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The contradictions and conflicts were, are and will be widespread. There are in all human communities, even in the world of politics, economy and finance. A potential source of conflicts are contradictions. When a conflict of interest is disclosed, a conflict situation arises. In addition to the conflict that brings positive effects there are also destructive conflicts that contribute to the disorganization states, regional communities, institutions and firms. The contradictions of financial interests and destructive conflicts in the sphere of finance are at the heart of research undertaken in this article. The key research problem is therefore the answer to the question of how to minimize the negative consequences of destructive conflicts in the sphere of finance. The main objective is to develop a theoretical and methodological framework for the theory of conflicts in the financial sphere, and to formulate an original concept of good integrated governance, based mainly on assumptions of ordoliberalism. ; Sprzeczności i konflikty były, są i będą zjawiskiem powszechnym i wszechobecnym. Występują we wszystkich ludzkich wspólnotach, również w świecie polityki, gospodarki i finansów. Potencjalnym źródłem konfliktów są sprzeczności. Kiedy sprzeczność interesów zostaje ujawniona, powstaje sytuacja konfliktowa. Oprócz konfliktów interesów, które przynoszą skutki pozytywne, występują też konflikty destruktywne, które przyczyniają się do dezorganizacji państw, społeczności regionalnych, instytucji i przedsiębiorstw. Sprzeczności interesów finansowych i konflikty destruktywne w sferze finansów znajdują się w centrum rozważań w niniejszym artykule. Kluczowym problemem badawczym jest odpowiedź na pytanie o sposoby minimalizowania negatywnych konsekwencji konfliktów destruktywnych w sferze finansów. Celem głównym jest opracowanie podstaw/ram teoretyczno-metodycznych do teorii konfliktów w sferze finansów wraz ze sformułowaniem oryginalnej koncepcji good integrated governance, opartej głównie na założeniach ordoliberalizmu.

This article describes why the Polish government has pushed for an invocation to Christian traditions in the European Union Constitution. It is ar- gued that this is a rather 'unfortunate' outcome of the political alliance between the Catholic Church and the Polish left, especially between President Alek- sander Kwas ́niewski and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). This alliance al- lowed the SLD to legitimize their rule in the post-socialist Poland, and it was a result of a political competition between them and the post-Solidarnos ́c ́ elites. As a result, John Paul II became the central integrative metaphor for the Polish society at large, which brought back in the marginalized as well as allowed the transition establishment to win the EU accession referendum in 2003. The arti- cle (which was written when Leszek Miller was still Prime Minister) demon- strates how this alliance crystallized and presents various elements of the cult of the Pope in Poland that followed. Finally, it argues that the worship of the Pope is not an example of nationalism, but of populism, understood not as a peripheral but as a central political force, and advocates for more research on the 'politics of emotions' at work in the centers and not in peripheries.

In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance faced its most serious predicament since the ColdWar. Its mission in Afghanistan revealed growing discrepancies between the member states. The Georgian crisis of 2008, the missile defence project and the enlargement showed a lack of coherence. NATO has split up into two or more factions. A crucial question arose as to NATO's ability to resolve the three main strategic dilemmas which have grown more pressing since the end of the ColdWar: (1) the choice between collective defence as the key role of NATO (Art. 5) and its out-of-area role of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism; (2) the choice between the transatlantic nature of NATO and its global partnerships; (3) the choice between the concept of the global military engagement of NATO and the so called comprehensive approach involving the cooperation of NATO with other security organizations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE in reconstructing post-conflict regions. NATO's performance in managing these challenges will bear critically on its future. The Strategic Concept from Lisbon 2010 has helped to clarify many controversial issues within the organization. NATO has managed to mitigate the risk of developing into a multi-tier organization. Relations between the factions have relaxed although interests appear to remain as diverse as they were before. ; In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance faced its most serious predicament since the ColdWar. Its mission in Afghanistan revealed growing discrepancies between the member states. The Georgian crisis of 2008, the missile defence project and the enlargement showed a lack of coherence. NATO has split up into two or more factions. A crucial question arose as to NATO's ability to resolve the three main strategic dilemmas which have grown more pressing since the end of the ColdWar: (1) the choice between collective defence as the key role of NATO (Art. 5) and its out-of-area role of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism; (2) the choice between the transatlantic nature of NATO and its global partnerships; (3) the choice between the concept of the global military engagement of NATO and the so called comprehensive approach involving the cooperation of NATO with other security organizations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE in reconstructing post-conflict regions. NATO's performance in managing these challenges will bear critically on its future. The Strategic Concept from Lisbon 2010 has helped to clarify many controversial issues within the organization. NATO has managed to mitigate the risk of developing into a multi-tier organization. Relations between the factions have relaxed although interests appear to remain as diverse as they were before.

