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SOCIAL CONFLICTS ARE THE MOTOR OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS & POINT TO A DESIRE OR STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGES. THESE CHANGES ARE SUBSEQUENTLY REALIZED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, & THE RESULTS LAID DOWN IN THE LAW. DISPROPORTIONAL POSITIONAL CHANGES OF ACTORS WITHIN A SOCIAL SYSTEM BRING ABOUT CONFLICTS. POSITIONS ARE TIED TO VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS, THUS DISPROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF VALUES LEAD TO CONFLICTS. A SECOND APPROACH MAY BE FOLLOWED, VIZ, THE UTILITY-THEORETICAL OR THE SATISFACTION-THEORETICAL APPROACH. THIS APPROACH DEALS WITH AN ANALYSIS OF UTILITY-FUNCTIONS OF ACTORS, CONFLICT BEING DEFINED AS A POSITION ON THE SATISFACTION-SCALE. 2 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.

THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONFLICT PRESUPPOSES LOCAL ISSUES OR CONTROVERSIES THAT CAN BE SETTLED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT CONFLICT BECAUSE RIOTS DO HAPPEN SOMEWHERE, VIZ ON THE TERRITORY OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT LOCAL ISSUES. THE OBJECTIVES OF ACTION HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFLICT IS A LOCAL ONE. THE OBJECTIONS OF AN ACTION CAN BE THE CHANGE OF LOCAL POWER HOLDERS OR A CHANGE OF THEIR POLICIES. REPLACEMENT OF LOCAL OFFICIALS BY LOCAL ACTION IN THE DUTCH SITUATION IS NOT SO OBVIOUS. IN MOST CASES A DECISION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED, EG THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW MAYOR. BY-ELECTIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS HAVE NEVER OCCURRED. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE PUTTING ASIDE OF A LOCAL COUNCIL & APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN MANY CASES LOCAL AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE COOPERATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO REALIZE PLANS OF IMPORTANCE, AT LEAST FINANCIALLY. EVEN WHERE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST, A LOCAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DEVIATE TOO MUCH FROM NATIONAL POLICIES. LOCAL REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT. LOCAL CONFLICT CANNOT CHANGE '1ST ORDER POLITICS' (POLICIES) OR '2ND ORDER POLITICS' (POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS) VERY FAR; THE LIMITS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM. RECENTLY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CHANGE THE WAY (PROPORTIONALLY TO THE STRENGTH OF ALL POSSIBLE PARTIES IN THE COUNCILS) THAT PROVINCIAL BOARDS OF ALDERMAN ARE TRADITIONALLY COMPOSED. THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE REASONED AS A POLITIZATION OF LOCAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, THE MAIN EFFECT WILL BE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN COMPETITION FOR SEATS. HA.

A DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF A SERIES OF CONFLICTS CONCERNING POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE U OF AMSTERDAM IS PRESENTED. ON 20 DEC 1972 THE COUNCIL OF THE DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (IN WHICH STAFF & STUDENTS ARE REPRESENTED) ADOPTED A NEW SYSTEM OF INTERDISCIPLINARY GROUPS WITHIN THE DEPT. THIS DECISION WAS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE FOR THE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, H. DAUDT, & 5 STAFF MEMBERS TO SUSPEND THEIR TEACHING ACTIVITIES. THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE U & THE U COUNCIL BECAME INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE. ORDERED TO RESUME THEIR TEACHING ACTIVITIES, THESE CIVIL SERVANTS APPEALED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT. THE DOCUMENTS PRESENTED CONSIST OF OFFICIAL LETTERS, STATEMENTS, RULINGS, & EXTRACTS FROM THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE PUBLIC BODIES THAT DEALT WITH THE MATTER. THE CONFLICT, WHICH STANDS UNRESOLVED AT THE TIME OF PUBLICATION, CAN BE SEEN AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF MORE OVERALL DEBATE ABOUT THE POSITION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE DUTCH U'S & STUDENT ACTIVISM. HA.

TYPICAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NETHERLANDS IS THAT CONFLICTS ARE QUICKLY POLITICIZED. EITHER AN EXISTING POLITICAL PARTY MAKES ITSELF A MOUTH-PIECE OF ONE OF THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, OR ONE OF THESE GROUPS FORMS A NEW PARTY. THE LATTER SOLUTION IS FAVORED BY THE EXISTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM, THAT GUARANTEES EASY ACCESS FOR NEW PARTIES TO PARLIAMENT. VARIOUS NEW PARTIES HAVE EMERGED IN THIS WAY, HAVE ATTRACTED MANY VOTERS, BUT HAVE LOST THEM AFTER A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD WITHOUT HAVING REACHED THE GOAL AT WHICH THEY AIMED. OPINION-RESEARCH MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE SHARPNESS OF A NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIES HAS INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE OPPOSITION OF EMPLOYEES TO EMPLOYERS. THE DUTCH POLITICAL SYSTEM CANNOT BE DENIED FLEXIBILITY IN THE HANDLING OF CONFLICTS. WITH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS, THIS FLEXIBILITY MAY BE LOST IF THE INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT INCREASED AT THE SAME TIME & IF NO STRUCTURAL CHANGES ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS & EMPLOYEES. HA.

