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This article draws on an empirical study of EC energy policy between 1985 and 1992 in a theoretical discussion of the requirements for a comprehensive theory of integration for the post-1985 period. An analytical framework that improves on intergovernmentalist approaches is proposed. The author argues that a `domestic politics' approach presupposes a delineation of state strategies and state actor capability in a given issue area prior to the analysis of interstate bargaining at the EC level. Further, this approach is argued to be inadequate as a basis for a theory of integration as such, where the ability on the part of the Commission for designing policy that satisfies states' interests is argued to be a necessary condition for the achievement of integrative outcomes. Integration is defined as the intended yet often informal effect of such policy designs, and informal integration is assumed to generate political pressures towards formal integration.

In this article, I investigate the potential for reform within the European Union (EU). Spatial models are employed to explore the extent to which domestic considerations prevent the organization from intensifying cooperation among member states. I show that intergovernmentalism will ultimately remain the predominant decision-making mode despite recent introduction of the codecision procedure which yields unconditional blocking power to the European Parliament. The capacity for institutional innovation is limited because of the coexistence of intergovernmentalist and supranationalist agenda-setting procedures. This dualism offers opportunities to overturn legislative decisions. After experiencing a defeat in the domain of `low politics' governments may create `negative spillovers' by asking for compensation in the unanimity-ruled area of `high politics'.

The general argumentation of Wolfgang Streeck's paper (1994) is the following. First, on the basis of a historical analysis, he tries to show that the social policy carried out at European community level has until now produced very few and poor results. Second, he identifies the reasons for such a situation essentially in the very nature of intergovernmentalism and Member States' reluctance to engage themselves supranationally as far as social policy is concerned, and also in a total lack of interest on the part of European employers in 'centralized, market-correcting social policy or collective bargaining'. Third, given these premisses, it would be vain and naive, according to Streeck, to expect that the Maastricht Social Agreement (MSA) will induce any change of behaviour on the part of social and political actors responsible for the making of European social policy; as a consequence, its substantive content is not likely to be more full-fledged in the future.

Peacekeeping policies aimed at preventing or halting armed conflict and peace building aimed at eliminating the causes of war are both purported functions of the United Nations Organization and specialized agencies. UN peacekeeping efforts have been increasingly successful, largely because of external factors - most notably the re-establishment of consensus among permanent members of the Security Council regarding the value of the United Nations for maintaining peace. Yet there exists little if any basis upon which to formulate a comprehensive and co-ordinated strategy to address the causes of armed conflict. Significant impediments to peace building include a lack of consensus on the very nature of the problems of development and their remedies, an absence of effective leadership, and various structural inadequacies. The United Nations functions effectively both to make and to enforce global policies when the intergovernmental political climate allows, but most UN agencies are not well equipped structurally or procedurally to deal with situations that are more than traditionally intergovernmental in their structure and dynamics. Finally, just as traditional intergovernmentalism via the UN may not ultimately produce an effective response to problems of social and economic underdevelopment, neither may globalism be an ultimate formula. Global policy-making for peace building requires interaction with and access to local and national participants, resources and institutional mechanisms, private as well as public. Until and unless the fundamental assumptions upon which the UN system is based are greatly altered, global policies that emanate from UN agencies to deal with underdevelopment and other major threats to long-term world peace are not likely to be very effective.