Suchergebnisse

Der Beitrag fragt nach Unterschieden und Verknüpfungsmöglichkeiten von Neoinstitutionalismus und Business Systems-Ansatz (BS). Er stellt die Kernelemente dieses auf Whitley (1999) zurückgehenden Ansatzes dar und zeigt, wo die Hauptunterschiede zwischen Neoinstitutionalismus und BS-Ansatz liegen. In diesem Zusammenhang werden die Mechanismen der Anpassung an den institutionellen Rahmen, die Analyseeinheit und der Institutionenbegriff genannt. Die Verknüpfung beider Ansätze steckt erst in den Kinderschuhen, eröffnet aber, wie die Verfasser an einigen Beispielen zeigen, durchaus interessante Perspektiven. (ICE2)

The 'new' institutionalism derives from market economics; the 'old' from political and moral philosophy. Among the open-ended principles to be institutionalised, the most important are those that facilitate exchanges between rulers and ruled, provide for the orderly transition of leaders and government, ensure accountability, and mediate between justice and efficiency. (SJK)

Advantages & disadvantages of three political science approaches to democracy (old, & new, institutionalism; & behaviorism cum developmentalism) are comparatively examined in light of recent political changes. None of these perspectives addresses the transformation from high coercion to high information systems during democratization, political risk factors, & other issues. It is hoped that institutionalists will develop a new understanding & interpretation of democracy from a detailed analysis of current events. 3 Photographs. M. Malas

Examines the comparative advantages of the rational-choice perspective for the study of institutions. The effects of institutions are explored, devising a comparative framework to demonstrate how various powers & institutional details influence the legislative-executive balance of power & policy choice in the US & parliamentary systems. The utility of this to show how specific policy settings provide new answers to key political puzzles & the strategic role of US courts in policy making is demonstrated via the example of the development of civil rights legislation via US Supreme Court decisions. Attention turns to the analysis of a range of rational-choice models (the "Law Merchant" [1990] variant of the prisoners dilemma model, spatial models of the separation of powers, & the rationality of fear model) explaining why institutions exist & considering their endogenous aspects to address why they exist in their particular forms. The latter focuses on the independent judiciary, democratic consolidation, ethnic conflict, medieval Genoa, Italy, & the American Revolution. It is concluded that discussion on the effect of institutions shows how rational-choice institutionalism integrates the study of US politics into broader comparative politics, & rational-choice theory offers various mechanisms that allow for predictions of discontinuous change. 12 Figures. J. Zendejas