Suchergebnisse

The institutionalization of sport forms is normally seen as involving such pro ceses as (increasing) bureaucratization and formalization; leading to the characteriza tion of sport in terms such as "technical efficiency" and generally ''instrumental orientations" on the part of those involved. However there is nothing logically ine vitable in institutionalization processes leading sport progressively in these direc tions. Cases can be found — even in compleN industrial societies — in which value patten,s emphasizing non-competitivveness and rejecting high degrees of formaliza tion and organization are institutionalized. This article discusses the institutionalization of sport in terms of two contrasting types of sport subculture; play-sport subcultures and athletic-sport subcultures. Certain conditions are identified which are conducive to the development of each of these "types" of sport.

This article proposes an authority based conception of the phenomenon of institutionalization. Whereas most social science writing on the subject focuses either upon the organization's internal structural integration (such criteria as well-boundedness, universalism, complexity, and coherence often are employed) or upon its ability to cope with environmental challenges (the concepts of adaptability and autonomy have been suggested), I propose that an organization'soffensive capabilitiesvis à vis environmental actors be viewed as a measurement of its institutionalization.Principally based upon fieldwork in New Zealand bolstered by additional research in Scandinavia, Britain, and Hawaii, this study focuses upon the institutionalization of the ombudsman—an increasingly popular bureaucratic control mechanism. A sociometric analysis of ombudsman-bureaucratic interaction is undertaken, and four questions are investigated: How extensive is the interaction? How consequential is the threat posed by complaints? What demands does the ombudsman make? How cooperative is the agency in responding? The investigation provides answers which are indicative of the ombudsman's successful institutionalization. That is, the office performs its mission and has established itself with the environmental actors as an authority figure.

AbstractThis article investigates the relationship between levels of party institutionalization and individual-level partisan mobilization. Levels of party institutionalization have been linked to macro-level outcomes such as party system stability, but little is known about the micro-level underpinnings of such patterns. This article investigates one set of mechanisms through which party institutionalization might affect electoral outcomes. Specifically, we ask how routinization and value infusion – two central dimensions of party institutionalization – shape partisans' political mobilization. We investigate these relationships by matching data on individual-level behaviour (taken from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 2014 wave) with data on party attributes commonly associated with levels of institutionalization (taken from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project – DALP). We find that while value infusion encourages relatively greater participation from non-member supporters, party routinization depresses non-member participation but may mobilize otherwise inactive members. These findings suggest that to understand the effects of party institutionalization on a macro-level phenomenon such as electoral volatility, it may be necessary to study how parties institutionalize, rather than just asking how much they institutionalize.

Military alliances are formed with varying degrees of institutionalization. While some alliances involve little initial investment or joint planning, others involve significant peacetime costs in establishing formal structures & engaging in military coordination. Several scholars have addressed the reasons states are willing to pay these governance costs in establishing cooperation -- through controlling the risks of opportunism & coordinating policy more extensively, state leaders may be able to achieve higher benefits from cooperation. What has received less systematic empirical attention, however, is the comparative performance of highly institutionalized alliances. Are alliances that represent "deeper" cooperation more reliable than their less institutionalized counterparts? The newly expanded Alliance Treaty Obligations & Provisions (ATOP) dataset includes detailed information about the institutionalization of alliances formed between 1815 & 1989. Using these data, we evaluate the effects of institutionalization on alliance performance. Surprisingly, we find no evidence that alliances with higher levels of peacetime military coordination or more formal alliances are more reliable when invoked by war. We speculate about directions for future research that might help to explain these results. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

Party system institutionalization (PSI) is regarded as a critical underpinning of democracy. However, the systematic study of PSI in democracies is constrained by weaknesses in existing measures, which are limited in coverage or comprehensiveness, and do not account for the latent nature of the concept, measurement error, and non-random missing data. This article presents a novel measure of PSI that uses a Bayesian latent variable measurement strategy to overcome extant measurement issues. The subsequent measure not only offers unmatched coverage and has demonstrated validity, but also exhibits more robust empirical associations with a range of outcomes related to the performance of democracy than existing measures. The measure should facilitate more integrated research on the causes and consequences of PSI in democracies around the world.

The authors bring together and extend three strands of existing research: the propensity of democracies to ally with each other, the effects of alliances being institutionalized, and the causal impact of democracy in promoting investment. This literature is applied to corporate alliances, predicting the probability that announced alliance contracts will be completed by the participants. The authors find that democratic political regimes generate rules that create corporate shareholder democracy and that the latter promotes the institutionalization of corporate alliances. Corporate democracy and alliance institutionalization will both, controlling for transaction costs, increase the probability that corporate alliances will be completed. The findings suggest a positive association among democratic corporate governance, the willingness of corporate alliance partners to accept institutionalized ties, and the creation of an environment conducive to commercial investment commitments through alliances. Overall, corporations appear to respond to some of the same alliance incentives as sovereign states.