Z powodu kryzysu irackiego i na skutek operacji w Afganistanie Sojusz znalazł się w najpoważniejszym impasie od zakończenia zimnej wojny. Coraz wyrazistsze rozbieżności doprowadziły do wytworzenia się kilku nurtów w obrębie państw członkowskich. Przywrócenie spójności Sojuszu zależy od rozwiązania lub złagodzenie kilku strategicznych dylematów: 1) między zachowaniem funkcji obrony zbiorowej symbolizowanej przez art. V i zasady odstraszania a funkcją out of area czyli zadaniami polegającym m.in. na zwalczaniu zagrożeń takich jak terroryzm, proliferacja broni masowego rażenia na obszarze pozatraktatowym; 2) pomiędzy transatlantyckim charakterem NATO a dążeniem do globalizacji, czyli nawiązywania partnerstw strategicznych z państwami z innych regionów świata i koncepcją uczynienia z NATO patrona nowej globalnej sieci bezpieczeństwa; 3) pomiędzy koncepcją realizowania zadań przez NATO wyłącznie w wymiarze militarnym a koncepcją całościowego podejścia, zakładającego obecność również wymiaru cywilnego, czyli przede wszystkim kooperację z innymi organizacjami jak ONZ, UE, OBWE dla realizacji nowego typu zadań rekonstrukcyjnych na obszarach pokonfliktowych. Koncepcja strategiczna przyniosła wyklarowanie stanowiska Sojuszu w wielu kontrowersyjnych sprawach. Ryzyko uformowania się kilku nurtów zmalało. W stosunkach między sojusznikami zmniejszyło się napięcie, chociaż różnice pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi zdają się utrzymywać ; In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, the North Atlantic Alliance faced its most serious predica- ment since the Cold War. Its mission in Afghanistan revealed growing discrepancies between the member states. The Georgian crisis of 2008, the missile defence project and the enlargement showed a lack of coherence. NATO has split up into two or more factions. A crucial question arose as to NATO's ability to resolve the three main strategic dilemmas which have grown more pressing since the end of the Cold War: (1) the choice between collective defence as the key role of NATO (Art. 5) and its out-of-area role of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass de - struction and international terrorism; (2) the choice between the transatlantic nature of NATO and its global partnerships; (3) the choice between the concept of the global military engagement of NATO and the so called comprehensive approach involving the cooperation of NATO with other security organizations such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE in reconstructing post-conflict regions. NATO's performance in managing these challenges will bear critically on its future. The Strategic Concept from Lisbon 2010 has helped to clarify many controversial is - sues within the organization. NATO has managed to mitigate the risk of developing into a multi-tier organization. Relations between the factions have relaxed although interests appear to remain as diverse as they were before.

