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The article describes numerous forms of actions of public administration authorities, characteristic of the execution of requirements stemming from Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union. In particular, it addresses the issues, such as: identifying operators of essential services, dealing with computer security incidents, control activities, restitutive measures and punitive measures. It has been demonstrated that, as regards cybersecurity, from the perspective of the requirements of effective implementation of the NIS Directive and good governance assumptions, it is appropriate to adopt hybrid forms of actions of administration authorities, based both on classic sovereign forms of actions of administration authorities (administrative decisions issued in cases regarding the recognition of an operator of an essential service, in cases concerning administrative pecuniary sanctions), as well as on other forms of actions (related to the exchange of information, issuance of recommendations, use of notices or providing technical support).

Owing to the Internet the concept of a 'free marketplace of ideas' is thriving. Although even today it is difficult to decide unanimously whether the Miltonian principle of the self-righting process is a theory reflected in real life, or rather a 'rhetoric myth', it is beyond any doubt that the conviction that under the conditions of free exchange of information and opinion truth is able to triumph over falsehood still intrigues people, who feel compelled to verify this conviction over and over again. How much the ideas referred to at the beginning of this text, namely the free marketplace of ideas and self-righting process, have taken possession of the imagination of a contemporary information recipient is demonstrated by the fact that they are echoed both in the academic studies devoted to the issue of freedom of speech and in introductory, journalistic or educational publications. It seems that in the future it will be the Internet that remains one of the main instruments to verify the rightness of the self-righting process. One should not doubt that it will be a never-ending process, as predicted by Milton. One can assume though that the concept of a 'free marketplace of ideas' will continue to exert a significant impact on the development of international standards of free speech both in Western culture and elsewhere. ; Owing to the Internet the concept of a 'free marketplace of ideas' is thriving. Although even today it is difficult to decide unanimously whether the Miltonian principle of the self-righting process is a theory reflected in real life, or rather a 'rhetoric myth', it is beyond any doubt that the conviction that under the conditions of free exchange of information and opinion truth is able to triumph over falsehood still intrigues people, who feel compelled to verify this conviction over and over again. How much the ideas referred to at the beginning of this text, namely the free marketplace of ideas and self-righting process, have taken possession of the imagination of a contemporary information recipient is demonstrated by the fact that they are echoed both in the academic studies devoted to the issue of freedom of speech and in introductory, journalistic or educational publications. It seems that in the future it will be the Internet that remains one of the main instruments to verify the rightness of the self-righting process. One should not doubt that it will be a never-ending process, as predicted by Milton. One can assume though that the concept of a 'free marketplace of ideas' will continue to exert a significant impact on the development of international standards of free speech both in Western culture and elsewhere.

The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. ; The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

The informal structures of the European Union employed in the struggle against international terrorism can be divided into those emerging inside the European Community, and those involving the states outside the EC, or third parties. The emergence of informal structures to fight terrorism resulted from the observation that the then EC did not cooperate to fight terrorism. In the 1960s and 1970s the increasing problem of terrorism stimulated efforts to look for ways to deal with it. It would have been a good solution to begin cooperation in the field of internal security on a Community scale, yet this approach stirred too many controversies and fears. Additionally, a general disinterest in political cooperation at that time made some states begin building informal structures aimed at the exchange of information on terrorist threats. It is worth emphasizing that the structures discussed in this paper (i.e. groups and clubs) are to a certain extent an element of European intelligence, as they involve intelligence agencies, structures operating within EU countries and outside, and the cooperation or synergy of intelligence provided by various mechanisms and activities. The cooperation within the framework of such structures goes beyond the EU and Europe, thus becoming more effective in fighting international, modern, globalized, non-territorial terrorism of a network character. Therefore, although the European Union has been conducting its own policy against terrorism involving all its member states, these informal structures with third parties will continue to play an important part in anti-terrorist cooperation between states that are at particular risk of terrorist activity.

