Institutional Choice in an Economic Crisis
In: Wisconsin Law Review, Band 2013
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In: Wisconsin Law Review, Band 2013
SSRN
In: Society and natural resources, Band 3, Heft 2, S. 159-171
ISSN: 1521-0723
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 586-611
ISSN: 1520-6688
AbstractA model based upon the common concept of rent‐seeking behavior avoids an exclusive focus on the pecuniary motive in private institutions and the power motive in public institutions. Using this model, the case for privatization ranges from very strong to unpersuasive, with some fascinating intermediate cases. Where purchases are frequent, information is abundant, costs of a bad decision are small, externalities are minimal, and competition is the norm, privatization ought to be pursued. At the other extreme, in situations where externalities and collective interests abound, natural monopolies are dominant, distributional goals are important, or debate and experience will alter preferences, governmental determination of service levels and public provision should continue. Intermediate situations such as those involving education, health, and some aspects of enterprise development provide the most interesting and hotly debated areas. These intermediate situations have both private and collective characteristics, choices are made infrequently with little information, have monumental consequences, distributional considerations are critical, and public debate about the level and type of service substantially affects individual behavior.
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 586, 604,
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 513-532
ISSN: 1939-9162
Scholars of institutional change in Congress offer competing theoretical accounts of the accrual of procedural rights by House majority parties. One camp posits that the interests and capacities of political parties drive procedural change that affects agenda control. An alternative perspective offers a nonpartisan, median‐voter account. I explore these two accounts, survey challenges involved in testing them, and determine the fit of the accounts to the history of procedural change in the House. I find that no single perspective accounts best for the pattern of rule changes affecting agenda control and that the median‐voter model may be time‐bound to the twentieth century—after partisan majorities had constructed the core partisan procedural regime of the House.
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 513-532
ISSN: 0362-9805
In: West European politics, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 65-88
ISSN: 0140-2382
World Affairs Online
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 44, Heft 5, S. 513-517
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: International organization, Band 46, Heft 2, S. 533-560
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: Crime, law and social change: an interdisciplinary journal, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 1-32
ISSN: 0925-4994
In: The review of politics, Band 58, Heft 1, S. 165
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 349-366
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 607
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 6, Heft 4, S. 604
ISSN: 1520-6688
In: 73 Hastings Law Journal 1461 (2022)
SSRN