Suchergebnisse

Kina har de senere årene fått en sterkere stemme i internasjonal politikk og har rettet oppmerksomhet og interesse mot nordområdene og mulighetene som finnes der. Inntredenen i regionen av en voksende supermakt har ikke gått upåaktet hen og har reist en rekke spørsmål blant de arktiske landene. Mange har fremmet ulike syn på og spekulasjoner om Kinas handlinger og retorikk i Arktis, og felles for disse er at de ønsker å forstå Kinas intensjoner. Denne artikkelen presenterer Kinas arktiske politikkutforming, hvordan Kina presenterer sine interesser i Arktis, og beskriver viktige kinesiske handlingsområder i Arktis. Artikkelen forsøker å svare på spørsmålene: Hvordan ser Kinas interesser i nordområdene ut i dag, og hva kan vi forvente av fremtidig kinesisk aktivitet i nord? Avslutningsvis reflekterer vi over betydningen dette kan ha for Norge.
Abstract in English:The 'New Superpower': What Does China Want in the Arctic?In recent years, China has gained a stronger voice in international politics and has turned its attention and interest to the High North and the opportunities that exist there. The entry into the region of a growing superpower has not gone unnoticed, and has raised a number of questions among the Arctic states. Many observers have put forward different views and speculations about China's actions and rhetoric in the Arctic, and what they have in common is that they want to understand China's intentions. This article introduces China's Arctic policy-making, how China formulates its interests in the Arctic, and describes key areas of action in the Arctic. What do China's interests in the High North look like today? In conclusion, we reflect on the significance this may have for Norway.

In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails. ; In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails.

Selv om Danmark efter sigende fik »verdens bedste miljølov« i 1973 præges miljøbeskyttelsesloven af iværksættelsesproblemer. Halvdelen af de særligt forurenende virksomheder modtager ikke et eneste tilsynsbesøg om året, og halvdelen af virksomhederne har stadig ikke en miljøgodkendelse. Da reguleringen er altovervejende baseret på ren administrativ styring med et imponerende ressourcekrav, må markarbejderne i miljøforvaltningerne udvikle særlig konsulentrolle som reaktion på et administrativt overload. Implementeringen af miljøbeskyttelsesloven må ses som en genuin politisk proces, snarere end en mekanisk af en vedtagen lov. Stærke interesser af økonomisk og bureaukratisk karakter fik under udformningen af lovgivningen indbygget en række indflydelsesmuligheder og vetopunkter med henblik på implementeringen, hvor aktørerne såvel legitimt som illegitimt fortsætte spillet fra beslutningsprocessen om reguleringen. ; The basic danish environmental law, passed in 1973, was structured with extention of the traditional patterns of participation, not only delegating local authorities a major responsibility, also allowing interest organizations of the regulated to play a major role during implementation. chosen regulation was solely administrative and during the decision-making process the different actors managed to complicate the law with further vetopoints as well as accesspoints influence. The implementation gap in Danish environmental regulation is to be explained the genuine political character of the implementation proces. The complicated procedures rules are defended by the strong interests, and the resulting administrative overload influences strategies of the street-level environmental bureaucracy. Often ignoring formal rules the local inspectors seek an advisor-role helping companies to comply, but leaving more than half of the especially polluting firms unattended, according to offical figures. The prevailing neo-corporative regulation seems unable to cope with the need for change arising from the ecological crisis.

Iver Neumann has been one of the most productive and visible foreign policy and IR scholars of his generation. He has had great influence both internationally and at NUPI. He has, however, not become a prophet in his own country. Norway's political science community has expressed little interest in the three traditions that have been the lasting anchor points in Neumann's works: the English School, the German tradition of critical theory and French post-modernism. This article suggests that Norwegian political studies have expressed a lack of curiosity – if not an active skepticism – towards political theory in general and continental approaches in particular. The errand here is not to wonder why. Rather, it is to provide the briefest of glimpses into some of the perspectives that lie outside the Anglo-American, methodological mainstream of Norwegian political science.