The informal structures of the European Union employed in the struggle against international terrorism can be divided into those emerging inside the European Community, and those involving the states outside the EC, or third parties. The emergence of informal structures to fight terrorism resulted from the observation that the then EC did not cooperate to fight terrorism. In the 1960s and 1970s the increasing problem of terrorism stimulated efforts to look for ways to deal with it. It would have been a good solution to begin cooperation in the field of internal security on a Community scale, yet this approach stirred too many controversies and fears. Additionally, a general disinterest in political cooperation at that time made some states begin building informal structures aimed at the exchange of information on terrorist threats. It is worth emphasizing that the structures discussed in this paper (i.e. groups and clubs) are to a certain extent an element of European intelligence, as they involve intelligence agencies, structures operating within EU countries and outside, and the cooperation or synergy of intelligence provided by various mechanisms and activities. The cooperation within the framework of such structures goes beyond the EU and Europe, thus becoming more effective in fighting international, modern, globalized, non-territorial terrorism of a network character. Therefore, although the European Union has been conducting its own policy against terrorism involving all its member states, these informal structures with third parties will continue to play an important part in anti-terrorist cooperation between states that are at particular risk of terrorist activity.

Podpisany w Helsinkach w 1975 roku Akt Końcowy KBWE otworzył nowy rozdział w poszukiwaniu optymalnego systemu bezpieczeństwa w strefie euroatlantyckiej, obejmującej obszar od Vancouver do Władywostoku. Ustanowił kooperatywny system bezpieczeństwa wprowadzający ponad blokowy mechanizm uzgadniania współpracy politycznej, gospodarczej i w dziedzinach humanitarnych, takich jak kultura, oświata, wymiana informacji i kontakty międzyludzkie. Po zimnej wojnie stworzono organy KBWE, wyposażono ją w nowe kompetencje w zakresie dyplomacji prewencyjnej i rozwiązywania konfliktów, ale ewolucja ładu międzynarodowego w Europie sprawiła, że wbrew początkowym zamierzeniem KBWE, przemianowana z początkiem 1995 roku na OBWE, nie stała się centralną instytucją bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. W wyniku rozszerzenia NATO i Unii Europejskiej na Wschód dokonało się odejście od zasady równego bezpieczeństwa dla wszystkich państw uczestniczących. OBWE pozostała drugorzędną instytucją wyspecjalizowaną w tzw. miękkich aspektach bezpieczeństwa. Kryzys ukraiński, wybuchły jesienią 2013 r., jak inne wyzwania i zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa pochodzące z innych regionów ukazały potrzebę rewitalizacji OBWE i stworzenia euroatlantyckiej i euroazjatyckiej wspólnoty bezpieczeństwa. ; The CSCE Final Act, signed in Helsinki in 1975, opened a new chapter in the search for the optimal security system in the Euro-Atlantic area, stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. It established a cooperative security system introducing a supra-bloc negotiation mechanism of political and economic cooperation, as well cooperation in such humanitarian fields as culture, education, exchange of information and interpersonal contacts. After the Cold War, CSCE organs were created and equipped with new competences in the field of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution, but the evolution of the international order in Europe meant that, contrary to the original intention of the CSCE (renamed at the beginning of 1995 as the OSCE), it has not become the central institution of European security. As a result of the Eastern enlargement of NATO and the European Union, the principle of equal security for all participating states was abandoned. The OSCE remained a secondary institution specialising in what is called the soft aspects of security. The Ukrainian crisis, which broke out in the autumn of 2013, accompanied by other challenges and threats to security originating in other regions showed the need