Suchergebnisse

On his two days campaign trip in the territory between the Danube and River Tisza, Count István Bethlen primarily emphasised the reconstitution of national unity, religious peace and reconciliation among social classes. This political campaign aimed at peacefully revising the Treaty of Trianon. And he thought it well: in order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to conceive political realism, that is, the economic, social and cultural reinforcement of die nation. For example, it was expedient for beginning the land reform, the dissemination of intensive forms of agricultural production and the industrialisation supplementing imports. For the intellectual basis to achieve these goals, Bethlen considered Christian liberalism the most appropriate. As a result of this campaign, the nominees of the United Party won 6 out of the 9 electoral districts. And among these 6 constituencies, 3 were eventually taken by the governing party by an intervention through the civil service. Bethlen and the leaders of the United Party often exploited the state apparatus and the civil service - in many cases illegally - to preserve power positions. Thus even the subsequent successes of the Bethlen consolidation cannot overshadow this fact.

What we today call the international system was created by the West from early modern age. This term is often used in political theory, but less focused on how to classify integrative forces within the international system. In the context of this study, we are attempting to lay down some conceptual basis. How do we understand the linking and unifying factors within the international system? Initially, the emergence of the international system was largely attributed to political factors in theory, but we can also refer to other explanatory principles: one considers economic factors and civilizational factors are taken into consideration as essential aspects of the international structures. According to our viewpoint, inter-civilization dialogue seems to be a "third way" that goes beyond the expansive one-sidedness of Western universalism and the world-level confrontation of hostile civilizations. This "civilizational approach" incorporates the two previous aspects - economic and political - and this is what gives its importance. In our view, inter-civilization dialogue is the only viable way to create global ethos, and only the resulting "intellectual revolution" can make national and supranational economic and political institutions to operate in effective way under the conditions of globalization.

It was only recently, in the early 2000's, that the national councils were formed as institutions of policy making. The present paper concerns the second election of the national councils, which was held in the traditional way and not by means of electors. In 2010, the primary issue was whether and to what extent the institution is considered legitimate by majority of the Hungarians in Serbia. However, mitigating the collective social inequities of Hungarians in Serbia/Voivodina was not empha-sized. This inequity is partly due to the political deep structure of the representational form of rule. In other words, the dispute on the working of the MNT paralleled the current challenges of the Hungarian party-political system in Voivodina. The actual possibilities of minority policy making or the sensibly discussable circumstances of a given policy area were not really included. The discourse belonged to the dimension of politics rather than that of policies. Even the most skilled intellectuals were unaware of the ways how interests can be institutionalized through policy making. The debate addressed the elections of the MNT and not its procedures of functioning/competence/decision. The 2010 election facilitated the progress in the legality and legitimacy of the body but it also pointed out that, due to the short-term and tactical workings of daily political struggles, the political possibilities and articulations of minority interests will continue to be kept in the background.

Mátyás Rákosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, was forced to resign by soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan on 18th July, 1956. He was followed by Ernő Gerő, who was also a hated man, responsible for all economic decisions in earlier years and taking part in a leadership which had committed serious crimes. He remained in power for three months only, until the October 1956 Revolution. Although Gerő announced political reforms, historians regard it only as a tactical step. This study suggests that these reforms, named "clear sheet", or "tabula rasa" policy, were in fact serious steps toward a "socialist democracy". What is more, these steps were not only announced but many of them was also taken. However, three months were not enough for Gerő to introduce all changes, because he was also engaged in neutralizing the activity of the party opposition lead by Imre Nagy's group. The study analyzes these reforms (e.g. increasing the role of the National Assembly, restoring the "socialist legality", decentralization, improving the living standards of the society, broadening the freedom of speech, giving greater support to the intellectuals etc.). To sum up, it can be stated that these reforms have a lot in common with the reforms of Imre Nagy in 1953. Surprisingly, it seems that the so-called "soft dictatorship" would have started much earlier, already in 1956, instead of 1963. The later reforms of János Kádár, introduced gradually in the 1960s (and sometimes only in the 1980s) probably originated also from this period of time, the Summer of'56. This study has much more questions than answers, its aim is to generate a new debate on Gerő's first secretariat hoping that a better understanding of this period can be reached. The most important questions are the following: why did the Revolution exacdy break out; how would it be possible to avoid it and, most interestingly, what would have happened if the Revolution did not break out at all?