Suchergebnisse

AbstractA model based upon the common concept of rent‐seeking behavior avoids an exclusive focus on the pecuniary motive in private institutions and the power motive in public institutions. Using this model, the case for privatization ranges from very strong to unpersuasive, with some fascinating intermediate cases. Where purchases are frequent, information is abundant, costs of a bad decision are small, externalities are minimal, and competition is the norm, privatization ought to be pursued. At the other extreme, in situations where externalities and collective interests abound, natural monopolies are dominant, distributional goals are important, or debate and experience will alter preferences, governmental determination of service levels and public provision should continue. Intermediate situations such as those involving education, health, and some aspects of enterprise development provide the most interesting and hotly debated areas. These intermediate situations have both private and collective characteristics, choices are made infrequently with little information, have monumental consequences, distributional considerations are critical, and public debate about the level and type of service substantially affects individual behavior.

Marketizing reforms are often suggested as remedies for the problems that plague socialist economies. Introducing market reforms is a complex problem. This article examines the obstacles to such reforms. It employs an institutional-choice perspective to study the conditions that are necessary to make marketization effective and discusses the likely outcomes of incomplete marketization.

MARKETIZING REFORMS ARE OFTEN SUGGESTED AS REMEDIES FOR THE PROBLEMS THAT PLAGUE SOCIALIST ECONOMIES, BUT INTRODUCING MARKETING REFORMS IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE OBSTACLES TO SUCH REFORMS. IT EMPLOYS AN INSTITUTIONAL-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE TO STUDY THE CONDITIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE MARKETIZATION EFFECTIVE AND DISCUSSES THE LIKELY RESULTS OF INCOMPLETE MARKETIZATION.

Specific choices made in completing the internal market reflected the relative bargaining power of the various member states. Argues that this bargaining power was influenced by asymmetries in economic dependence, differences in time horizons, and differences in domestic constraints on national governments. Specifically, the choices reflected the preferences of France and especially Germany. (Abstract amended)