to revitalise the OSCE and create a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the head of Polish diplomacy at that time, Adam Rapacki, considered the Caribbean Crisis to be extremely dangerous for Poland. It was due to the fact that Warsaw maintained good economic relations with Washington. Since establishing diplomatic relations with Havana, relations between the Polish People's Republic (PPR) and Cuba had developed slowly. From 1960, PPR was forced to help Cuba, while not drawing any benefits from exchange trade. Larger commitment to improve relations with Castro's regimes was forced by Moscow. Poland was the last member of Eastern Bloc to establish relations with Havana. The United States of America reacted to these events in an extremely nervous manner. The administration of President John Kennedy threatened to cancel economic cessions granted to Poland. In this context, Adam Rapacki's visit to Havana in June 1961 seemed provocative from the USA point of view. British diplomacy, however, interpreted the Polish minister's speech at the University of Havana differently and maintained that Rapacki was careful not to offend the United States of America. Moreover, the Foreign Office believed that he was forced to make this foreign visit. When the Cuban Missile Crisis began, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to avoid any actions that could be seen as provocative by U.S. Navy forces, conducting a naval blockade of the island. The USSR did not inform its allies about the plan of placing the missiles on Cuba, which testified to the lack of sovereignty of the PPR and other Eastern Bloc states. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not make any active moves regarding the crisis, but still tried to obtain the most reliable information on the events. The most informed person was PPR's ambassador in Washington, while those in Havana and Moscow had incomplete data. In addition, after the biggest threat of the outbreak of thermonuclear war has passed, it was the PPR that provided information about Fidel Castro's critique of Moscow's position towards the crisis. ; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych oraz ówczesny szef polskiej dyplomacji Adam Rapacki uważali kryzys karaibski za niezwykle groźny dla Polski. Wynikało to z faktu, że Warszawa utrzymywała dobre relacje gospodarcze z Waszyngtonem. Od czasu nawiązania relacji dyplomatycznych z Hawaną stosunki między PRL a Kubą rozwijały się wolno. Od 1960 r. PRL była zmuszona okazywać pomoc Kubie i nie czerpała zysków z wymiany handlowej. Szersze zaangażowanie na rzecz poprawy stosunków z reżimem Castro było wymuszone przez Moskwę. Polska jako członek bloku wschodniego nawiązała relacje z Hawaną najpóźniej ze wszystkich krajów wchodzących w jego skład. Na wspomniane ruchy Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki zareagowały w sposób niezwykle nerwowy. Administracja prezydenta Johna Kennedy'ego groziła cofnięciem cesji gospodarczych udzielonych Polsce. W tym kontekście wizyta Adama Rapackiego w Hawanie w czerwcu 1961 r. wydawała się z punktu widzenia USA prowokacyjna. Inaczej wystąpienie polskiego ministra odebrali brytyjscy dyplomaci, którzy utrzymywali, że podczas przemówienia na Uniwersytecie w Hawanie Rapacki starał się nie obrażać Stanów Zjednoczonych. Dodatkowo Foreign Office uważało, że został on zmuszony do złożenia owej wizyty zagranicznej. W momencie, gdy rozpoczął się kryzys rakietowy na Kubie, polskie MSZ starało się za wszelką cenę uniknąć działań, które mogły zostać odebrane jako prowokacja przez siły US Navy, prowadzące morską blokadę wyspy. O zamiarach dotyczących rozmieszczenia pocisków atomowych na Kubie ZSRR nie poinformowało swoich sojuszników, co świadczyło o braku suwerenności PRL oraz innych państw bloku wschodniego. MSZ nie podejmowało żadnych aktywnych ruchów w tej kwestii, ale starało się pozyskać najbardziej wiarygodne informacje na temat rozgrywających się zdarzeń. Najlepiej poinformowany był ambasador PRL w Waszyngtonie, a jego odpowiednicy w Hawanie i Moskwie mieli niekompletne dane. Dodatkowo, po ustaniu największego zagrożenia związanego z wybuchem wojny termonuklearnej, to PRL przekazywała informacje o krytyce Fidela Castro kierowanej wobec Moskwy, a dotyczącej kryzysu.