Suchergebnisse

The author gives a brief account of the (active or passive) complicity of the overwhelming majority of Serbian intellectuals in the Serbs' war on Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and the war crimes and crimes against humanity author then argues that in view of this complicity, intellectuals outside Serbia should not be doing "business as usual" with their Serbian colleagues. He advances an argument for a comprehensive, but selective, boycott of Serbian intellectuals as the morally appropriate response of intellectuals the world over. (SOI : PM: S. 94)

Henry Kissinger is one of the most eminent and influential intellectuals in American foreign policy. His work and achievements may be divided into three phases of his participation in the creation of American foreign policy. In the first - scholarly - phase of his career, he criticized US foreign polic His works from that period clearly reflect his "realpolitik" outlook. Particularly important for his life and work is the second phase when he was able, as a national security adviser and later as Secretary of State for presidents Nixon and Ford, to use his remarkable intellectual capital and successfully practice realpolitik as the creator and proponent of American foreign policy. After his retirement from foreign policy administration, Kissinger did not cease to use his clout in the field of international relations and American foreign policy. He has been one of the most significant American intellectuals who have exerted an influence on American foreign policy. (SOI : SOEU: S. 133)

Following the military defeat of the secular strategic orientation ("Drang nach Westen") in Croatia of Serbian political and intellectual elite, a question arises: which are the feasible strategic options of Serbian nationalist elites? Theoretically, three options are possible: (1) radical strategic reorientation: giving up entirely on the existing orientation and setting up new strategic priorities; (2) a respite and mustering strength for a new round (a reprise of the tactical variant of 1991); (3) hatching a novel, long-term tactical variation which would enable the achievement of strategic objectives step by step, by "peaceful means". The author finds the third option most viable, though there are no hints that such a choice has actually been made. However, supposing this option might eventually be acted upon, the author goes on to envisage the quandaries and dilemmas which political and intellectual elites in Serbia might be faced with. (SOI : PM: S. 44)

On the occasion of the bicentennial of the publication of Kant's "Treatise on perpetual peace", the author attempts to evoke and actualize that classic of modern philosophy of politics. According to Hajo Schmidt, the strong point of Kant's concept was his realism which prevented him from slipping into intellectual, utopian idealization of human nature and political relations among people. Having in mind not only the rational but also irrational aspects of human nature, i.e. the insuperable chasm between good and evil, Kant in that respect offers edifying peacemaking propositions. This he achieves by advocating the concepts of free individuals, independent national states and the cosmopolitan unity of humankind. These three moments make up the content of Kant's concept of republicanism. Their identity and plurality are the foundations of the world peace. (SOI : PM: S. 18)

The revival of the nation has shocked German intellectuals who think that the nation-state is historically obsolete and that new models should be upheld: the united Europe, a world community of responsible states, globalisation of markets, a universe of human rights. The contrary tendencies in today's world are marked by giving up on huge political entities which have been replaced by smaller nationality-based states. It seems that political freedom leads to the formation of nation-states based on democratic constitution. This process requires looking into the relation between the nation-state and democracy. The key for the explanation of their relationship can be found in the notion of nation. Citizenship mediates between the people (in its real manifestation as a social group), and democracy as a constitutional principle. It gives to the state as a personal entity legal structure on which to build a democratic form of the state and guarantees legally applicable taxonomies and limitations. (SOI : SOEU: S. 17)

R. J. Kvaternik (1799-1851), professor of history at the Kings Academy of Sciences in Zagreb, had a great influence on several generation of Croatian intellectuals through his pedagogic work and his patriotic and liberal views. The Zagreb journal Südslawische Zeitung also reflected liberal and democratic views. The author compares Kvaternik's views, exposed in questions for public examinations in general and Hungarian History (positiones), with those expressed in the journal concerning actual political issues and institutional, economic, and cultural questions. In both cases, there is notable democratic orientation, inclination towards parlamentary system, and the need for education of the people as requirement for a general progress of the country. The ideas of equality, tolerance, and peaceful resolution of issues are fundamental to the views. S. Z. stands steadfastly to its views. The similarities between Kvaternik's views and those of S. Z. suggests that some of Kvaternik's disciples were contributors to the journal. Unfortunately, this remains only a presupposition, because articles in S. Z. were not signed. (SOI : CSP: S. 276)

