Suchergebnisse

Research on legislative‒executive relations in foreign affairs has generally assumed that parliaments are more active in 'intermestic' affairs than in traditional foreign policy issues. This paper revisits this assumption by examining whether parliaments in European countries scrutinise crucial decisions on a typical intermestic domain: external energy policy and, more specifically, intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) on energy. Contrary to the expectation, the study finds high variation in the level of parliamentary scrutiny across and within countries. To account for this variation, the paper focuses on the role of issue framing, particularly the impact of securitising and/or depoliticising moves by members of parliament and government. The paper argues that, in contrast to traditional foreign policy matters, securitisation attempts in areas with a strong economic component are likely to increase politicisation and hence also parliamentary engagement. Conversely, parliamentary disengagement is likely to come from the opposite dynamics: successful depoliticisation of governmental responsibilities.

In 2005, the Texas Legislature approved Senate Bill 1894, which established two special utility districts within the extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) of the City of Terrell, Texas, forming the largest rural planned development community in the State of Texas. This legislation allowed Terrell to use a city-design model to plan proactively for communities in its ETJ before they are constructed, through the establishment of comprehensive regional and intergovernmental agreements. Expansion from the large Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan areas threatens the small-town character of Terrell and other rural communities in northern Texas. The recent adoption of complex intergovernmental agreements and land development planning initiatives in Terrell has stimulated the entire area to enact similar partnership agreements between developers and cities. This case study illustrates how local city authorities, challenged to preserve quality of place, can manage the growth around them and attract new investment while minimizing problems and avoiding negative consequences.

Canada's federal government has exclusive authority to commit Canada to international treaties, but, under the Canadian constitution, compliance with treaty obligations that extend into areas of provincial competence is solely within provincial jurisdiction. As well, while Canada is responsible to its treaty partners if provinces act contrary to Canada's obligations, the provinces are not directly accountable. The absence of a direct legal requirement to fulfil treaty obligations means that incentives for provincial compliance are weakened and, in turn, that the reliability of Canadian obligations relating to matters within provincial jurisdiction is diminished. This paper explores the prospects for using an intergovernmental agreement to address the gap between provincial action and federal responsibility. While such an agreement could express each province's commitment to comply with Canadian treaty obligations, intergovernmental agreements have some inherent weaknesses that make them an imperfect commitment device.