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the head of Polish diplomacy at that time, Adam Rapacki, considered the Caribbean Crisis to be extremely dangerous for Poland. It was due to the fact that Warsaw maintained good economic relations with Washington. Since establishing diplomatic relations with Havana, relations between the Polish People's Republic (PPR) and Cuba had developed slowly. From 1960, PPR was forced to help Cuba, while not drawing any benefits from exchange trade.Larger commitment to improve relations with Castro's regimes was forced by Moscow. Poland was the last member of Eastern Bloc to establish relations with Havana. The United States of America reacted to these events in an extremely nervous manner. The administration of President John Kennedy threatened to cancel economic cessions granted to Poland. In this context, Adam Rapacki's visit to Havana in June 1961 seemed provocative from the USA point of view. British diplomacy, however, interpreted the Polish minister's speech at the University of Havana differently and maintained that Rapacki was careful not to offend the United States of America. Moreover, the Foreign Office believed that he was forced to make this foreign visit.When the Cuban Missile Crisis began, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to avoid any actions that could be seen as provocative by U.S. Navy forces, conducting a naval blockade of the island. The USSR did not inform its allies about the plan of placing the missiles on Cuba, which testified to the lack of sovereignty of the PPR and other Eastern Bloc states. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not make any active moves regarding the crisis, but still tried to obtain the most reliable information on the events. The most informed person was PPR's ambassador in Washington, while those in Havana and Moscow had incomplete data. In addition, after the biggest threat of the outbreak of thermonuclear war has passed, it was the PPR that provided information about Fidel Castro's critique of Moscow's position towards the crisis. ; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych oraz ówczesny szef polskiej dyplomacji Adam Rapacki uważali kryzys karaibski za niezwykle groźny dla Polski. Wynikało to z faktu, że Warszawa utrzymywała dobre relacje gospodarcze z Waszyngtonem. Od czasu nawiązania relacji dyplomatycznych z Hawaną stosunki między PRL a Kubą rozwijały się wolno. Od 1960 r. PRL była zmuszona okazywać pomoc Kubie i nie czerpała zysków z wymiany handlowej.Szersze zaangażowanie na rzecz poprawy stosunków z reżimem Castro było wymuszone przez Moskwę. Polska jako członek bloku wschodniego nawiązała relacje z Hawaną najpóźniej ze wszystkich krajów wchodzących w jego skład. Na wspomniane ruchy Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki zareagowały w sposób niezwykle nerwowy. Administracja prezydenta Johna Kennedy'ego groziła cofnięciem cesji gospodarczych udzielonych Polsce. W tym kontekście wizyta Adama Rapackiego w Hawanie w czerwcu 1961 r. wydawała się z punktu widzenia USA prowokacyjna. Inaczej wystąpienie polskiego ministra odebrali brytyjscy dyplomaci, którzy utrzymywali, że podczas przemówienia na Uniwersytecie w Hawanie Rapacki starał się nie obrażać Stanów Zjednoczonych. Dodatkowo Foreign Office uważało, że został on zmuszony do złożenia owej wizyty zagranicznej.W momencie, gdy rozpoczął się kryzys rakietowy na Kubie, polskie MSZ starało się za wszelką cenę uniknąć działań, które mogły zostać odebrane jako prowokacja przez siły US Navy, prowadzące morską blokadę wyspy. O zamiarach dotyczących rozmieszczenia pocisków atomowych na Kubie ZSRR nie poinformowało swoich sojuszników, co świadczyło o braku suwerenności PRL oraz innych państw bloku wschodniego. MSZ nie podejmowało żadnych aktywnych ruchów w tej kwestii, ale starało się pozyskać najbardziej wiarygodne informacje na temat rozgrywających się zdarzeń. Najlepiej poinformowany był ambasador PRL w Waszyngtonie, a jego odpowiednicy w Hawanie i Moskwie mieli niekompletne dane. Dodatkowo, po ustaniu największego zagrożenia związanego z wybuchem wojny termonuklearnej, to PRL przekazywała informacje o krytyce Fidela Castro kierowanej wobec Moskwy, a dotyczącej kryzysu.