Celem artykułu było przedstawienie możliwych obszarów współpracy Sojuszu Północno-atlantyckiego z Unią Europejską wobec obecnych oraz przyszłych zagrożeń. Niejednokrotnie partnerstwo Euroatlantyckie ucieleśnione w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim, służy Europejczykom za usprawiedliwienie dla ich ucieczki od strategicznej odpowiedzialności i delegowania na Stany Zjednoczone trwałego zarządzania regionalnym bezpieczeństwem, czy światową stabilnością. WPBiO jest narzędziem cywilno-wojskowym polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej. Podobnie jak NATO musi pozostać narzędziem militarnej solidarności Stanów Zjednoczonych i Europy. Konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński oraz ataki terrorystyczne w Europie i na świecie stały się wielkim sprawdzianem dla systemu bezpieczeństwa na obszarze Euroatlantyckim oraz wielką szansą na zacieśnienie stosunków pomiędzy Unią Europejską a NATO. Obecna sytuacja pokazuje, że Sojusz Północnoatlantycki oraz Unia Europejska nie mogą bagatelizować aktualnych zagrożeń. Powinny natomiast konsekwentnie realizować wspólne ustalenia, stosując "twardą politykę" wobec ekspansji Rosji oraz Państwa Islamskiego. Pojęcie Euroatlantycki interes narodowy z punktu widzenia retoryki jest niewątpliwie oksymoronem. Z punktu widzenia polityki określa jednak sprawę pilną i absolutnie konieczną zarówno dla państw członkowskich Sojuszu, jak i dla samej Unii Europejskiej. ; The purpose of the article was to present the possible areas of cooperation the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to the current or future threats. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership often embodied in the North Atlantic Alliance, serves Europeans as an alibi for their escape from a strategic responsibility and delegation to the United States sustainable management of regional security and global stability. CSDP is a tool for civil-military foreign policy of the European Un¬ion. Like NATO must remain a tool of the United States military solidarity and Europe. Rus- sian-Ukrainian conflict and terrorist attacks in Europe and the world has become a big test for the security system on the Euro-Atlantic area and a great opportunity for the strengthening of rela¬tions between the European Union and NATO. The current situation shows that NATO and the European Union cannot underestimate the current threats. By contrast, they should consistently implement joint arrangements with a tough policy towards Russia and the expansion of the Islamic State. The concept of "Euro-Atlantic national interest" from the point of view of rhetoric is clearly an oxymoron. From a policy perspective, however, a matter of urgency sets and absolutely necessary for both the Allies and the European Union itself.

The purpose of the article was to present the possible areas of cooperation the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to the current or future threats. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership often embodied in the North Atlantic Alliance, serves Europeans as an alibi for their escape from a strategic responsibility and delegation to the United States sustainable management of regional security and global stability. CSDP is a tool for civil-military foreign policy of the European Union. Like NATO must remain a tool of the United States military solidarity and Europe. Russian-Ukrainian conflict and terrorist attacks in Europe and the world has become a big test for the security system on the Euro-Atlantic area and a great opportunity for the strengthening of relations between the European Union and NATO. The current situation shows that NATO and the European Union cannot underestimate the current threats. By contrast, they should consistently implement joint arrangements with a tough policy towards Russia and the expansion of the Islamic State. The concept of "Euro-Atlantic national interest" from the point of view of rhetoric is clearly an oxymoron. From a policy perspective, however, a matter of urgency sets and absolutely necessary for both the Allies and the European Union itself. ; Celem artykułu było przedstawienie możliwych obszarów współpracy Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego z Unią Europejską wobec obecnych oraz przyszłych zagrożeń. Niejednokrotnie partnerstwo Euroatlantyckie ucieleśnione w Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckim, służy Europejczykom za usprawiedliwienie dla ich ucieczki od strategicznej odpowiedzialnooeci i delegowania na Stany Zjednoczone trwałego zarządzania regionalnym bezpieczeństwem, czy światową stabilnooecią. WPBiO jest narzędziem cywilno-wojskowym polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej. Podobnie jak NATO musi pozostać narzędziem militarnej solidarności Stanów Zjednoczonych i Europy. Konflikt rosyjsko-ukraiński oraz ataki terrorystyczne w Europie i na świecie stały się wielkim sprawdzianem dla systemu bezpieczeństwa na obszarze Euroatlantyckim oraz wielką szansą na zaciśnienie stosunków pomiędzy Unią Europejską a NATO. Obecna sytuacja pokazuje, że Sojusz Północnoatlantycki oraz Unia Europejska nie mogą bagatelizować aktualnych zagrożeń. Powinny natomiast konsekwentnie realizować wspólne ustalenia, stosując "twardą politykę" wobec ekspansji Rosji oraz Państwa Islamskiego. Pojęcie Euroatlantycki interes narodowy z punktu widzenia retoryki jest niewątpliwie oksymoronem. Z punktu widzenia polityki określa jednak sprawę pilną i absolutnie konieczną zarówno dla państw członkowskich Sojuszu, jak i dla samej Unii Europejskiej.

