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Why do some states resist entering into international treaty regimes while others demonstrate eagerness to participate? Drawing on United Nations treaty ratification data from three different issue areas - arms control, environment and human rights - this volume focuses on the United States and China to study the participation patterns of democracies and non-democracies in international treaty regimes.

Cover -- Half Title -- Dedication -- Title page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1 Conceptualizing State Participation and Resistance with Multilateral Treaty Regimes -- Analytical Case Studies -- Domestic Politics and Treaty Participation -- Realist International Relations Theory and Interstate Cooperation -- Multilateralism as a Loose System of Global Governance -- Foreign Policy Behavior of the Democracies -- Integrating Domestic and International Politics -- 2 Probing the Organizational Structure of Treaty Regimes and its Influence on Participation and Resistance -- Evolution of Multilateral Treaties -- Participation in Treaties -- Why States Join Treaties -- Consent with Treaties and State Participation -- Participation in Treaties and Levels of Consent -- Resistance to Participation in Treaties -- Domestic Political Structure as a Source of Participation and Resistance -- Identifying Domestic Social Norms -- Cross-National Analysis of Treaty Ratification -- Global Environmental Treaties -- 3 State Participation in Multilateral Environmental and Security Regimes -- Multilateral Treaties -- Data on Domestic Polities -- Multilateral Environmental Treaty Regimes -- Choice of MEAs for Treaty Participation Analysis -- State Participation in Multilateral Environmental Treaties -- Assessing Participation in Multilateral Environmental Treaties -- Controlling the Spread of WMD through Multilateral Treaties -- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime -- Other Types of Arms Control Agreements -- WMD Capable States and Arms Control Regimes -- Participation in Multilateral Arms Control Agreements -- 4 State Participation in Multilateral Human Rights Regimes -- United Nations Human Rights Treaty System -- State Participation in Human Rights Conventions

Political leaders are ultimately responsible for their country's foreign policy, but our understanding of how executive turnover affects the likelihood of international treaty ratification remains limited. For contributing to this debate, I define leader change as the replacement of the executive leader by a new one who relies on different social groups for support. Focusing then on those cases where new leaders can assume office only from predecessors who plausibly supported treaty ratification, I expect that—in light of the predecessor's support for an agreement and the change in the domestic support base—leadership turnover makes ratification less likely. The empirical implication is tested with quantitative methods using data on multilateral treaties of the post–Cold War era. The main findings and a series of additional analyses provide strong and robust evidence for the theoretical argument. This research sheds new light on the determinants of multilateral cooperation as well as the role of government leaders in international affairs and foreign-policy decision-making.

Extradition — Treaties — Limits on extradition — Extradition Treaty between Czech Republic and Republic of Moldova — European Convention on Extradition, 1957 — Czech Republic seeking to extradite Moldovan complainant to Moldova — Whether substantial grounds for believing complainant at risk of torture if extradited — Whether extradition would violate Article 3 of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950Human rights — Prohibition of torture — Whether complainant at risk of torture if extradited to Moldova — Human rights treaties — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 3 — Case law of European Court of Human Rights — Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984 — Whether obligations under human rights treaties having priority over obligations under extradition treatiesTreaties — Human rights treaties — Extradition treaties — Obligations under treaties — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 3 — Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984 — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 — Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic, 1992, Article 7(2) — European Convention on Extradition, 1957 — Extradition Treaty between Czech Republic and Moldova — Whether obligations under human rights treaties or obligations under extradition treaties having priority in event of conflictRelationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — Human rights treaties — European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Article 3 — Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984 — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 — Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Czech Republic, 1992, Article 7(2) — Extradition treaties — European Convention on Extradition, 1957 — Extradition Treaty between Czech Republic and Moldova — Obligations under human rights treaties — Obligations under extradition treaties — Priority of obligations in event of conflict — Article 1(1) of Constitution of Czech Republic — Governance of State by rule of law — Amendment to Constitution — Whether altering status of human rights agreements as special group of norms — The law of the Czech Republic

This article develops an empirical framework for analysing the timing of international treaties. Atreaty is modelled as a dynamic game among governments that decide on participation in every period.The net benefit of treaty membership increases over time. Spillovers among members and non-membersaccelerate or delay treaty formation by transforming participation into a strategic complement or substitute,respectively. The predictions of the model inform the estimation of the structural parameters, based on across section of treaty ratification dates.With this approach, I estimate the sign and magnitude of strategicinteraction in the ratification of the Montreal Protocol, in the formation of Europe's preferential tradeagreements, and in the growth of Germany's network of bilateral investment treaties. Through a seriesof counterfactual experiments, I explore different mechanisms that give rise to strategic interaction in theformation of these treaties.

AbstractThis research note introduces the International Treaty Ratification Votes Database, which covers more than 6,000 votes on the ratification of international treaties in Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States between 1990 and 2019. In addition, the database presents data on the voting behavior of ninety parties in eight of these countries, resulting in more than 11,000 party observations. The research note presents the two datasets with their two units of analysis, the parliamentary and the party level, and describes the main variables, reaching from descriptive vote and cabinet data to issue areas, comparative party family classifications, and actual voting records. Furthermore, we suggest avenues for using the data for future research on the domestic politics of foreign policy: Our data can be used to study patterns in the politicization of international treaties and organizations, ratification delays, legislative–executive relations, the party politics of foreign policy making, and the crisis of the liberal international order.