Contemporary research that has investigated the nature of legislative institutionalization is analyzed to demonstrate shortcomings with such scholarship & to illustrate how institutionalization is an ongoing process. Various conceptualizations of institutionalization, particularly Polsby's (1968) identification of institutionalization's principal characteristics, are reviewed, demonstrating how conceptual differences have problematized the measurement of institutionalization in legislative bodies. Problems with Polsby's understanding of legislative institutionalization are subsequently addressed, eg, his delineation of the US House of Representatives as a closed system is deemed a significant oversight. Attention is then shifted toward scrutinizing comparative studies of legislative institutionalization, eg, P. Kopecky's study of Czech & Slovak parliaments, to determine how Polsby's conceptualization has fared when applied to foreign legislatures. Future research is strongly encouraged to conceptualize the difference between "institutional boundedness" & the institutional structure & to acknowledge the association between institutional & organizational studies. J. W. Parker

We address the co-evolution of language and material practices during institutionalization by proposing a tropological model of institutionalization that integrates linguistic and practice-oriented approaches into a four-stage sequence: Metaphor enables members to inaugurate institutional change by inspiring and energizing initial movement. Members use metonymy to operationalize the emerging institution by demonstrating how it can become expected practice. Synecdoche is used to facilitate diffusion, standardizing the institution across time and space. When material practice is noticeably contrary to linguistic claims, however, members use irony to bring about deinstitutionalization and generate another inaugurating metaphor. The model further proposes that ritualized actions dramatize each trope, highlighting its symbolic meaning and embedding distinct material practices that serve both to institutionalize the practice and to facilitate boundary crossing to the next trope. The paper goes beyond current literature by offering an integrated theory of trope and ritual as an explanation of how institutions are simultaneously symbolic-linguistic and practice-material.

AbstractThis article seeks to expand our understanding of why states use international institutions to manage transboundary rivers. Agreements governing the use and management of international rivers can contain a variety of different institutional features. We address the question of why riparian states choose to include or exclude these features from river treaties. Our explanation focuses on the problem of securing post-agreement compliance. Institutions perform a variety of functions that help states maintain cooperation over time. We analyze this explanation using a data set of river treaties formed between 1950 and 2002. We find that the institutionalization of river treaties is associated with water scarcity, the flow pattern of shared rivers, trade interdependence, and the level of economic development. These findings have important implications for the possibility that rivers will be a source of future conflicts.

Party identification, the psychological bond between citizens and a political party, is one of the central variables in understanding political behavior. This article argues that such party ties are also a measure of party system institutionalization from the standpoint of the public. We apply Converse's model of partisan learning to 36 nations surveyed as part of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. We find that electoral experience and parental socialization are strong sources of partisanship, but the third-wave democracies also display evidence of latent socialization carried over from the old regime. The results suggest that party identities can develop in new democracies if the party system creates the conditions to develop these bonds.

Studies of party- and party-system stability have often explored the connection between the party-level property of Party Institutionalization (PI) and parties' electoral performance and organizational longevity, yet scholars still have not agreed on a standard measure for this concept. This article argues that the length of party statutes could provide part of such a measure, specifically for the extent to which parties have become routinized (a key dimension of PI) through the formalization of their rules and practices. We validate the plausibility of this measure using data on 303 parties from 49 countries, demonstrating that party statute length varies systematically and in ways predicted by our knowledge of how party organizations reflect their institutional environments and the complexity of internal coalitions. We also show that statute length varies in expected ways with attributes often associated with higher or lower levels of party institutionalization. We conclude that statute length offers a conceptually congruent and objective indicator of formalization, one that could be used either alone or combined with measures of parties' informal practices to advance our understanding of the relationship between PI and democratic development.

This article seeks to expand our understanding of why states use international institutions to manage transboundary rivers. Agreements governing the use and management of international rivers can contain a variety of different institutional features. We address the question of why riparian states choose to include or exclude these features from river treaties. Our explanation focuses on the problem of securing post-agreement compliance. Institutions perform a variety of functions that help states maintain cooperation over time. We analyze this explanation using a data set of river treaties formed between 1950 and 2002. We find that the institutionalization of river treaties is associated with water scarcity, the flow pattern of shared rivers, trade interdependence, and the level of economic development. These findings have important implications for the possibility that rivers will be a source of future conflicts. Adapted from the source document.