Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis
In: Wisconsin Law Review, Band 2013
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In: Wisconsin Law Review, Band 2013
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In: International Politics and Institutions in Time, S. 117-143
Why do institutions emerge, operate, evolve and persist? Institutional Choice and Global Commerce elaborates a theory of boundedly rational institutional choice that explains when states USE available institutions, SELECT among alternative forums, CHANGE existing rules, or CREATE new arrangements (USCC). The authors reveal the striking staying power of the institutional status quo and test their innovative theory against evidence on institutional choice in global commerce from the nineteenth through the twenty-first centuries. Cases range from the establishment in 1876 of the first truly international system of commercial dispute resolution, the Mixed Courts of Egypt, to the founding and operation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization, and the International Accounting Standards Board. Analysts of institutional choice henceforth must take seriously not only the distinct demands of specific cooperation dilemmas, but also the wide array of available institutional choices
In: Production, Growth, and the Environment, S. 283-299
This paper proposes to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the independence of Timor-Leste by focusing on two controversies that marked the period before its proclamation and whose consequences extend into the present. The first one deals with the "road map to Independence" and comprises the debate on the best process to elaborate a Constitution. It is intertwined with the problem of the extent to which Timorese ought to participate in the critical decisions of the transitional period, conducted under the aegis of the United Nations. The second impinges on the choice of its system of government and its impact on the consolidation of democracy. This section discusses the relevant literature on semi- presidentialism to frame a comparative perspective to events in Timor-Leste and shows the historical evolution of the process of constitutional design and the debates it involved. Finally, this essay proposes to look at those critical choices as a function of the history of Timor-Leste since 1975 and the political balance of forces rather than derived from theoretical principles.
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In: East European politics and societies: EEPS, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 296-317
ISSN: 1533-8371
Choices of political institutions have been subject to increasing examination in recent years. The literature on these choices generally argues that they are driven primarily by politicians' power interests, with impartial values playing at most a subservient role. Yet there are circumstances in which that may not be the case, in which values do come more to the fore. This article examines two propositions: that a principal legacy of significant democratic dissident activity is that it enhances the direct role of impartial values in initial choices of political institutions; and that the values involved have a specifically dissident hue. It begins by exploring theoretically the reasons for expecting these patterns. It then examines the propositions empirically through analysis of institutional choice in East-Central Europe in 1989 and 1990. The third section expands the analysis, first by using Linz and Stepan's typology of nondemocratic regimes to consider the circumstances under which the posited mechanisms may operate, and then by tentatively exploring evidence from a broad range of cases. The article concludes that the circumstances in which dissident values matter significantly in institutional choices are rare but nevertheless generalizable. The analysis therefore provides a valuable addition to our understanding of institutional choice processes as well as of dissident legacies.
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Working paper
In: Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Band 1, Heft 4
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In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
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Working paper
In: Lenz, Tobias. 2018. "Frame Diffusion and Institutional Choice in Regional Economic Cooperation." International Theory 10(1): 31-70.
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In: International theory: a journal of international politics, law and philosophy, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 31-70
ISSN: 1752-9727
Why have many regional organizations adopted common markets and customs unions? This article proposes a cognitive diffusion mechanism – termed frame diffusion – to explain convergent institutional choices across structurally diverse settings. Using Strang and Meyer's (1993) notion of 'theorization' to combine foundational work on framing with the literature on diffusion, I argue that processes of theorization transform the experience of successful institutional innovators into abstract cognitive schemas, which link a particular understanding of a cooperation problem to specific institutional solutions. As policymakers in other contexts encounter similar cooperation problems, they adopt framed institutional solutions, which results in institutional convergence at the macro level. I further suggest that this process of frame diffusion is conditional on ideational affinities in social purpose between the innovating organization and other regional organizations. Where other organizations pursue a distinct social purpose, policymakers rely on alternative frames and thereby cement institutional variation. After developing this argument theoretically, I illustrate it in an exploratory comparison of institutional choice in three most different regional organizations: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Common Market of the South, and the Southern African Development Community. The argument points to significant 'blind spots' and conceptual complementarity between prominent mechanisms of diffusion.
This book gathers leading international scholars to examine the institutional choices and innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and discuss the likely effects that of the changes that it set out to accomplish. Will the changes meet the declared goals of a more efficient and democratic Union which will allow the EU to act internationally with greater coherence and efficiency? If institutions matter, how much do they matter? How significant is the Lisbon Treaty? What kind of leadership will be available in the post-Lisbon EU?
In: Journal of experimental political science: JEPS, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 181-200
ISSN: 2052-2649
AbstractI investigate the extent to which reputational incentives affect policy choices in the context of a controlled laboratory experiment. In theory, asymmetric information and outcome unobservability undermine electoral delegation by creating incentives for politicians to pander. Under the right conditions, it may be preferable to remove such incentives by removing accountability altogether. The data suggest that subjects playing the role of politicians fail to take advantage of voters even though voters indeed create the predicted electoral incentives, albeit in a weaker form than predicted by the theory. When given the choice of institutions via a novel elicitation method, subjects prefer to retain electoral accountability or to make decisions themselves through direct democracy, even though both institutions yield lower expected payoffs than delegation to unaccountable agents.
This paper examines whether an institution has a differing impact on cooperation if it is introduced by a representative of the affected parties rather than exogenously imposed. The experimental design is able to control for selection effects arising from the democratic policy choice. I find evidence of a large democracy premium in the sense that endogenously implemented institutions lead to more cooperation than iden- tical exogenous institutions. Especially the subjects who initially did not prefer the policy comply if it was brought about by an elected representative. The results have implications for the analysis of decision-making processes and policy recommendations in general.
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Defence date: 5 December 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Marise Cremona (supervisor), EUI; Professor Miguel Maduro, EUI; Professor Francesco Maiani, University of Lausanne; Doctor Günter Wilms, Legal service, European Commission and Legal Advisor, EUI ; The Commission's policy of selective enforcement rests on four pillars: confidentiality, bilateralism, flexibility, and autonomy. For years, the European Parliament, the Ombudsman and stakeholders have put pressure on the Commission to reform its enforcement policy in order to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of EU citizens by, inter alia, allowing complainants access to documentation from its investigations and securing their rights by means of legally-binding measures. They have sought to replace the Commission's existing discretionary model of enforcement with a new approach characterized by such standards as transparency, trilateralism, objectivity, and accountability. The Commission, however, supported by the Court of Justice, has in most part resisted these challenges, changing its policy of selective enforcement only to such a degree that does not substantially interfere with its four pillars. This thesis seeks to explain the reasons for the Commission's commitment to the existing discretionary model of enforcement. By means of the Comparative Institutional Analysis, it is argued that the proposed reforms would distort the balance between the Commission's demand and supply sides. The Commission's capacity to enforce EU law is limited, and burdening it with new responsibilities in order to introduce transparency or objectivity to its operation would lead to the formalization of enforcement measures, increasing its administrative burden and decreasing its efficiency. It would skew its attention towards complainant-relevant violations and transform its enforcement into a vehicle for individual grievances running counter to the Commission's understanding of its enforcement function as guardian of the Treaties. The Commission's opposition to the accountability approach does not, however, mean a rejection of its demands. The EU Pilot is an example of the Commission's effort to address some of these expectations while maintaining the balance between the forces of supply and demand. Selective enforcement thus may not be as much about prioritizing cases as it is about assigning appropriate enforcement measures.
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