Suchergebnisse

Der Beitrag fragt nach Unterschieden und Verknüpfungsmöglichkeiten von Neoinstitutionalismus und Business Systems-Ansatz (BS). Er stellt die Kernelemente dieses auf Whitley (1999) zurückgehenden Ansatzes dar und zeigt, wo die Hauptunterschiede zwischen Neoinstitutionalismus und BS-Ansatz liegen. In diesem Zusammenhang werden die Mechanismen der Anpassung an den institutionellen Rahmen, die Analyseeinheit und der Institutionenbegriff genannt. Die Verknüpfung beider Ansätze steckt erst in den Kinderschuhen, eröffnet aber, wie die Verfasser an einigen Beispielen zeigen, durchaus interessante Perspektiven. (ICE2)

As key socio-cultural building blocks of human societies, institutions are distinct from organizations and, hence, are central to sociological inquiry. In recent decades, however, institutional analysis has increasingly moved towards the analysis of organizations, while treating "institutions" as the environments or fields of organizations. While the insights offered by contemporary organizational theorists have provided important keys to understanding how organizations, especially economic organizations, adapt to pressures within their environments, we argue that the Old Institutionalism has much to offer the New Institutionalisms. In the paper below, the Old Institutional is revisited to construct a precise definition of institutions as well as posit a robust theory of institutional dynamics; a theory which supplements contemporary organizational analysis. Four dynamics stand out: the process of institutional autonomy; the intersection of stratification systems and institutions; modes of integration within and between institutions; and generalized symbolic media of exchange. In particular, the latter two occupy our attention primarily as they have been under-theorized elsewhere. ; Non UBC ; Arts, Faculty of ; Sociology, Department of ; Reviewed ; Faculty

The 'new' institutionalism derives from market economics; the 'old' from political and moral philosophy. Among the open-ended principles to be institutionalised, the most important are those that facilitate exchanges between rulers and ruled, provide for the orderly transition of leaders and government, ensure accountability, and mediate between justice and efficiency. (SJK)

Advantages & disadvantages of three political science approaches to democracy (old, & new, institutionalism; & behaviorism cum developmentalism) are comparatively examined in light of recent political changes. None of these perspectives addresses the transformation from high coercion to high information systems during democratization, political risk factors, & other issues. It is hoped that institutionalists will develop a new understanding & interpretation of democracy from a detailed analysis of current events. 3 Photographs. M. Malas

AbstractThis is a complement to Anne Haila's critique of institutionalism in Chinese urbanism. This is understood as an extension of Ronald Coase's transaction cost economics in urban space. The focus is well‐defined property rights which, extended to both urban land and intellectual property, allow monopoly competition and internalise public goods — whether social or environmental — into the logic of the neoliberal commoditized transaction. This ('Washington‐Consensus') notion of rights is contrasted to the blurred ('Beijing‐Consensus') property rights arrangements of today's China. Here property is a 'bundle of rights', in which different legal persons have rights in the same unit of urban space. In this property is not well defined but instead a 'boundary object'. I draw on Francois Jullien to describe such relational property, which is coloured, less by individualism, than by Taoist‐like relations. These comprise a long‐time horizon, an ongoing never completed, never actualized character of transacting or exchange. They comprise rights‐sharing, obligation‐sharing and risk‐sharing. Parallels are drawn with, not Roman and Continental a priorist, but with English a posteriorist notions of property.Résumé À l'appui de la critique d'Anne Haila sur l'institutionnalisme dans l'urbanisme chinois, ce texte l'appréhende comme une extension, à l'espace urbain, de l'économie des coûts de transaction selon Ronald Coase. Le propos s'attache aux droits de propriété bien définis qui, étendus aux terrains urbains et à la propriété intellectuelle, permettent une concurrence monopolistique et une internalisation des biens publics, qu'ils soient sociaux ou environnementaux, dans la logique de la transaction néolibérale banalisée. Cette notion des droits (dans l'axe du Consensus de Washington) est opposée aux dispositifs flous (au sens d'un 'Consensus de Beijing') propres aux droits de propriété dans la Chine d'aujourd'hui. La propriété y est constituée d'un 'lot de droits', par lequel plusieurs personnes morales ont des droits dans la même unité d'espace urbain; la propriété n'y est pas définie avec précision, constituant plutôt un 'objet‐frontière'. François Jullien éclaire la description de cette propriétérelationnelle, moins empreinte d'individualisme que de rapports d'inspiration taoïste; ceux‐ci correspondent à un type de transaction ou d'échange suivi, à longue échéance, jamais terminé, jamais actualisé– tout en englobant le partage des droits, des obligations et des risques. Par comparaison, cette conception de la propriété se rapproche, non pas des a priori de la notion romaine ou continentale, mais de l'a posteriori de la notion anglaise.