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Two ambiguities in the theory of just institutions are explored. If the "fair value of political liberty" is given the weight Rawls claims it should be given, an egalitarian interpretation of justice as fairness emerges. In that case, the lexical ordering of the two principles of justice is impaired, & restrictions in the total system of liberties may be needed to maintain the fair value of political liberty. The difference principle is shown to have two interpretations: the familiar maximin rule & a principle of "compensating inequalities," which are derived from Rawl's contribution curve analysis. This is the principle Rawls uses in his theory of just institutions. However, it is the maximin rule that Rawls seeks to derive from the original position. This derivation is deficient, owing to Rawls's unconvincing argument for an "as-if" risk aversion of rational contractors. Given different "as-if" risk preferences, one can arrive at a utilitarian contract, within the framework of Rawls's original position. The relation between justice as fairness & Rawls's account of civil disobedience is analyzed. Rawls uses the lexical priority rules to decide when civil disobedience is justified, & excludes infractions of the difference principle. This exclusion, while possibly convincing in a strictly egalitarian interpretation of justice as fairness, cannot successfully be defended. Modified HA.

The present article is a discussion of De spankracht van de Europese Unie. Gaan democratie en uitbreiding samen? (The EU tension capital. Do democracy and expansion go together?), an assembly of essays that are rated highly interesting by its reviewers. Characteristic for the European Union is its wish to be both democratic and effective. To nourish national and regional diversity, and establish a large internal market at the same time. To promote citizen and stakeholder participation, and respond in an effective and rapid way to all sorts of new challenges. The guiding principle of the book is the question whether the nature of the EU allows the achieving of these different topics at the same time. An edition in the interest of political scientists, but more so for politicians and policy makers, marked by a tendency for pessimism amongst the different contributors. As stated in the conclusion; a perfectly normal characteristic of complex political systems going through institutional crisis to reemerge at a later date with renewed stability. References. O. van Zijl

Sociological research concerning three Catholic "pillar" organizations (the Catholic school system, the Christian hospitals, & the Catholic U) indicates that secularization is not followed by "depillarization" or weakening of the Catholic pillars. It is suggested that there is a process of secularization within the Catholic organizations, with as main components the development of a sociocultural Christianity (a secular surrogate for church religion) & professionalization by which Christian organizations ensure job security & social advancement for its loyal members. Thanks to its informal ties with the Christian pillar organizations, the Parti Social Chretien (Christian Democrat Party) acts on both components by stressing the specific identity & defining the interests of the pillar organizations. This explanation reveals some major aspects of the ties between Catholics (in the sociological sense) & their party, a bond that is certainly not affected by the secularization process. Modified HA.

The aim here is to understand better the governing organizations of Us & high schools in a democratic environment. The Law for U Government Reform is studied & its model of government characterized in terms of ideal models. A small empirical research project was set up to investigate how the rules relative to departmental councils function to reach the objectives they are assigned. One must distinguish between the allotment of responsibility for making decisions on subjects that relate to the U's "output" (teaching, research, degrees) & matters that are related to the U "input." Three conceptions of authority & three models of U government must be noted: (1) the "professional" model (decisions rest with the best qualified scientific personnel), (2) the "corporate" model (every section of the U contributes to the government), & (3) the "council" model (all responsibilities are vested in the whole U). The Law for U Government Reform aims at working out the corporative model. Research must concentrate on the relationship between goals & implementation, & not on evaluating the goals set up by the Law. By & large, nonscientific personnel are represented in the councils. The student position on these councils is strong due to the absenteeism of other members. Propositions initiated by students or nonscientific personnel are a small minority of the adopted propositions. Propositions opposed by a majority of the scientific personnel present are always adopted. The main student input is found in the area of teaching goals. It is doubtful that the intended democratization of decision-making can be effectively accomplished in the framework of the departmental councils. 6 Tables, Appendix. HA Tr & Modified by A. Orianne.

Electoral institutions shape the incentive that elected representatives have to cultivate a personal vote, a geographically-concentrated personal vote in particular. But are electoral institutions able to make representatives do what they would not do otherwise and to make them not do what they otherwise would have done? Using data from the cross-national PARTIREP MP Survey, it is demonstrated that electoral institutions shape elected representatives' local orientation. Local orientation decreases as district magnitude grows - regardless of what representatives think about political representation. But representatives' conceptions of representation do shape their uptake in the legislative arena from their contacts with individual constituents. The effect of the electoral incentive grows stronger as elected representatives think of representation as a bottom-up rather than a top-down process. Adapted from the source document.

Hans Daudt proposed a decade ago no uncertain terms that the Netherlands cannot be considered a representative democracy. The system does not fails to adequately account for the needs of the citizens and hopes to turn it into policy. In the Netherlands immediately falls in such consideration also the word 'regents' to denote an elite alienated from the society it is supposed to represent and serve. The Dutch debate about whether democracy and its institutions are not ready for a makeover, is only an example of a widespread debate among politicians, political commentators and political scientists which searches for the causes of the imperfect functioning of democracy and to remedies before. Very often stands the question whether the representative institutions do belong to accomplish their task. Repeatedly show that the fact that survey research institutions - parties, parliament, government - those least trusted by the citizens. Adapted from the source document.

The abolition of the political institutions of the Belgian provinces, as provided in the government declaration of 7 June 1977, puts into question the usefulness of these institutions. Light is thrown on policies at the provincial level, now & in the near past, by means of a brief functional & financial analysis. Juridical & institutional limitations have a restraining influence on the functioning of the provinces. A task analysis shows that provinces are primarily concerned with traditional tasks (eg, education traffic), & that they have also concerned themselves with modern social welfare tasks (eg, culture & community organization). Belgian provinces have very limited means. As a result, their current expenditures do not exceed 3% of all current public expenditures. This shows the relatively small importance of the provinces in the total government structure. 10 Tables. Modified HA.

The question is examined of what personal income distribution will be brought about by the institutions of a political democracy, assuming these institutions have the power to determine this. It has been assumed that an egalitarian income distribution would result. The ideas of Hans van den Doel (Democracy and Welfare Economics, Cambridge, 1979) offer an alternative model. The majority of individuals would not seek radical leveling down of incomes for several reasons: concern for economic growth & employment, & the hope of the poor to become rich. Also, if a majority sought radical leveling down, & the measures were not rigorously enforced, a Prisoner's Dilemma would result for each individual; but if they were rigorously enforced, a situation of collective intransitivity would emerge, making the decision subject to cycling. Resolution of this problem would likely leave median income voters in a strong position that they could use to benefit themselves at the expense of the poor. These findings are consistent with the finding of R. W. Jackman (Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis, New York, 1975) that political equality does not play an important role in increasing equality of material rewards. 4 Tables, 5 Figures. Modified HA.