I akademia skrives det ofte at stater deltar i institusjoner så lenge dette sammenfaller med deres interesser på ethvert tidspunkt. Implikasjonen av dette er at stater som Kina kanskje vil avvise internasjonale institusjoner så fort de føler at institusjonene ikke er nyttige. Jeg vil hevde at Kina lar sine interesser formes av institusjonene ut over hva ytre rammevilkår vil tilsi. For å belyse dette argumentet tar artikkelen for seg en casestudie med utviklingen av Shanghai-samarbeidsorganisasjonen (SCO) og Kinas holdninger i denne prosessen. Spesifikt vil artikkelen trekke linjer fra forhandlingene mellom Kina og Sovjetunionen over grensespørsmål på 1980-tallet frem til grunnleggingen av SCO på 2000-tallet. Ved å sammenligne en rasjonell tilnærming med en historisk vil artikkelen hevde at den historiske er mer relevant for å forstå Kinas holdninger. Artikkelen argumenterer at en historisk tilnærming har potensial som et nyttig verktøy, og at den bør undersøkes mer innen IR-faget.
Abstract in EnglishEfficient tools or historical frameworks? China's attitude to international institutionsIn academia, it is common to assume that states participate in institutions insofar as this serves their interests at any given time. The implication is that states like China may reject international institutions as soon as they no longer consider them useful. The author argues that China lets its interests be shaped by the institutions beyond what structural factors imply. To shed light on this argument, this article conducts a case study of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's attitudes to this process. Specifically, the article will draw connections from negotiations between the China and the Soviet Union over border disputes in the 1980s to the foundation of the SCO in the 2000s. By comparing a rational approach with a historical one, the article argues that the historical approach is more relevant to understand China's attitudes. It further argues that a historical approach has potential as a useful tool and should be examined further in IR.

eGovernment and autoritative public data in Denmark are still mainly focused on the landside of Danmark. But the need of eloborating the coordinating effort of administration at sea is recognised and the development of maritime eGovernment is happening within the next years. This paper discusses the data involved in this administration and focuses on the need for understanding the function and hence value of data. Some maritime data are dealing with accurate placements of objects, and as a tricky part some are dealing with floating placement. Other data are handling non-visible areas in terms of zoning, e.g. planning and interest areas and finally some data are representation of legislation, whether it is rights or restrictions. These different data are not always usable in the same manner. This paper investigates the correlation between spatial data and legislation. Experience from many years of land administration can be used as part of this discussion as well as the conclusions from this paper can be discussion as input to the ongoing development on land.

eGovernment and autoritative public data in Denmark are still mainly focused on the landside of Danmark. But the need of eloborating the coordinating effort of administration at sea is recognised and the development of maritime eGovernment is happening within the next years. This paper discusses the data involved in this administration and focuses on the need for understanding the function and hence value of data. Some maritime data are dealing with accurate placements of objects, and as a tricky part some are dealing with floating placement. Other data are handling non-visible areas in terms of zoning, e.g. planning and interest areas and finally some data are representation of legislation, whether it is rights or restrictions. These different data are not always usable in the same manner. This paper investigates the correlation between spatial data and legislation. Experience from many years of land administration can be used as part of this discussion as well as the conclusions from this paper can be discussion as input to the ongoing development on land.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.

Hensikten med denne artikkelen er å bidra til diskusjonen om idealismens betydning for USAs utenrikspolitikk. Utgangspunktet er at ideelle hensyn synes å ha fått redusert betydning under Obama og siden Trump. Ettersom den amerikanske idealismen angivelig skriver seg fra en særegen politisk historie og ideologiske tradisjoner med dype røtter i amerikansk samfunnsliv, er denne endringen til å undres over. I teksten lanseres og diskuteres fem hypoteser som kan forklare idealismens bortfall: anti-idealisme, overflodsidealisme, personlighetstrekkidealisme, strukturselektert idealisme og tidsåndsidealisme. Det konkluderes med at bortfallet av idealisme ikke nødvendigvis betyr at USAs egeninteresse blir bedre ivaretatt.
Abstract in English:Idealism's Disappearing ActThe aim of this article is to contribute to the discussion on the role of idealism in U.S. foreign policy. During the Obama and Trump presidencies, the significance of idealistic considerations in U.S. foreign policy has dwindled. The change is remarkable, as the idealistic impulse allegedly stems from ideological traditions deeply rooted in American society as well as a unique political history. From this observation, five hypotheses, apt to explain the diminishing impact of idealism, are suggested and discussed: anti-idealism, abundance induced idealism, idealism by personal bent, structurally selected idealism and zeitgeist idealism. The article concludes that U.S. self-interest is not necessarily better off with a cessation of idealism.