A few years after the collapse of communist regimes, it is evident that the confidence about the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy was premature. This waking up to the reality is not only the consequence of the hardships in the transformation of post-communist societies, but of the intellectual scepticism regarding the normative potential of liberal democracy in the developed western societies. The problem might in most general terms be formulated as the incapacity of liberal democracy to generate and reproduce the normative requirements for its own survival. The author thinks that the solution to this paradox can nevertheless be found within the institutional framework of liberal democracy: if the traditional moral concepts on which liberal democracy was founded in the past are worn out indeed, and no civil- religious substitute for that tradition has emerged as yet, then its only possibility is to create its own, modern or post-modern, morality by means of the public discourse mechanism and the political participation of citizens. The normative dimension of liberalism must not be reduced to the theory of private ownership, market and competition, but be envisaged as a constitutional theory of human rights and restricted government and the egalitarian distribution of goods and opportunities. (SOI : PM: S. 30)

Recent historical developments in the relationship between Croats and Serbs are discussed, refering to an article by V. Vujacic (Theory and Society, No. 6, 1996). The idea of an Illyrian and later a Yugoslav commonwealth of all South Slavs, originating in Croatia in the 19th century, had its legitimating psychological foundation in a "illusion of centrality", developed at the time by a part of the Croatian political and intellectual elite, a view of the preeminent position of Croatia and the Croats among all the Slav ethnic groups in the region and, therefore, of a natural central role of Croatia in the future commonwealth. In a similar way, the armed struggle of the Serbs for independence from the Ottoman empire in the 19th century and for the expansion of the Serbian State in the 19th and 20th century has generated a Serbian belief in the dominant role of Serbia and the Serbs in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established in 1918, later Kingdom of Yugoslavia. These incompatible illusions are believed to be the roots of a number of political positions and decisions taken by both Croats and Serbs in the 20th century. The views of Max Weber on nationality and nationalism are discussed in relation to the problem of cooperation and conflict between Croats and Serbs in the 20th century. (SOI : PM: S. 17)

The aim of this article, through an analysis of Veljko Vujacic's text and other pamphlets and manifestos by the Serbian political elite, was to show that the Serbian elite and the Serbian society have not got rid of their nationalist bias in explaining the events which led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. They claim that the main culprit for this failure was the communist national policy and the failure to use adequate means (meaning Rankovic's technology of violence) in order to preserve the unity of the state. The second part of the article serves to demonstrate how Weber's view on the politics of power does not suffice to explain away the bolshevist and the communist form of the populist Serbian nationalism. The moment when the former Yugoslav political elite split into the anticommunist and anticentralist on the one hand, and the bolshevist and the centralist on the other, there was no possibility for a compromise. The third part suggests that Vujacic (and not only he) thinks that a way of overcoming the Serbian "dominant" nationalism is the catharsis of Serbian intellectuals and the Serbian society. However, as the latest events and proclamations of the Serbian elite show, his is a solitary case. (SOI : PM: S. 37)

Mixed government, which is commonly regarded as a distinctly medieval form of government, is relevant also to contemporary constitutional states. It is the best form of government, since the aristocratic element is a continuous source of virtue, especially of justice, and a check not only on the executive, as the monarchical element which is the seat of political power, and the legislature, as the democratic element which expresses the will of the majority, but also groups and institutions that have the might and will to impose themselves as oligarchies. Mixed government is also the form of government that is practised by most developed contemporary constitutional states: USA, UK, France, Switzerland, Germany etc. European nobility is the original aristocratic institution, by virtue of the fact that it was a system for the transfer of both virtue and general conditions of life. Three institutions that emerged in the late Middle Ages assumed structures and functions of the nobility. + The first is the clergy. When, as a result of the differentiation of feudal society ethical and intellectual virtues of the nobility could no longer maintain general conditions of life, the clergy, by virtue of their abstract knowledge that ranged from philosophy and theology to law and medicine, became a class of new experts in generalities and thereby a new aristocracy. The second modern aristocratic institution is the judiciary, which has a structure and function similar to earlier aristocracies. The task of judges is to establish the highest virtue o constitutionalism. It is justice by law, which regulates general conditions of life in the state and society. What qualifies judges for the task is expertise in the new generality. The expertise includes not only education and experience in law but also impeccable private life and demonstrated professional ethics. + The third modern aristocratic institution is the profession, whose most important instance is the legal profession. It shares its structure and function partly with the judiciary and partly with other professions. It seems that modern professions are degenerating. In the key area of data processing, due to rapid changes of technology, professions as systems of the transfer of virtue do not even seem to be possible. Professional aristocracies are replaced increasingly by oligarchies of capitalists and technocrats. (SOI : PM: S. 111)