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AbstractHow has the research on the European Council and the Council of the EU engaged with Moravcsik's theory on liberal intergovernmentalism (LI)? This article analyzes 25 years of Council research. Most of this literature does not refer to LI, and a majority of the references that are made raise critique against LI. However, compared to other major works on European integration, LI is by far the most important source in the Council literature. Furthermore, a closer look at the most significant challenges raised against LI indicates that its account of intergovernmental bargaining in the EU is not in serious question. On the other hand, few studies provide systematic tests of the key assumptions of LI with regards to interstate bargaining. As a result, the self‐proclaimed status of LI as a baseline theory is confirmed in the Council literature more by implicit, somewhat reluctant, consent than by overt support.

What are the determinants of Japan's regional policies? This article argues that Japan's regional policy is the result of the government's strategic choice made through processes of domestic and international bargaining. Based on liberal intergovernmentalism, this article focuses on the level of domestic preferences for East Asia and the threat of China. In the first stage, the preference of the Prime Minister and political winning-coalition groups matter. In the second stage, the level of the threat of China is a pivotal variable. In combining these two variables, the article proposes the following four types of ideal regional policies for Japan: (1) pro-East Asia policy; (2) expanded-Asia policy; (3) interactive policy; and (4) reactive policy. To substantiate this idea, the article traces Japan's regional policy trajectory from the Yoshida Cabinet to the Hatoyama Cabinet. An in-depth case study shows that Japanese cabinets vary in their regional policies in the way this article expected from each ideal type based on liberal intergovernmentalism.

Der Artikel untersucht die Beziehungen und die gewaltenteilenden Elemente in der institutionellen Entwicklung der Europäischen Union, vor allem das Verhältnis supranationaler Institutionen wie der Europäischen Kommission, des Europäischen Parlaments oder des Europäischen Gerichtshofs zu intergouvernementalen Institutionen wie dem Ministerrat. Dabei wird deutlich, daß die Entwicklung des politischen Systems der EU nicht immer linear verlaufen ist und sich die Stellung und Bedeutung der verschiedenen Institutionen im Laufe der Zeit sehr differenziert entwickelt hat (SWP-Fnk)

We present a unified model of the politics of the European Union (EU). We focus on the effects of the EU's changing treaty base (from the Rome to Amsterdam Treaties) on the relations among its three supranational institutions—the Commission of the European Communities, the European Court of Justice, and the European Parliament—and between these actors and the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. We analyze these institutional interactions in terms of the interrelationships among the three core functions of the modern state: to legislate and formulate policy (legislative branch), to administer and implement policy (executive branch), and to interpret policy and adjudicate disputes (judicial branch). Our analysis demonstrates that the evolution of the EU's political system has not always been linear. For example, we explain why the Court's influence was greatest before the passage of the Single European Act and declined in the following decade, and why we expect it to increase again in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty. We also explain why the Commission became a powerful legislative agenda setter after the Single European Act and why its power today stems more from administrative discretion than from influence over legislation.