'Polarization' has become a catchword in Dutch politics, denoting the emphasis on conflicting rather than mutual interests. It is assumed that the efforts made to 'polarize' the voter population are aimed at reducing the large reservoir of middle-of-the-roaders. In its weekly opinion survey, the Netherlands Institute of Public Opinion (NIPO) consistently finds about 30% of the Rs choosing the center of a left/right semantic differential scale with almost an equal number of Rs going to right & left positions. The almost Gaussian overall distribution is shown to be highly correlated with party choice & voting behavior. The frequency distributions along the left/right Osgood scale are highly skewed inside each separate political preference group. The results of a new additional question are reported. The question reads: "If you were not allowed or could not choose this position would you then go for the one adjoining to the right or to the left?" A very large proportion of Rs move over to the left or right even beyond the extremes of the seven-point scale, effectively extending it to a nine-point scale. The popular center position is then reduced to about 12%. Even more interesting are larger variations over time that are shown for an interesting period extending from late Sept to the end of Nov 1977, during which efforts to form a new socialist-dominated government failed. The extended scale is shown to be a more sensitive instrument than the seven-point semantic differential alone. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

The literature of the last decade on Marxist or materialist theories of the state is reviewed. It is concluded that a Marxist theory of the state, ie, a theory that explains the conditions & mechanisms of the formation & functioning of the state, does not exist. What is presented as a Marxist theory is actually a structural-functionalist conception of the state, formulated in Marxist terms. This conception is characterized by strong teleological & metaphysical overtones & contains many elements of so-called bourgeois theories of the state. It is demonstrated that this conception is incompatible with a theory in which the processes of formation & functioning of the state are regarded as the results of ongoing political processes & conflicts, arising from relations of dependence & power in & between societies. Modified HA.

State formation is defined as the growth of power resources of the state apparatus, the growth of state autonomy, & the growth of societal regulations, sanctioned by state power resources. The relationship between state formation & economic development is investigated, using the method of historical case study. It is hypothesized that growing state regulation is to be expected in periods of acute labor shortage & economic growth. It is found that "houses of correction" were founded in times of overwhelming labor surplus & mass unemployment. The reasons for the foundations of these institutions, however, are not seen as economic, but social: they were a means to fight the social & political consequences of mass unemployment, eg, poverty, crime, & political rebellion. It is concluded that state formation can be found in times of economic prosperity as well as in times of depression, when the depression has severe political or social consequences. It is the result of social & political conflicts possibly due to economic development. Modified HA.

Explanation is given to the dismal predictions of the Club of Rome studies concerning long-run consequences of economic growth & population increases, & why they are not translated into policy changes affecting those variables. The domestic function of economic growth, providing bargaining space for the solution of political conflicts, & the propensity of policy makers to give priority to short-run problems affecting their own position inhibit these policy changes. Focus is on the theory of W. Harich, (KOMMUNISMUS OHNE WACHSTUM? BABEUF UND DER CLUB OF ROME [Communism without Growth? Babeuf and the Club of Rome], Rheinbeck: Rowohlt, 1975) a philosopher from the German Democratic Republic who argued for rigid centralization of political & economic power at the global level. Although Harich did not include concepts such as `liberty', `democracy', & `constitution' in his theory, this can be compared to some of the political reactions to the challenge in Western Europe. Proposals made by Tinbergen & the Mansholt plan however are found to be more promising. 3 Figures. Modified HA.

THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION IS PURSUED ALONG ECOLOGICAL LINES, FOCUSING ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF POLITICS & ADMINISTRATION. IF POLITICS IS DEFINED IN TERMS OF VALUES, POWER, & PUBLIC POLICY, THEN AN ADMINISTRATOR MAY BE CONSIDERED A 'POLITICIAN' IN MANY RESPECTS, ALTHOUGH HE IS OPERATING IN A MORE STRUCTURED CONTEXT & SUBJECT TO DIFFERENT NORMS (ADMINISTRATIVE OUTPUT-CULTURE, VS POLITICIAN'S INPUT-CULTURE). WHETHER CORRUPTION IS DEFINED AS THE VIOLATION OF NORMS, AS SELF-INTERESTED BEHAVIOR, OR AS A TRANSACTION, THE VARIOUS FORMS OF CORRUPTION MAY BE EXPLAINED BY THE CONFUSION & OVERLAP OF POLITICS & ADMINISTRATION. OFFICIAL POSITIONS MAY SERVE AS SPOILS, USED AS POLITICAL RESOURCE, OR CORRUPT LOYALITIES MAY GUIDE AN ADMINISTRATOR'S BEHAVIOR; THE LATTER MAY BE RELATED TO THE INFORMAL ORGANIZATION WITHIN THE BUREAUCRACY OR TO THE SOCIAL & POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, INTERNAL BUREAUCRATIC COMPETITION & ENVIRONMENTAL NEEDS FOR CORRUPT INFLUENCE ON PUBLIC POLICY ARE ESPECIALLY STRONG BECAUSE OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS, DISRUPTIVE CONTACT BETWEEN TRADITIONAL & WESTERN NORMS & ROLES, & BECAUSE OF AN INCREASING IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION UPON THE CULTURALLY DISTANT LOCAL COMMUNITIES. CULTURAL CONFUSION & POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF MANY GROUPS LEAVE CORRUPTION AS THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC POLICY AT THE OUTPUT STAGE. MODIFIED HA.