Poland's natural gas supplies dependence from the Russian Federation was negatively assessed by Polish political groups. Politicians from many parties raised validity of building a diversified import structure of this commodity, and an important concept, which was considered over the years, was energy cooperation with Norway. The aim of the article is therefore to analyze the political thought of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish People's Party parties in the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The main research paradigm used in the text was the analysis of testimonies and traces of political thought. Taking up the topic was important due to the lack of studies in which we can find the results of original studies on the position of political parties in the context of building this pipeline. ; Uzależnienie Polski od dostaw gazu ziemnego z Federacji Rosyjskiej było negatywnie oceniane przez polskie ugrupowania polityczne. Politycy wielu partii podnosili zasadność budowy zróżnicowanej struktury importu tego surowca, a ważną, rozważaną przez lata koncepcją energetyczną była współpraca z Norwegią. Celem artykułu jest analiza myśli politycznej Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej oraz Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego w odniesieniu do budowy gazociągu Baltic Pipe. Główny paradygmat badawczy, zastosowany w tekście, stanowi analiza świadectw i śladów myśli politycznej. Podjęcie badanego tematu było istotne z uwagi na brak opracowań, w których można znaleźć efekty autorskich studiów dotyczących stanowiska partii politycznych w kontekście budowy tego gazociągu.

Sorbian National Party / Lusatian Alliance as a National Minority and Regional PartyLusatian Sorbs are the smallest Slavic ethnic group. They live in Lusatia, which is part of the German states of Saxony and Brandenburg. The Lusatian Sorbs engage in political activities at the local, regional, state and national levels. In 2005, the Sorbian National Party (in the Lower Sorbian language: Serbska ludowa strona, SLS) was founded, and in 2010 its name was changed to the Lusatian Alliance (Łužyska alianca, ŁA). The Party's leader is Hannes Kell. The organisation is both a national minority and a regional party. The Party's programme includes the introduction of equal status of both German and Lusatian languages within the Sorbian territory, promotion of the Lusatian language in Lusatia, obtaining political autonomy for Lusatian Sorbs, as well as striving for the reduction and eventual closure of open pit lignite mining, which causes damage to the environment and destroys the region's villages. The Lusatian Alliance desires to hold a democratic election and appoint Sorbian authorities that would have a budget at their disposal to financially manage and oversee Sorbian education.

The main purpose of this article is to present the phenomenon of forming of main political parties in Poland during the 1990s such as Electoral Action "Solidarność" (AWS) and Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Moreover, the article partly describes the polish party system and process of its consolidation. The author puts an emphasis on the significance of the parliamentary elite in this process and its influence on existence of political parties. The article has been divided into two parts describing history of formation and typical features of each party. The author made an attempt to create the model of consolidation of political party in Poland and outlined its most important elements such as the cause and aim of integration and internal structure of political party. Taking into consideration the consolidation of SLD and AWS there is a visible inability of forming, one, universal model of integration process. It appears that the participating in elections is the only thing that presented parties had in common.

This article analyses the problem of Israelites forming an alliance in diff erent times chiefl y described in the Pentateuch. Many existing exegetic commentaries lack a clear answer explaining the extent of the prohibition to ally with Gentiles described in Ex 23:32; 34:12; Deut 7:2 and Judg 2:2. The author wants to give a full answer to the question why the prohibition concerns only the nations neighboring Israel after the chosen people started to occupy the Promised Land; or perhaps it also concerns the Gentile nations that neighbored Israel. Should the prohibition be interpreted restrictively or extensively? One should also defi ne the necessity of the prohibition, that is what it actually concerned — any sort of signing a pact with Gentiles or merely the realm of purity of faith so as to dodge the temptation of idolatry. An attempt to answer these questions will broaden the knowledge about these important times of the chosen people. ; This article analyses the problem of Israelites forming an alliance in diff erent times chiefl y de-scribed in the Pentateuch. Many existing exegetic commentaries lack a clear answer explaining the extent of the prohibition to ally with Gentiles described in Ex 23:32; 34:12; Deut 7:2 and Judg 2:2. The author wants to give a full answer to the question why the prohibition concerns only the nations neighboring Israel after the chosen people started to occupy the Promised Land; or perhaps it also concerns the Gentile nations that neighbored Israel. Should the prohibition be interpreted restric-tively or extensively? One should also defi ne the necessity of the prohibition, that is what it actually concerned — any sort of signing a pact with Gentiles or merely the realm of purity of faith so as to dodge the temptation of idolatry. An attempt to answer these questions will broaden the knowledge about these important times of the chosen people

