, die sich diesem Themengebiet häufig mit marktbasierten Ansätz...

In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To assess the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.

Eva Becker assesses the US financial crisis as a crisis of regulatory data, information and knowledge. Based on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's interviews as well her own interviews, and drawing on Capture Theory and recent reformulations thereof, she develops "knowledge capture" as a theoretic framework to assess financial regulation under conditions of 21st century complexity. Contents Narratives of the Global Financial Crisis Multi-Level Complexity: The 21st Century Financial System US Policy Responses to the Crisis Knowledge Asymmetries and the Idea of Knowledge-Based Regulation Knowledge Capture in Financial Regulation: A Theoretic Framework Target Groups Lecturers and students of Political Science, Sociology and Economics Experts for Financial Market Regulation The Author Eva Becker holds a degree in communication management, philosophy and comparative literature (BA at University of Leipzig, Germany) and public management and governance (MA at Zeppelin University, Germany). From 2012 to 2014, she worked as a research associate on Helmut Willke's research project "policy responses to systemic risk", funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG)

This book is an essential reference source for the latest scholarly research on the importance of information asymmetries and uncertainties and their effects on the overall regulation of financial industries. Featuring extensive coverage on a wide range of perspectives, such as financial reporting standards, investor confidence, and capital flows.

"Our focus, especially in the case studies, lies on the regulatory system of the United States. Our distinctions and conclusions can nevertheless be transferred to other jurisdictions, as domestic regulators all over the world are faced with similar system dynamics." (contract)