Nordområdene har vært på den norske utenrikspolitiske agendaen i 15 år. Mye har endret seg i denne perioden. Det som preger debatten i 2020, er forestillinger om stormaktpolitikk og rivalisering i nord. Samtidig hevdes det fra de arktiske hovedstedene at regionen er preget av samarbeid, og at de arktiske statene har fellesinteresser som gjør konflikt lite sannsynlig. Hvordan kan to så ulike oppfatninger om Arktis opptre samtidig? I dette bidraget foretar vi en lagdeling mellom tre ulike nivåer av sikkerhetspolitikk i og om nordområdene og Arktis. Dette tydeliggjør hvordan regionen kan være preget av både samarbeid og rivalisering på samme tid. Samarbeid og rivalsering vektes ulikt avhengig av tid og sted, men de er ikke gjensidig utelukkende.
Abstract in English:Great Power Politics and Increased Tension? The Art of Differentiating Analyses in the ArcticThe High North has been on the Norwegian foreign policy agenda for 15 years. Much has changed over this period. What characterizes the debate in 2020 are notions of great power politics and rivalry in the north. At the same time, Arctic states claim that the region is defined by cooperation and that the Arctic states have common interests that make conflict unlikely. How can two such different perceptions of the Arctic exist simultaneously? In this contribution, we separate between three different levels of security policy in and around the High North and the Arctic. This helps clarify how the region can be characterized by both cooperation and rivalry at the same time. Cooperation and rivalry differ depending on time and place, but they are not mutually exclusive.

Komparation med sammenlignelige lande negligeres som oftest i studier af dansk militær 'aktivisme'. Dette bidrag vil bøde på det i en analyse af Danmarks interventionsparathed med Norge og Polen som baggrundstæppe. Den konkrete situation, der studeres, er krisen vedr. begrænsede luftangreb mod Syrien i september 2013 i kølvandet på regimets formodede anvendelse af kemiske våben i Ghouta. I modsætning til de fleste allierede lod Danmark sig ikke afskrække af den kontroversielle Irak-intervention 10 år tidligere. Danmarks særlige parathed handlede mindre om lokale omstændigheder end om Danmark selv, forholdet til Washington og landets angivelige historiske 'gæld' til USA. Det er imidlertid svært at måle en sådan gæld, ligesom det er en udfordring for superatlantismen, at Danmarks interesser er mere geografisk begrænsede end stormagten USAs.
Abstract in EnglishAlways ready! Danish intervention enthusiasm in comparative perspectiveComparison with similar countries is much neglected in studies of Danish military 'activism'. This contribution seeks to remedy that in an analysis of Danish forces' 'happiness both to travel and to fight', in which Norway and Poland serve as the comparative backcloth. The specific situation under scrutiny is the crisis over limited air raids over Syria in September 2013 in the wake of the regime's alleged use of chemical weapons in Ghouta. As distinct from most allies, Denmark was not discouraged by the controversial Iraq intervention 10 years earlier. The special Danish readiness was less about perceptions of the local conditions than about Denmark itself, its relationship to Washington and an alleged historical 'debt' to the US. However, not only is such debt difficult to measure; a challenge to superatlanticism is also that Danish interests are geographically more delimited than those of the US great power.

Covid-19-pandemien har tydeliggjort hvordan grensekryssende helse-trusler har samfunnsmessige konsekvenser. Epidemier ute av kontroll og andre ikke-kontrollerte grensekryssende helsetrusler kan sees som trusler mot fred og sikkerhet. Slike helsekriser kan ha store negative konsekvenser på helse, sosiale forhold og økonomisk utvikling, og har derfor potensiale for å bli både lokale, regionale og globale sikkerhetskriser. Stor ulikhet i tilgang til virkemidler for å kunne håndtere en helsekrise – eksempelvis medisinske mottiltak som vaksiner, legemidler og diagnostikk – kan skape eller forverre ustabilitet og være en sikkerhetsutfordring i seg selv. Med fokus på erfaringer fra covid-19-pandemien vektlegger vi i denne artikkelen global helsesikkerhet som et globalt fellesgode. En økende interesse for grensekryssende helsetrusler i FNs sikkerhetsråd gir muligheter og handlingsrom, men utfordrer også hvordan helsetrusler tolkes og tilnærminger til den internasjonale responsen.
Abstract in English:Outbreaks with Cross-border Potential and the UN Security CouncilThe Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted how outbreaks with cross-border potential have broader macroeconomic consequences. Uncontrolled epidemics and other uncontrolled outbreaks with cross-border potential can be seen as threats to peace and security. Such health crises can have severe consequences for health, social conditions and economic development, and have the potential to impact local, regional and global security. Inequality in access to medical countermeasures, such as vaccines, medicines and diagnostics, can impact or exacerbate instability and be a security threat in itself. Using lessons learned from the covid-19 pandemic, this article emphasizes global health security as a global public good. Increasing interest in outbreaks with cross-border potential in the UN Security Council might open windows of opportunity, but also challenges how global health threats are understood and the international responses to such outbreaks.