Zsfassung in rumen. und engl. Sprache. Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: Alliance with Romania in Poland's foreign policy between 1918 and 1931

The author analyses the North Atlantic Alliance through the prism of community of values as the foundation of the system of collective self-defence. The starting point of the discussion was the construction of a "security community" by the states of the western hemisphere in order to repel the direct existential threat from the USSR. This constructed 'community' proved to be an institution capable of transformation – after the end of the 'Cold War' – in the face of new security threats. The 21st century has confronted the Allies and NATO with new challenges. These challenges come both from counter-system states – strategic rivals – and from within the Alliance itself, from states rejecting common values. The subjects of an in-depth comparative analysis are: internal challenges, examined in the form of case studies; the "hub and spokes system", treated as a possible alternative to the Alliance; and NATO's internal study – a report on challenges and the possibilities of meeting them. The author presents a catalogue of existential internal challenges with which NATO is confronted and the organisation's search for ways to cope with these challenges. He presents an alternative model of bilateral alliances as a way to ensure security of the western hemisphere in case of NATO's inability to survive. The aim of the study is to answer the question within the framework of the disjunctive alternative: will it be possible to transform (by the parties to the Washington Treaty) NATO into a community of values? Or will it be necessary to replace NATO with a network of bilateral agreements, that is, to replace the plurilateral institution with structured bilateral cooperation? The study is based on the conclusions of a legal survey of primary sources and representative literature on the subject. ; The author analyses the North Atlantic Alliance through the prism of community of values as the foundation of the system of collective self-defence. The starting point of the discussion was the construction of a "security community" by the states of the western hemisphere in order to repel the direct existential threat from the USSR. This constructed 'community' proved to be an institution capable of transformation – after the end of the 'Cold War' – in the face of new security threats. The 21st century has confronted the Allies and NATO with new challenges. These challenges come both from counter-system states – strategic rivals – and from within the Alliance itself, from states rejecting common values. The subjects of an in-depth comparative analysis are: internal challenges, examined in the form of case studies; the "hub and spokes system", treated as a possible alternative to the Alliance; and NATO's internal study – a report on challenges and the possibilities of meeting them. The author presents a catalogue of existential internal challenges with which NATO is confronted and the organisation's search for ways to cope with these challenges. He presents an alternative model of bilateral alliances as a way to ensure security of the western hemisphere in case of NATO's inability to survive. The aim of the study is to answer the question within the framework of the disjunctive alternative: will it be possible to transform (by the parties to the Washington Treaty) NATO into a community of values? Or will it be necessary to replace NATO with a network of bilateral agreements, that is, to replace the plurilateral institution with structured bilateral cooperation? The study is based on the conclusions of a legal survey of primary sources and representative literature on the subject.

The US — Jordan relations, both during and after the Cold War, can be described as close, based on the pursuit of common goals and mutual respect. Although the United States of America and the Kingdom of Jordan have never concluded a formal treaty with each other, they cooperated on many levels, in the Middle‑Eastern region and internationally, both during the second half of the 20th century and in the first two decades of the 21st century. Despite the complex geopolitical situation in the Middle East, re‑occurring threats and challenges that may have weakened the bilateral relations between the two states, the informal alliance between the US and Jordan have survived, which is indicative of the importance of these relations and the strength of the partnership. The place and role of Amman in the foreign policy of Washington have many aspects and dimensions. One can observe certain evolution of the position that consecutive American governments attributed to Jordan depending on conditions that have been both extra‑regional (the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union) and intra‑regional (the three Gulf Wars, the Middle‑Eastern peace process). It is also important to emphasize that after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the mutual relations have gained a different, more strategic dimension. Hence, it can be argued that Jordan's importance in the US foreign policy has only reached its pinnacle during the post‑Cold War era. The present article seeks to pinpoint the place and role of the Kingdom of Jordan in the US policy towards the Middle East after the Cold War and to define the character of the relationship between the two states. Its main goal is to identify and describe both positive and negative factors determining the US — Jordan relations. The article will also attempt to answer the questions about the extent to which the Arab Spring has influenced the shape of the mutual links between Washington and Amman.