Suchergebnisse

The often long-lasting process of intrafamily business succession involves contracts for management and ownership transfer that unfold in a complex series of stages. The older and larger a family business, the more heterogeneous the involved family members' interactions and interests can become. These differences become obvious in the succession process. Also, in entrepreneurial families, information is not easy to obtain and is neither perfect nor unlimited, for example, with regard to expectations regarding the duration or the type of business succession. Information asymmetries can arise. This article investigates the drivers of information asymmetries and provides insight into the current research by investigating information asymmetries and their impact during different phases of intrafamily business succession. Data from 215 German firms reveal the occurrence of specific information asymmetries during different phases of intrafamily business succession. JEL CLASSIFICATION M1; M59; D82; L2

Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes.

Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Dramatic symmetries in strategies and techniques of persuasion create challenges to the functioning of established actors in the global media ecology, including international broadcasters. This essay articulates an adaptation of the concept of asymmetric warfare to the field of propaganda, persuasion and recruitment. It examines the particular challenge of certain asymmetric entrants, including ISIS and categorizes how the more traditional entities and government
institutions react to these new entrants in markets for loyalties. (author's abstract)

Dramatic symmetries in strategies and techniques of persuasion create challenges to the functioning of established actors in the global media ecology, including international broadcasters. This essay articulates an adaptation of the concept of asymmetric warfare to the field of propaganda, persuasion and recruitment. It examines the particular challenge of certain asymmetric entrants, including ISIS and categorizes how the more traditional entities and government institutions react to these new entrants in markets for loyalties.